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PREFACE
On May 31, 1951, new and significant changes in the field of 
military justice were introduced. The Uniform Code of Military Justice 
became effective, and with it, by executive order of President Harry S, 
Truman, the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951.
A unique and important feature of the new Code was the establish­
ment of the United States Court of Military Appeals. This new Court, 
composed of three civilian judges, was created by Congress, as a reviewing 
authority for significant cases in military justice. Congress also re­
quired the Court, in conjunction with the Judge Advocates General of the 
armed forces, to survey the operations of the Code, to report on the 
status of military justice, and to make pertinent recommendations.
During the past fifteen years the Court has rendered more than 
two thousand opinions, and has docketed almost twenty thousand cases.
It has admitted more than twelve thousand attorneys to the bar. Yet 
this "Court of Last Resort" in the nation's largest judicial system 
has received a disproportionate share of public recognition.
The purpose of this thesis is to collect pertinent information 
about the operation of the United States Court of Military Appeals, and 
to study the effects of its decisions safeguarding constitutional rights 
in military justice. In pursuing this objective, I have freely quoted 
from the Uniform Code and the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 
1951.
li
Chapter I, Background, is largely based on Winthrop's Military 
Law and the Congressional Record. Chapter II and III, on Congressional 
Legislative History and reports on The Uniform Code. Chapter IV and V 
are based on study of cases germane to the subject of constitutional 
rights, and personal experience. Chapter VI is based upon reports of 
the Court and the Congressional Record. In a number of instances the 
same material is discussed in several places; this is necessary to avoid 
cumbersome cross-referencing. Tables have been compiled from official 
data.
Thanks are due to the faculty of the Political Science Department 
of the University of North Dakota for guidance and motivation. My 
personal interest in military justice (after more than twenty years 
diversified military assignments with intermittent duty as investigator, 
counsel, court member, and accuser) was sparked to unite with an academic 
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ABSTRACT
This study was undertaken to examine the operation of the 
United States Court of Military Appeals, and the effects of that Court's 
decisions upon military justice in the armed services. Of particular 
interest was the Court's concern for safeguarding the constitutional 
rights of military personnel.
Extensive study of cases revealed an improving trend in the 
administration of military justice at the trial and investigative level 
and an increasing concern at all command levels for fairness and im­
partiality in military judicial proceedings. Study of congressional 
hearings on constitutional rights of military personnel confirmed that 
there has been remarkable progress from the ancient condition of military 
servitude to the modern position of recognition of the serviceman as an 
individual citizen.
From the results of this study, it is apparent that the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice provides protections for an accused serviceman, 
that are equal to and in many regards superior to civilian systems of 
justice. Furthermore, the United States Court of Military Appeals, 
through its painstaking dedication to protect those accused of crime, 
has had a profound effect on the quality of military justice.
vii
INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Code of Military Justice is the law designed by 
Congress to be uniformly applicable to the Army, the Navy, the Air 
Force and the Coast Guard in time of war or peace. It is a monumental 
piece of legislation; its passage was preceded by lengthy hearings in 
which the viewpoint of every interest was exhaustively considered.
To reduce to an acceptable and harmonious working basis all the 
divergent views and practices of over 150 years was a magnificent 
achievement.
In this thesis I shall first refer to the historical back­
ground of military justice, the provisions of earlier codes, and the 
operations and effects of military justice prior to the enactment of 
the Uniform Code. Then, a study of the Code's legislative history, 
some comparisons with its predecessors, and its unique provisions. 
Among these provisions, by far the most revolutionary, is the 
United States Court of Military Appeals.
Next, I will trace the legislative history of this new Court, 
its composition and function, and its impact on military justice.
The Court of Military Appeals, from the very first days of its 
operation, has been the guardian of rights for all persons subject 
to the Code. In its judicial function it has applied the intent of 
Congress, the language of the Code, and the Constitution itself in 
safeguarding the rights of the accused; at the same time it has 
recognized responsibility in adhering to the disciplinary requirements
1
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of the military. To observe the Court in action I will refer to some 
of the decisions which have contributed to the case law of the military 
justice system.
Finally, there will be reference to significant changes in the 
Code since its inception, and an analysis of proposed legislation for 
the future.
CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES MILITARY JUSTICE 
Pre World War II
Military law is the specific law governing the armed forces as 
a separate community. Military justice is a system of administering 
military law. Of course there are other forms of control of human 
conduct under which the military power of a government acts. Such 
forms are (1) martial law, the temporary exercise of military 
authority over civilians, and (2) military government, the exercise 
of military authority by one nation over another. This thesis is 
primarily concerned with military justice and the individual rights 
of military personnel.
The ultimate purpose of military justice is to maintain 
military discipline and thereby strengthen national security.
Command and obedience are basic elements in all military relations, 
and it is discipline which effectively unites these elements in the 
performance of a military mission. From time to time, appropriate 
authorities have adopted various codes, rules, regulations and 
articles as instruments of military justice.
While no written military codes remain from the early times 
of the Greeks or Romans, some of the principal military offenses 
familiar to present military justice, such as desertion, mutiny, 
cowardice and the like were recognized in their armies. Many of
3
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the ancient forms of punishments have come down to this day. Such 
punishments as dishonorable discharge, servile duty, hard labor and 
many other penalties were known then as now. On the other hand, 
others such as decimation, beheading and maiming have fallen by the 
wayside through the years. Flogging, however, was adjudged in the 
United States as recently as 1862.^
The written military laws of Europe date from the Salic code 
of the fifth century. Continental military laws reached full develop­
ment by the Franks in 1532 in The "Carolina," the celebrated code of 
Emperor Charles V. Another historic example is the code of Sweden's 
King Gustavus Aldolphus, promulgated by him to his army in 1521.
The first complete British military code was that of Richard
II late in the 14th century. There subsequently evolved in 1689 the
British Articles of War, which were considerably influenced by the
code of Gustavus Adolphus. This was brought about by the service of
many English officers in the armies of Aldolphus. The statutory
2authority for the articles was the Military Act of 1689. Annually 
re-enacted with many alterations and amendments, the substance of 
the major provisions remained in effect through World War II.
In America, even before the Declaration of Independence, the 
Continental Congress had drawn up rules for the control of the army.
Only three days before George Washington took command of the Continental 
Army, the second Continental Congress had adopted the first Articles
^William Winthrop, Military Law (Washington: W. H. Morrison,
2 vols., 1886), Vol. 1, p. 4.
2Ibid., p. 7.
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of War, June 30, 1775. Many of the articles were copied from the
4Massachusetts articles of April 5, 1775. Other colonies adopted
similar codes. These articles were adopted, almost without change
from the contemporary English articles. Experience in fighting
under the British flag in four Colonial wars over a period of more
than 30 years had convinced our early legislators of the soundness of
the code. Washington served on the committee appointed, "to prepare
rules and regulations for the government of the army."
One distinctive feature in the development of our national
military law has been the enactment of timely revisions. The code
was first revised in 1776 after recommendations of a committee of five
consisting of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, John Rutledge, James Wilson
6and R. R. Livingston. The revised code was largely the recasting of 
the British articles. John Adams also had considerable responsibility 
in adapting the British Naval Articles of 1749, for the early American 
Navy. The United States Articles for the Government of the Navy, 
enacted in 1862 and amended on several occasions, were originally and 
continued to be in theory and substance, fundamentally the British 
Naval Articles.^
3Worthington C. Ford (ed.), Journals of the Continental Con­
gress: 1774-1789 (34 vols.; Washington: U. S. Government Printing
Press, 1904-37), I, p. 90.
^Jinthrop, op. cit., p. 12.
^Journals of the Continental Congress, I, p. 83.
^Ibid ., p. 365.
^Edmund M. Morgan, "The Background of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice," Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 6-169, Feb. 1953.
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The United States Articles of War were subsequently revised 
in 1786, adopted by the first Congress after the adoption of the Con­
stitution in 1789, and superceded by the articles of 1806. The next 
significant revisions were in 1874 following the Civil War experience. 
The 1916 revisions modernized court-martial proceedings, moderated 
some penalties and in general brought military justice into closer 
harmony with civil justice.
World War I had considerable impact on the administration of 
military justice, because of the large civilian components involved. 
After severe criticism of the powers of field commanders, the War 
Department enacted General Order number 7, in January 1918, directing 
that severe sentences calling for death, dismissal, or dishonorable 
discharge could be executed only after such cases had been reviewed 
by the office of the Judge Advocate General.
Critics, however, insisted that individual rights of military 
personnel should be comparable to the right of civilians and should 
be safeguarded by law. In brief they proposed a civilian appellate 
agency, similar to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for 
military justice. The military leaders held that reviewing authorities 
should be free from possible political influences and thoroughly know­
ledgeable of the nature, cause and effect of military offenses. The 
military position was sustained. The amended articles of 1920 and 
1928 were minor revisions only. This code remained in effect through
Q
World War II.
"Articles of War," Encyclopedia Americana, 1954 ed., Vol. II,
p. 356.
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Post World War II
During the course of World War II approximately 11,000,000
men saw service in the United States Army, and of that number approx-
9imately 80,000 were convicted by general courts-martial. Even before 
the cessation of hostilities it was apparent to the War Department and 
to the Congress that a detailed study of the Army system of justice 
was appropriate, if not mandatory. Accordingly, in 1944 and 1945, the 
War Department sent Col. Phillip McCook, former prominent New York 
jurist, to various theaters of operation to conduct such studies. 
Additional reports were submitted to the War Department from other 
sources.
Within a few months after the end of hostilities the matter 
was brought to the attention of the American Bar Association, and on 
March 25, 1946, the War Department Advisory Committee was established 
by the order of the Secretary of War. The committee, under the 
chairmanship of the Honorable Arthur T. Vanderbilt, and referred to 
as the Vanderbilt Committee, consisted of nine outstanding lawyers 
and Federal jurists from eight States and the District of Columbia. 
From March 25, 1946, until December 13, 1946, a period of almost 
nine months, the members of that committee engaged in studies, in­
vestigations, and hearings, and availed themselves of voluminous
statistical data of the Judge Advocate General's Department and
, 10 other sources.





At full committee hearings in Washington, the Secretary of 
War and Under Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the Commander of 
the Army Ground Forces, the Judge Advocate General, the Assistant 
Judge Advocate General, numerous other officers, and the representatives 
of five veterans' organizations were heard. There were numerous 
personal interviews, supplemented by letters, and the digesting of 
321 answers to questionaires from both military and nonmilitary 
personnel. Additional widely advertised regional public hearings 
were held at New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Raleigh, Atlanta, 
Chicago, St. Louis, Denver, San Francisco, and Seattle. The subsequent 
report of the committee was based on these extensive inquiries.'*"'*'
During the Seventy-ninth Congress a Military Affairs Sub­
committee devoted more than one year to detailed study of the Army 
System of Justice. Additional studies were conducted by special 
committees of the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, American 
Veterans, American Volunteer Corps, the Judge Advocate Generals' 
Association, The War Veterans' Bar Association, the New York County 
Lawyers' Association, and the Phi Alpha Delta law fraternity. The 
reports and recommendations of each of these groups were made available 
to the Armed Services Committee and representatives of each of the 
organizations appeared before the committee in public hearings in 
support of their recommendations. Other witnesses, who had particular
knowledge of the subject by virtue of their service and experience in






these organizations and individuals represented the most comprehensive 
study of military justice ever conducted in the history of our country.
During the Eightieth Congress the Legal Subcommittee on Armed 
Services, Representative Charles Elston, Ohio, Chairman, conducted 
extensive hearings on the same subject. That subcommittee was in 
session from April 14, 1947, until July 15, 1947, and considered all 
of the studies to that date. As a result of these hearings, the sub­
committee presented to the full committee, what is now known as 
Title 11, Public Law 759, Eightieth Congress. That bill, which per­
tained only to the Army, was included as an amendment to the Selective
13Service Act of 1948.
This law became the basis for the Articles of War, 1949, and
14was made applicable to the Air Force as well as the Army. This code
known as the Elston Act has been stoutly defended by prominent
military authorities as superior to the later Uniform Code of Military 
15Justice, 1951. A major feature was the right for enlisted personnel 
to have more direct representation on the court. Traditionally, 
court members had always been commissioned officers; now one-third of 
the membership could be enlisted. Actually this right was exercised 
in less than seven percent of courts-martial. The general feeling
13Ibid.
■^The Air Force became a separate service in 1947, but for 
several years maintained administrative and logistic relationship 
with the Army.
■^Major General Reginald C. Harmon, USAF, in several public 
statements in 1958, reaffirmed before the Senate Committee Hearings 
on Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel, 19621
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was that officers were more lenient than enlisted men sitting on 
courts. ̂
During this period, prior to the implementation of the Uniform 
Code, 1951, the Armed Forces were continually subjected to press and 
public censure for their administration of Military Justice. One 
widely circulated article, by Arthur John Keefe, Professor of Law, 
Cornell University Law School and former President (1947) of a Naval 
General Court Martial Sentence Review Board, was especially damaging.^ 
Professor Keefe stated:
Few of us know how completely different the military judicial 
system is from the civilian. When a man is inducted into the 
armed forces he leaves behind almost all of the Constitutional 
safeguards which ordinarily protect him from a capricious 
police, or from a hasty or biased judge or jury. His commanding 
officer is chief of police, district attorney, jury, trial judge 
and judge of first appeal, all in one. If he is suspected of 
breaking the law he is tried in secret by men whose principal 
purpose is to preserve Draconic discipline.
After the last war more than 20,000 cases were brought before 
the special Navy General Court-Martial Sentence Review Board 
of which I was President. In almost half of these cases we 
found flagrant miscarriages of justice and recommended radical 
reductions in sentences. The Army's clemency board likewise 
changed many thousands of punishments.-*-^
Spurred on by such denunciations and motivated by a need for 
uniformity in keeping with the reorganized defense establishment, 
additional improvements in military justice became the goal of Defense 
Secretary Forrestal. The realization of that goal, The Uniform Code 
of Military Justice, will be discussed in the next chapter.
■^Stanley Frank, "The G. I.'s Day in Court," Nations' Business, 
Jan. 1953, p. 73.
■^Arthur John Keefe, "Drum Head Justice-A Look at our Military 
Courts," Reader's Digest, Aug. 1951, pp. 39-44.
CHAPTER II
THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 
Legislative History
At the conclusion of World War II, there was considerable 
discussion and criticism of the justice systems of the Army and the 
Navy which at that time embraced all the military services. As a 
result of this criticism both departments created several independent 
boards and committees to review war-time courts-martial cases and 
also to study their court-martial systems. Many eminent members of 
the bar served on these committees. As a result of their studies, 
both the War Department and the Navy Department submitted separate 
bills, for introduction early in the Eightieth Congress, revising 
their systems of military justice. The House of Representatives 
after lengthy hearings passed the bill, House of Representatives 
2575, revising the Army courts-martial system, but no hearings 
were held on a companion bill in the Senate.'*’
During the first session of the Eightieth Congress the 
National Security Act of 1947 was enacted, unifying the armed services 
and creating a separate Department of the Air Force. Since the pro­
posed revisions of the Army and Navy justice systems differed in
■̂ Edmund M. Morgan, "The Background of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice," Vanderbilt Law Review, VI (Feb. 1953), 169
11
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many respects, and in order to avoid having a third distinct system 
established by the Air Force, the then chairman of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee suggested to the Secretary of Defense that a bill 
be prepared for introduction early in the Eighty-first Congress 
which would provide a uniform system of courts-martial for all the 
military service.^
Toward the end of the Eightieth Congress, the bill revising 
the Army courts-martial system, as passed by the House of Representa­
tives, was included as an amendment to the Selective Service Act of 
1948, during the debate in the Senate on the bill, and subsequently
became Public Law 759, Eightieth Congress. This was the Elston Act
3referred to in Chapter I.
In July of 1948, Secretary of Defense Forrestal appointed a 
special committee to draft a Uniform Code of Military Justice, uniform 
in substance and uniform in interpretation and construction, to be 
equally applicable to all of the armed forces. Professor Edmund 
Morgan, Jr., of the Harvard Law School was designated chairman, the 
remainder of the committee being Assistant Secretary of the Army 
Gordan Gray, Under Secretary of the Navy John Kenny, and Assistant 
Secretary of the Air Force Eugene Zukert. Supplementing the efforts 
of the main committee was a working group of approximately fifteen 
persons, including officer representatives of each of the services, 
and five civilian lawyers with service experience, under the chairmanship
oLegislative History: Uniform Code of Military Justice, in 
U. S. Code Congressional Service, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1949, 2222.
^U. S., Congressional Record, HR 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1950,
XCVI, 5796.
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of Mr. Felix Larkin, assistant general counsel in the Office of the
4
Secretary of Defense.
During the seven month study, the Morgan committee and the 
working group considered the revised Articles of War, the Articles 
for the Government of the Navy, the Federal Code, the penal codes of 
various States, and voluminous reports on military and naval justice 
which have been made in recent years by various distinguished persons. 
The end result of this combined effort was Senate 857, a bill to pro­
vide a Uniform Code of Military Justice, and companion bill to House 
of Representatives 4080, as amended and passed by the House of 
Representatives.
A subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee held extensive 
hearings on this bill, at which time representatives of the Morgan 
Committee, veterans' associations, bar associations, Reserve Officers 
associations, the Judge Advocates General of the armed services, and 
other qualified witnesses appeared.
The difference of opinion of those who appeared before the 
committee, or made known their views by other means, pointed for the 
most part to the particular provisions of the bill discussed below. 
These opinions were carefully considered by the committee and, where 
desirable, changes were made.
Article 2, subdivision 1, provides the general jurisdiction 
of the Uniform Code over persons in the regular omponents of the 
armed services, including volunteers, inductees, and reservists 
called into Federal service. In order to leave no doubt as to the 
point where an inductee will, be subject to the code, this subsection
"*Ibid.
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is now consistent with the Selective Service Act of 1948 to provide 
that jurisdiction will not be obtained over those who attempt to 
avoid selection or induction. Jurisdiction over these persons will 
continue to reside in the Federal courts.
Article 2, subdivision 3, was objected to by reserve 
associations on the ground that it would be used to subject reserves 
to the code when they are engaged in all types of inactive duty 
training. Although the committee made no change in this subdivision, 
it expressed the view that military departments should issue orders 
subjecting reserves to the code only when they are engaged in inactive 
duty training involving the use of dangerous or expensive equipment.
Article 3 provides a continuing jurisdiction over certain 
persons who have left the service and who heretofore have been immune 
from prosecution. Under this section, • however, such persons are 
subject to this code, whenever the Federal courts do not have juris­
diction, and when the offense is serious enough to call for at least 
five years' sentence and was committed within the statute of 
limitations.
Article 15 provides for commanding officers' non-judicial 
punishment and combines the practices of mast punishment in the 
Navy and Coast Guard and the disciplinary punishment imposed by 
commanding officers in the Army and Air Force. This punishment 
consists of withholding of privileges, restriction to specified 
limits, forfeiture of limited amounts of pay, and is not imposed 
pursuant to trial by court martial, but enables commanders to 
impose limited punishments for disciplinary purposes. In the pp-st, 
the punishments authorized have differed in the Army, Navy, and
15
Air Force. The Army and Air Force have never used confinement, or 
confinement with bread and water, as a disciplinary punishment, while 
such punishments were traditional in the Navy and Coast Guard. This 
article limits, as a disciplinary punishment imposed by commanding 
officers, confinement to seven days. It further limits confinement 
with bread and water to three days, and this punishment can only be 
used when the recipient is attached to or embarked on a vessel.
The composition of the three types of courts-martial is pro­
vided in Articles 22, 23, and 24, These articles continue, in general, 
procedures already in effect in all services and provide for the 
appointment of the members of the courts and counsel, the convening 
of the courts and the referral of charges by the President,
Secretaries of Departments, and certain commanding officers. A 
number of witnesses, principally representing bar associations, urged 
the amendment of these articles to provide a different method of 
selection of court members. They conceded that the commanding 
officers should retain the right to refer the charges for trial, 
select the trial counsel, and review the case after trial. These 
witnesses contended, however, that the authority to appoint the 
court presented the opportunity to the commander to influence the 
verdict of the court. They proposed that members of a court be 
selected by a staff judge advocate from a panel of eligible officers 
and enlisted men made available by commanding officers.
Departmental witnesses opposed these amendments and 
supported the existing method of selecting court members, on the 
ground that the military has a legitimate concern with military 
justice and the responsibility for operating it, and,that it is not
16
inappropriate for the President, the Secretaries of the Departments, 
or selected commanding officers to appoint the members of a court.
It was their position that to have the court members selected by 
judge advocates from among panels of eligibles submitted by the 
commanders was.impracticable and unwieldy, would hamper the utilization 
of persons on the panels on normal military antics, and could not 
operate efficiently in time of war. A number of added protections, 
not found in either the Articles of War or the Articles for the 
Government of the Navy, were included in this bill, such as a supreme 
civilian Court of Military Appeals, boards of review removed from the 
commander, and provisions that the law officer, trial and defense 
counsel of a general court must be trained lawyers. As an additional 
feature, the bill included strong penalties against any authority who 
attempted to influence a court. With these safeguards, the committee 
adopted the provisions recommended by the National Military Establish­
ment .
Article 26 provides the authority for a law officer of a 
general court-martial. Under previous law the Navy had no law 
officer. The Army and the Air Force have had a law officer for 
general courts-martial who, in addition to ruling upon points of 
evidence, retires, deliberates, and votes with the court on the 
findings and sentence. Officers of equal experience on this subject 
are sharply divided in their opinion as to whether the law officer 
should retire with the court and vote as a member. In view of the 
fact that the law officer is empowered to make final rulings on 
all interlocutory questions of law (except on a motion to dismiss 
and a motion relating to the accused's sanity), and under this code
17
would instruct the court upon the presumption of innocence, burden of 
proof, and elements of the offense, it was not considered desirable 
that the law officer should have the voting privileges of a member of 
the court. This is consistent with the practice in civil courts 
where the judge does not retire and deliberate with the jury.
Article 67 of the Uniform Code provides for a Court of 
Military Appeals, which is an entirely new concept in the field of 
military law. This court, composed of three civilians, appointed by 
the President and confirmed by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, is the supreme authority on the law and assures uniform inter­
pretation of substantive and procedural law. The committee believed 
it desirable to have the judges of the Court of Military Appeals
serve for a term of eight years rather than hold office during good 
6behavior. Provision is made for staggering the expiration of terms 
of the judges. This Court of Military Appeals will be discussed in 
chapter III.
Under provisions of Public Law 759, Eightieth Congress, a 
separate Judge Advocate General's Corps was established for the 
Army. No such separate legal corps exists for the Navy or the Air 
Force. The Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force opposed the 
creation of a separate legal corps within their departments at this 
time. Since the legal corps in the Department of the Army had been 
in operation only since February 1, 1949, and the advantages of such 
a corps are speculative, it was believed desirable to postpone the
^The term of office was finally set at fifteen years at the 
last conference as a compromise measure. The House wanted lifetime 
appointments.
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creation of separate legal corps within the Air Force and the Navy
until further experience is available on the operation of the corps
in the Army. The operation of this Code will not be hampered by
lack of uniformity in this respect. Restrictive qualifications were
included with respect to the appointment of future Judge Advocates
7General of the military departments.
Identical bills based on the Department of Defense draft, 
were introduced in both Houses of the first session Eighty-first 
Congress early in 1949 (S 857, HR 2498). After extensive hearings 
the House Committee on Armed Services reported out a revised version 
April 28, 1949, HR 4080 (Rep. 491). HR 4080 passed after debate with
g
some amendments Hay 5, 1949.
The Senate Committee on Armed Services after further hearings 
reported out an amended version of HR 4080 on June 10, 1949 (S. Rep.
9
486). This passed the Senate with additional amendments February 3, 
1950.^  The report of the Conference Committee (HR Rep. 1946), was 
adopted by the Senate April 15, 1950 and by the House the next day.
The President signed the bill May 5, 1950. In order to provide time
^Morgan, op. cit.
^U. S., Congressional Record, XCV, 5818-5843.
9Letter from Louis Johnson to Senator Tydings. Appendix A.
10U. S., Congressional Record, XCVI, 1321-1339, 1381-1398, 
1458-1475.
^ Ibid., 5791, 5825-5827. The conference committee included 
for the Senate: Millard E. Tydings, Estes Kefauver, Leverett 
Saltenstall, and Wayne Morse. For the House: Overton Brooks, Philip 
J. Philbin, Edward DeGraffenreid, Paul W. Shafer, and Charles H. Elston.
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for adjustment, the Uniform Code of Military Justice was not to take 
effect until May 31, 1951.
The purpose of the Uniform Code is to provide a single 
unified, consolidated and modified system of criminal 
law and judicial procedure equally applicable to all of 
the armed forces of the United States.^
Provisions Of The Code
The Code is uniformly applicable in all of its parts to the 
Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Coast Guard in time of war 
and peace. It covers both the substantive and the procedural law 
governing military justice and its administration in all of the armed 
forces of the United States. It supercedes the Articles of War, the 
Articles for the Government of the Navy, and the Disciplinary Laws of 
the Coast Guard and is the sole statutory authority for:
1. The infliction of limited disciplinary penalties for minor 
offenses without judicial action;
2. The establishment of pre-trial procedure;
3. The creation and constitution of three classes of courts- 
martial corresponding to those formerly in existence;
4. The eligibility of members of each of the courts and the 
qualifications of its officers and counsel;
5. The review of findings and sentence and the creation and 
constitution of the reviewing tribunals; and
6. The listing and definition of offenses, redrafted and re­
phrased in modern legislative language.
^Public Law 506, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. (May 5, 1950). 64
Stat. 108 (1950) 50 U. S. C. The Code was amended in 1956, 1959, 1960, 
1961, and has become Chapter 47, Title 10, U. S. Code., Amendments are 
introduced in almost every session of Congress.
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The Code, while based on the Revised Articles of War and the 
Articles for the Government of the Navy, is a consolidation and a 
complete recodification of the former statutes. Under it, personnel 
of the armed forces, regardless of the Department in which they serve, 
are subject to the same law and will be tried in accordance with the 
same procedures. The provisions of section 1 of the Code provide, for 
the first time in the history of this nation, a single law for the 
administration of military justice in the armed forces.
Among the provisions designed to secure uniformity are the 
following:
1. The offenses made punishable by the code are identical for 
all the armed forces;
2. The same system of courts with the same limits of juris­
diction of each court is set up in all the armed forces;
3. The procedure for general courts-martial is identical as 
to institution of charges, pretrial investigation, action by the con­
vening authority, review by the Board of Review, and review by the 
Court of Military Appeals in all the armed forces;
4. The rules of procedure at the trial including modes of 
proof are equally applicable to all the armed forces;
5. The Judge Advocates General of the three Departments are 
required to make uniform rules of procedure for the boards of review 
in each Department.
6. The required qualifications for members of the court, law 
officer, and counsel are identical for all of the armed forces;
7. The Court of Military Appeals, which finally decides 
questions of law, is the court of last resort for each of the armed
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forces; it also acts with the Judge Advocates General of the three 
Departments, as an advisory body with a view to securing uniformity 
in policy and in sentences, and in discovering and remedying defects 
in the system and its administration.
Among the provisions designed to insure a fair trial in a 
general court-martial are the following:
I
1. A pretrial investigation at which the accused is entitled
to be present with counsel to cross-examine available witnesses against - 
him and to present evidence in his own behalf;
2. A prohibition against referring any charge for trial which 
does not state an offense or is not shown to be supported by sufficient 
evidence;
3. A mandatory provision for a competent, legally trained 
counsel at the trial for both the prosecution and the defense;
4. A prohibition against compelling self-incrimination;
5. A provision for equal process to accused and prosecution 
for obtaining witnesses and depositions, and a provision allowing 
only the accused to use depositions in a capital case;
6. A provision giving an accused enlisted man the privilege 
of having enlisted men as members of the court trying his case;
7. A provision whereby voting on challenges, findings, and 
sentences is by secret ballot of the members of the court;
8. A provision requiring the law officer to instruct the 
court on the record, concerning the elements of the offense, pre­
sumption of innocence, and the burden of proof;
9. A provision for.an automatic review of the trial record 
for errors of law and of fact, by a board of review, with the right of 
the accused to be represented by legally competent counsel;
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10. A prohibition against receiving please of guilty in 
capital cases;
11. A provision for the review of the record for errors of 
law by the Court of Military Appeals. This review is automatic in 
cases where the sentence is death or involves a general or flag rank 
officer. A review may be requested by petition on the part of the 
accused in any sentence involving confinement of one year or more.
Among the provisions designed to insure a fair trial in 
special and summary courts-martial are the following:
1. Under former law and procedure there was great variation 
in the nomenclature, composition, procedure, and powers of the inter­
mediate military courts; this code completely eradicates all of those 
differences and establishes complete uniformity;
2. In special courts-martial it is not required that the 
defense counsel be a lawyer unless the prosecuting counsel is; both 
must be equally qualified, however; enlisted men may have enlisted 
men as members of the court; if a bad-conduct discharge is imposed, 
a full stenographic transcript must be made, and the case reviewed 
in the same manner as a general court-martial record;
3. Peremptory challenge of a member of a special court- 
martial is provided, as in a general court-martial. Voting is by 
secret ballot; review by the judge advocate or legal officer is 
required;
4. Provision is made for permitting an accused person to 
refuse trial by a summary court (trial by a designated officer) if 
he prefers to be tried by a special court-martial; he then would 
have the privilege of counsel and of having enlisted men on the court
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if he were an enlisted man; review by a judge advocate or legal officer 
is required.
Among the provisions to prevent interference with due adminis­
tration of justice are:
1. The convening authority may not refer charges for trial 
until they are found legally sufficient by the staff judge advocate 
or legal officer;
2. The staff judge advocate or legal officer is authorized 
to communicate directly with the Judge Advocate General;
3. All counsel at a general court-martial trial are required 
to be lawyers, and to be certified by the Judge Advocate General as 
qualified to perform their legal duties;
4. The law officer (a competent lawyer), rules on all questions 
raised at the trial, except on a motion for a directed verdict and on 
the issue of the accused's sanity;
5. The commander, who is the convening authority, must not 
act on a finding or sentence of a general court-martial without first 
obtaining the advice of his staff judge advocate or legal officer;
6. The board of review, located in the office of the Judge 
Advocates General and removed from the convening authority, is 
composed of legally trained men and reviews the trial record for errors 
of law and fact;
7. The Court of Military Appeals is composed of civilians 
and passes finally on all questions of law;
8. When counsel appeâ r before the board of review and the Court 
of Military Appeals, both parties must be represented by qualified 
lawyers;
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9. Censure by a commanding officer of a court-martial or any 
member or officer thereof, because of any judicial action of the court 
or any member or officer is forbidden; any attempt improperly to in­
fluence official action in any aspect of a trial or its review is pro­
hibited .
Among command functions the Code retains are:
1. Commanding officers refer the charges in general, special, 
and summary courts-martial and convene the courts;
2. Commanding officers appoint the members of the courts;
3. Commanding officers appoint the law officer and counsel 
for the trial;
4. Commanding officers retain full power to set aside findings 
of guilty and to modify or change the sentence, but are not permitted 
to interfere with verdicts of not quilty nor to increase the severity 
of the sentence imposed;
5. The powers of commanding officers at mast and company
punishment are retained, for minor offenses which require prompt
action, and for which comparitively light punishments can be imposed.
The procedural safeguards in this type of non-judicial punishment are
considerably less than in the courts-martial, but are believed to be 
, 13reasonably adequate.
Reaction
The new Uniform Code of Military Justice was greeted with 
enthusiastic acclaim by most legal authorities. But some were still
13This power was increased by major changes in Article 15,
UCMJ, effective Feb. 1, 1963.
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concerned that the reforms over command control had not gone far enough
. 14"questionably supported" constitutional rights. Others deplored the 
"lack of assurances of constitutional guarantees."^ Professor Keefe 
stated:
All this sounds fine. The new code is a step in the right 
direction, but unfortunately a short one. The codes' Punitive 
Articles are as sweeping and harsh as the old Articles of War 
which John Adams copied almost verbatim from the British 
military code of 1749. One new Article expressly forbids the 
commanding officer who convenes a court to exert any influence 
over its decision. But the commanding officer still draws the 
charge, elects the judges, appoints the law officer, names the 
prosecution and defense counsel, and himself reviews the results 
of the hearing. Lawyers or not, the officers will continue to 
avoid the "old man's" displeasure.
As for the Court of Military Appeals, it will hear automati­
cally only cases involving generals, admirals and the death 
penalty. The ordinary officer or enlisted man must ask for 
permission to appeal. This is a complicated process and the 
average soldier or sailor will have a hard time setting it in 
motion. And at that, the high court will be empowered to 
probe only for errors in law, not in fact.̂
The well known ex-military attorney, Frederick Bernays Wiener, 
in commenting on doubtful benefits said:
. . . civilian Court of Military Appeals-as to which all 
concerned, in service and out, will have to hold their 
breaths. Given qualified personnel with vision and breadth 
of understanding, it might work.^
The Association of the Bar, City of New York reported:
In an interim report on the nations new Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, which becomes effective May 31, 1951, a 
committee praised establishment of a three justice civilian 
Court of Military Appeals to review military court-martial *1
^ George Washington Law Review, XX (1951), 2
•^Georgetown Law Journal, XXXVIII (May, 1950), 521.
1 6"Arthur John Keefe, "Drum Head Justice-A Look at Our 
Military Courts," Leaders Digest (August, 1951), 44.
17
Frederick Bernays Wiener, "The Uniform Code of Military
Justice," Army (1950).
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sentences. First appointees to this court, the report said, 
would set its standard of prestige and policy and only men 
outstandingly qualified should be appointed by President 
Truman.
While the code represented a considerable advance in the 
standard of military justice, the committee regretted that 
"last ditch opposition," by high ranking officers had de­
feated efforts to remove from the commanding officer of 
an accused military prisoner the power to appoint the court 
that would try him. However, it was pointed out that the 
code would subject to court-martial any commander who 
should attempt to coerce or influence a court.
A series of editorials in the press showed continued anxiety 
about command control:
. . . it is a good Bill, as far as ,it goes, but it doesn't 
go far enough. What it does to provide like procedures in 
the various service arms is an essential part of unification 
and should be supported and approved. What it does not do 
is to meet fairly the challenge of the command role in the 
whole court-martial set up.’*'9
Its provisions for a civilian Court of Appeals, for cross 
examination at pre-trial hearings and for the presence of 
enlisted men on the courts-martial will win wide applause.^
This command control goes to the heart of military 
justice. But the new civilian judges on the Court of 
Military Appeals are empowered to make recommendations to 
improve the code, and undoubtedly one of the provisions 
they will study closely is command control. The new code, 
nevertheless, is a vast improvement over the old Articles 
and Disciplinary Laws of the Services.^
Despite these criticisms the general consensus was favorable. 
On the day the code became effective, Overton Brooks proudly addressed 
the House of Representatives:
Mr. Speaker, last year this Congress passed the bill en­
titled "A Uniform Code of Military Justice: and today this 
law takes effect throughout the armed services. It is a 
monumental piece of legislation and is intended to correct








18, 1950, p. 36.
6, 1949, p. 24.
8, 1950, p. 22.
25, 1951, p. 26
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the inequalities, inefficiencies and injustices of the old 
archaic system-or lack of system I should say-prevailing in 
the armed services.
The subcommittee of which I was chairman worked for 4 
months almost daily, including many Saturdays, on this piece 
of legislation. We reviewed every article in the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice carefully, made many changes and 
made rewrites of it. When this bill left us in the House,
I felt that it was as perfect as we could write such a 
measure at that time. I am grateful to the members of the 
subcommittee for having applied themselves most diligently 
and tirelessly, without fanfare or publicity whatsoever, 
to the extremely important job of guaranteeing justice to 
be done within the uniformed services.
Mr. Speaker, the public has not had confidence in 
justice as administered in the armed services. Rightfully 
or wrongfully comparisons, to the hurt of military justice, 
have been made with our civilian system of justice and in­
variably military justice has come out the loser. I believe 
the new Uniform Code of Military Justice will go far toward 
bringing the faith, confidence and esteem in our military 
courts to the level of that of civilian courts. Certainly 
fair, conscientious and wholehearted support of this pro- ^  
gram will go far toward eliminating the evils of the past.
The background, legislative history, provisions and initial
reactions concerning the Uniform Code of Military Justice have been
described above. The actual operation of the code will be explained
23in chapter V. The following table portraying the scope of the 
three types of courts-martial is included in an attempt to simplify 
the language of the code itself. The next chapter will be devoted 
to those provisions of the Code which were the most revolutionary 
changes, which have ever been incorporated in our military law - 
The United States Court of Military Appeals.
U. S.,Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, 
XCVII, 6013.
Table I - Based on Morris 0. Edwards and Charles L. Decker, 
The Serviceman and the Law, (Harrisburg: The Military Service 




TABLE SHOWING SCOPE OF SUMMARY, SPECIAL, AND GENERAL COURTS-MARTIAL
Special
Appointing Anyone who may convene general or 
Authority special court;
The CO of detached company, other 
detachment of Army;
The CO of detached squadron or 
other detachment of Air Force; 
The CO or OC of any other command 
when empowered by Sec. of Dept. 
(Art. 24)
Anyone who may convene general 
court;
The CO of a district, garrison, 
fort, camp, station, Air Force 
base, auxiliary airfield, or 
other place where members of 
Army or Air Force are on duty;
The CO of brigade, regiment, 
detached battalion, or corres­
ponding unit of the Army;
The CO of a wing, group, or 
separate squadron of the Air 
Force;
The CO of any vessel, shipyard, 
base, or station; the CO of 
any Marine brigade, regiment, 
detached battalion, or corres­
ponding unit; the CO of any 
Marine barracks, wing, group, 
separate squadron, station 
base, auxiliary airfield, or 
other place where members of 
the Marine Corps are on duty;
The CO of any separate or de­
tached command or group of de­
tached units of any of the armed 
forces placed under a single 
commander for this purpose;
The CO or OC of any other command 




Pres, of U. S., Sec. of a 
Dept., CO of a Territorial 
Dept., an Army Group, an 
Army, an Army Corps, a 
division, a separate bri­
gade, or a corresponding 
unit of the Army or Marine 
Corps;
The C-in-C of a fleet, the 
CO of a naval station or 
larger shore activity of 
the Navy beyond the con­
tinental limits of the 
U. S.;
The CO of an air command, 
an air force, an air 
division, or a separate 
wing of the Air Force or 
Marine Corps;
Such other CO's as may be 
designated by the Sec. 
of a Dept.;
Any other CO in any of the 
armed forces when empow­






Members 1 (An officer) 3 5 (Plus a law officer)
Persons
Triable
Enlisted persons only who do not 
object (unless they have been 
permitted to elect and have re­
fused non-judicial punishment 
under Art. 16).
Any person subject to Code. 
(Par 15 MCM)
Any person subject to Code. 
(Par 14 MCM)
Offenses Non-capital (same exception as for 
special courts). (Par 16 MCM)
Non-capital, (except general 
court-martial authority may 
cause certain capital cases to 
be tried by special court- 
martial) . (Par 15 MCM)






Confinement 1 mo., or hard labor 
without confinement, 45 days, 
or restriction, 2 mos., and 
Forfeiture 2/3 of 1 month's pay. 
Reduction in grade (Art. 20; Par 
16b MCM)
Confinement 6 mos., and for­
feiture of 2/3 pay per month 
for 6 mos.
Reduction in grade.
Hard labor without confine­
ment, 3 mos. (on enlisted 
persons only).
Bad conduct discharge (com­
plete record must be kept).
(Art. 19)
Any authorized punishment 
(including death, dis­
missal, dishonorable 








Officer exercising general court- 
martial jurisdiction (or other 
designated authority). (Par 91c 
MCM)
Officer exercising general court- 
martial jurisdiction (or other 
designated authority).
Judge Advocate General's office 
in case of those involving bad 
conduct discharges. (Par 91b 
MCM)




THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS 
Legislative History
The earliest legislative reference to a Court of Military
Appeals appears in Senate 64, a bill "To establish Military Justice,"
introduced by Senator Chamberlain in the 66th Congress, 1st Session.
This bill, in Article 52, provided for a Court of Military Appeals
consisting of three judges appointed by the President. However, the
amended bill, as reported out of committee and enacted into law
(known as the 1920 Articles of War),-*- did not contain the provision
for a Court of Military Appeals. On the other hand it did provide
statutory authority for the appointment of Boards of Review in the
2Office of The Judge Advocate General, in Article 50%. After World 
War II, in March 1946, the Secretary of War appointed the War Depart­
ment's Advisory Committee on Military Justice. This committee, 
commonly known as the Vanderbilt Committee, in December 1946 specifically 
recommended that The Board of Review Authority be revised.
A. The checking of command control
The final review of all general court-martial cases should 
be placed in the Department of the Judge Advocate General 
and every such review should be made by The Judge Advocate 





theater of operations, or by such a board or boards as shall be 
designated by The Judge Advocate General or the Assistant. The 
reviewing authority shall have the power to review every case 
as to the weight of the evidence, to pass upon the legal 
sufficiency of the record and to mitigate, or set aside, the 
sentence and to order a new trial. This recommendation re­
lates not only to checking command control but also importantly 
to the correction of disparity between sentences.
In order to make this recommendation effective, Article of 
War 50% should be amended. In its present form it is almost 
unintelligible. It should be rewritten and the procedure pre­
scribed should be made clear and more definite. There seems 
to be no good reason why cases in which dishonorable discharge 
is suspended should not be reviewed in the same way as are 
cases in which it is not suspended.
As a result of this recommendation, the Elston Bill, which was
4enacted in 1948 as amendments to the Articles of War, repealed 
Article 50%. This bill provided for review of all courts-martial cases 
involving a general officer or sentences of death, dismissal, dishonor­
able, or bad-conduct discharge. It also provided, in Article 50, for 
a Judicial Council composed of three general officers of the Judge 
Advocate General's Corps. At the time of the enactment of the Elston 
Bill there was considerable activity and agitation by veterans' 
organizations and bar associations for Congress to take some action 
to preclude "Command control" in courts-martial proceedings.
In June 1948 the Secretary of Defense appointed a committee on 
a Uniform Code of Military Justice, with Professor Edmund M. Morgan, Jr. 
as chairman.** It should be noted that Professor Morgan had in 1919 
testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Military Affairs which was 
considering Senate 64, a bill "To establish military justice." In his
U. S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, 
XCVI, 5795-96.
462 Stat. 627.
^Edmund M. Morgan, "The Background of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice," Vanderbilt Law Review, VI (Feb. 1953), 169.
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testimony he was in favor of and recommended the passage of Article 52,
establishing a Court of Military Appeals. At that time he had strong
feelings that such a court should be separate and apart from the 
6military.
The Morgan Committee in its recommendations for a Uniform Code 
of Military Justice, which was submitted to Congress by the Department 
of Defense on February 4, 1949, provided for a Judicial Council within 
the National Military Establishment of not less than three members 
appointed by the President from civilian life. The Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, act of May 5, 1950, as amended, and now codified in 
title 10, United States Code, subsequently provided for a Court of 
Military Appeals, located for administrative purposes in the Department 
of Defense, and composed of three members appointed from civil life.^
During both the Senate and House hearings on the proposed Bill 
there was considerable discussion as to (1) The number of persons to 
be appointed to the Judicial Council (later amended to read Court of 
Military Appeals), (2) Whether there should be a requirement that the 
members have had military experience, and (3) other qualifications and 
tenure. Extensive hearings were held by the House of Representatives, 
Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee No. 1. The Senate committee 
after studying the proposed legislation, reported the Bill to the 
Senate, making the following comments pertaining to the Court of 
Military Appeals:
U. S., Congress, Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Military Affairs, Hearings, on S. 64, Articles of War, 66th Cong. 1st 
Sess., 1919, p. 1381.
^Public Law 506, 81st Cong,, 2nd Sess. (May 5, 1950). 64 Stat.
108. Revised to Chapter 47, 10 U. S. C. 867.
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Article 67 of the Uniform Code provides for a court of 
military appeals, which is an entirely new concept in the 
field of military law. This court, composed of three 
civilians, appointed by the President and confirmed by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, will be 
the supreme authority on the law and assure uniform in­
terpretation of substantive and procedural law. The 
committee believed it desirable to have the judges of 
the court of military appeals serve for a term of 8 years 
rather than hold office during good behavior. Provision 
is made for staggering the expiration of terms of the 
judges.
Article 67. Review by the Court of Military Appeals.
This article is new although the concept of a final 
appellate tribunal is not. Proposed AGN, Article 39 (g) 
provides for a board of appeals while AW 50 (a) provides 
for a judicial council. Both of these tribunals, however, 
are within the Department. The Court of Military Appeals 
provided for in this article is established in the National 
Military Establishment for the purpose of administration 
only, and will not be subject to the authority, direction, 
or control of the Secretary of Defense. The terms of the 
judges are fixed at 8 years. The judges are to be highly 
qualified civilians and for this reason the compensation 
has been made the same as that of a judge of the United 
States Court of Appeals.
Paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) provides for the 
staggering of the terms of the judges.
Paragraph (3) provides for removal of a judge for 
cause.
Grounds for removal are generally similar to those 
available against a judge of the Tax Court, except that 
mental or physical disability is made a ground for re­
moval. (See 26 U. S. C. 1102.)
Paragraph (4) follows the retirement provisions appli­
cable to judges of courts in Territories and possessions. 
(See 28 U. S. C. 373.)
Paragraph (5) provides authority on a temporary basis 
to fill any vacancy caused by the illness or disability 
of a judge of the Court of Military Appeals. The pro­
vision is adopted so that statutory authority will exist 
to keep the Court of Military Appeals at full strength 
during periods when the case load is very heavy. Such 
authority is desirable because of the provision in sub­
division (c) requiring that the Court of Military Appeals 
act uponga petition for review within 30 days of its 
receipt.
8U. S., Congress, Senate, Report no. 486, Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, p. 6, p. 81
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Comments pertaining to the Court of Military Appeals made on
the floor of the Senate appear in the Congressional Record of February
92, 1950, and are extracted as follows:
MR. KEFAUVER... Following this review (by a board of Review), 
there is a review for errors of law by a single Court of 
Military Appeals composed of three civilians. It is 
apparent that such a tribunal is necessary to insure un­
iformity of interpretation and administration throughout 
the armed services. Moreover, it is consistent with the 
principle of civilian control of the armed forces that a 
court of final appeal on the law should be composed of 
civilians. The result of this pattern for an appellate 
system will be that the appellate procedure will be 
strengthened by a greater centralization of authority in 
tribunals, rather than in individuals as at present.
This appellate system also has the virtue of being less 
complex than the present systems and should result in 
greater protection for an accused. In general, it is 
patterned after the appellate system of the Federal 
courts, with the court of military appeals closely follow­
ing the procedures of the Supreme Court of the United 
States.
While some differences of opinion were expressed by the 
witnesses on the merits of the court of military appeals, 
the preponderance of opinion was favorable. Several in­
dividuals and some of the reserve associations criticized 
the court as too civilian in nature and as accomplishing 
an unnecessary amount of unification. There was also a 
difference of opinion between the Services themselves, 
with the Department of the Army registering a dissent to 
this type of court. On the other hand, the Navy, the Air 
Force, Professor Morgan, the bar associations, the AMVETS, 
the American Veterans Committee and a number of other 
witnesses strongly favor such a supreme civilian court of 
military law. The position of the proponents of this court 
is that it is necessary if the substantive and procedural 
law of the uniform code-which applies to all persons in 
the Service-is to be uniformly interpreted. In addition, 
they see a need for a final authority on the law and feel 
that the present system-whereby the Secretaries of the 
Departments of the President are called upon to decide 
questions of law-is completely inadequate. In addition, 
they believe that a court of this character, with the 
prestige of a United States Court of Appeals will do great 
deal to insure public confidence in the fairness of mili­
tary justice. The House committee and our committee feel
U. S., Congress, House, Report no. 1946 Conference UCMJ, 
81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, p. 4.
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that a court of this character will result in major im­
provements in the trial of courts-martial.
As originally drafted, the judges of this court were 
to be appointed by the President, after confirmation by 
the Senate for life. Our committee carefully considered 
this provision and felt that, since the court represents 
a new concept in military law, it was advisable to pro­
vide the appointment of the judges for a term of years, 
rather than for life. Accordingly, our committee amended 
the provision relating to tenure and has made them similar 
to the tax court of the United States and some of the 
Territorial courts.
MR. KEM. I should like to ask the Senator whether his 
committee has made a study of the business which would 
come before the Court of Military Appeals which is estab­
lished by the bill, as provided at page 161.
MR. KEFAUVER. Yes; the committee has considered that 
problem and has made some study of it.
MR. KEM. In the course of a normal year in time of 
peace, how many cases would the court have to consider?
MR. KEFAUVER. Considering the number of courts- 
martial, the witnesses who testified before our committee, 
the Morgan committee, and the House committee, including 
those representing the three armed services, as I under­
stand, were of the opinion that this court would be 
sufficient to handle cases which would come before it.
MR. KEM. I had no doubt that it would be sufficient; 
but my question was predicated on whether the court would 
have enough to do to keep its members busy, whether the 
bill would give the court jurisdiction sufficiently 
broad to keep three men busy throughout the year, in time 
of peace.
MR. KEFAUVER. I may say that was one of the questions 
which arose and which caused the Senate committee to re­
commend that the terms of the three judges be not for life, 
but for a certain number of years, the idea being that 
after a certain amount of experience we would know fairly 
well whether there should be additional judges or fewer 
judges.
But the general feeling was that there would be suf­
ficient work, or perhaps a little more than sufficient, 
for them to do, to keep them very busy; that probably 
2,000 or 3,000 cases a year would come to them.
MR. KEM. Of course there is no way to estimate the 
number of writs of certiorari which would be granted.
MR. KEFAUVER....Mr. President, one very worthwhile 
section of the proposed code is that which requires the 
Court of Military Appeals to make to the Congress an 
annual report in which it will state the number of cases 
it has tried, the disposition of the cases and its re­
commendations for improvement of the system. At the
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present time Congress does not receive annual recommenda­
tions or reports about military justice. u
MR. MORSE„ The purpose of House Bill 4080 which is 
now before the Senate is, of course, to create a Uniform 
code of Military Justice for all the services. While 
there is a common agreement upon the need for uniformity 
in the administration of the judicial system of the 
armed forces, there is considerable divergence of opinion 
concerning the propriety of bringing to military justice 
certain concepts of civilian justice, and an even greater 
difference of opinion as to the advisability of creating 
a court of appeals for the Military Establishment, the 
members of which shall be appointed from civilian life.
I refer, of course, to article 67 of the pending bill 
which creates a Court of Military Appeals consisting of 
three judges appointed from civilian life by the President, 
by and with the consent of the Senate, located for admin­
istrative purposes in the National Military Establishment.
This court is a direct outgrowth of the Judicial Council 
constituted by section 226 of the Elston Act, Public Law 
759, in the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the 
Army....
MR. MORSE. Two objections have been interposed to the 
enactment of article 67. The first is that it places 
appellate power of cases tried by military courts in a 
civilian body, the members of which are not familiar with 
problems peculiar to the maintenance of dicipline in the 
armed services. The powers of review of the proposed 
court of military appeals are limited to matters of law.
It would seem therefore, that the court would not be re­
quired to pass upon questions which involve technical 
military knowledge.... ̂
The report of the Senate and House Conference contained the 
following comments pertaining to the Court of Military Appeals:
2. In section 1, article 67, the House had provided 
for the Establishment of a Court of Military Appeals, con­
sisting of three judges appointed from civilian life by 
the President, by and with the consent and advice of the 
Senate, for life tenure. The House further provided that 
such judges were to receive the same compensation, allow­
ances, perquisites, and retirement benefits as judges of 
the United States court of appeals. The Senate amended 
this provision by reducing the tenure of the judges from 102
10Ibid., p .  1391.
11Ibid., p .  1469.12Ibid . , p. 1470.
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life to a term of 8 years, providing that the first appointees 
should have staggered appointments with one expiring on March 
1, 1953, a second on March 1, 1955, and a third on March 1,
1957, after which all successive appointments would be for a 
term of 8 years. While the Senate amendment left the salaries 
of these judges at $17,500 a year, it discarded the retire­
ment benefits accorded judges of the United States court of 
appeals and substituted the same retirement benefits as 
those provided for judges of Territorial courts.
The conference agreement provides that the judges of the 
Court of Military Appeals shall be appointed for a term 
of 15 years, respectively, the first of which will expire 
on May 1, 1956, the second on May 1, 1961, and the third 
on May 1, 1966, with the terms of office of all successors 
to be for a full 15 year term.
The conference agreement also terminated the retirement 
provisions provided by the Senate amendment and substituted 
therefor contributory civil-service retirement. It will be 
noted that, as a result of the conference agreement, the 
bill makes no reference to retirement privileges. However, 
it is a well settled principle of law that employees of the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the govern­
ment for whom no other retirement system is provided will, 
as a matter of law, come within the provisions of contri­
butory civil-service retirement. It is the intent of the 
conferees that this be the type of retirement for the 
judges of the Court of Military Appeals.
The House recedes and agrees to the Senate amendment with 
an amendment.13
Although there have been technical amendments to the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, the composition of the Court or the qualifi­
cations of its members has not been changed since the court was 
established. By the act of March 2, 1955 the salary of each judge 
was increased from $17,500 to $25,500 a year.^ The act also pro­
vided for the payment of travel expenses and reasonable maintenance 
expenses, not to exceed fifteen dollars a day, when outside the 
District of Columbia on official business.
S., Congress, House, Report no. 1946 Conference UCMJ, 




The United States Court of Military Appeals (hereafter called 
the Court or USCMA) is a civilian tribunal. It is entirely independent 
of the military in the review of courts-martial cases under its juris­
diction, but is the highest appellate body in the military judicial 
system. It may be aptly called the supreme court of military justice. 
It has been nicknamed, "The GI Supreme Court" or "The Military Court of 
Last Resort". Its decisions establish precedents which are binding 
upon the services. It is a legislative rather than a constitutional 
court because it was established by Congress under authority implied 
from constitutional provisions other than Article III.^ For adminis­
trative purposes, which extend to such matters as acquisition of
supplies and security clearance of the court's staff, it is located in
16the Department of Defense. The Court itself is physically situated 
in its own courthouse on 5th and E Streets, N. W. , Washington, D. C.
The three judges of the Court must be appointed from civilian 
life. They may, however, hold a reserve commission in any of the 
Armed Forces. Appointment is by the President, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. They may be removed by the President for 
neglect of duty, malfeasance, or upon the ground of mental or physical 
disability. In case of temporary disability, the President may 
designate a U. S. Court of Appeals judge to fill the office during the
■^Rocco J. Tresolini, American Constitutional Law, (New York: 
The MacMillan Company, 1959), p. 30.
^Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 67. Henceforth 
cited as UCMJ 67.
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period of disability 7 The judges serve staggered terms of fifteen
18years at salaries of $25,500 a year. The present fixed term of
office will probably be changed to life tenure which would make tenure
19as well as salary equivalent to the U. S. Court of Appeals. A bill,
H. R. 3179, incorporating these features and provisions for retirement
privileges and survivor benefits, was passed by the House of Representa-
20tives July 9, 1963, There has been some consideration for increasing21the membership to five. The Court has a staff of approximately forty 
civilian employees, and has an annual budget of approximately $500,000.
The original members of the Court, who were appointed by 
President Harry S. Truman, were Chief Judge Robert E. Quinn, formerly 
Governor of Rhode Island and state Superior Court Judge, Judge George 
W. Latimer, formerly a justice of the Supreme Court of Utah, and Judge 
Paul W. Brosnan, Dean of Tulane University Law School. Brosnan, who 
died in office, in December 1955, was succeeded by Judge Homer Ferguson, 
appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Ferguson was formerly 
Judge of the Circuit Court of Michigan, U. S. Senator from Michigan, 
and Ambassador to the Philippine Government. Latimer, whose term 
expired in May 1961, was succeeded by Judge Paul J. Kilday, appointed 
by President John F. Kennedy; Kilday had been a Congressman from Texas 17*920
17UCMJ 67 (a) (4).
^Public Law 9, 84th Congress, March 2, 1955. Sec. (i), 69 
Stat. 10. The original salary was $17,500.
19Benjamin Feld, A Manual for Court-Martial Practice and Appeal, 
(New York: Oceana Publications, 1957), p. 91.
20Annual Report of the United States Court of Military Appeals, 
1963, p. 50. Henceforth cited as USCMA.
^Feld, op. cit. , p. 126.
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in the U. S. House of Representatives since 1938. Chief Judge Quinn 
was reappointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in May 1966.
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Court is
empowered to prescribe its own rules of procedure. Jurisdiction is
prescribed by rule three and Article 67 of UCMJ. The Court reviews
22the record of trial in the following cases:
(a) General or flag officers; death sentences. All 
cases in which the sentence, as affirmed by a board of 
review, affects a general or flag officer, or extends 
to death;
(b) Certified by The Judge Advocate General. All 
cases reviewed by a board of review which The Judge 
Advocate General forwards by Certificate for Review 
to the Court; and,
(c) Petitioned by the accused. All cases reviewed by 
a board of review in which, upon petition of the accused 
and on good cause shown, the Court has granted a review, 
except those reviewed under Article 69.
As explanation of the rule, cases are reviewed on three bases: 
(1) mandatory or automatic review such as (a) above, (2) Certificate 
of Review; only the government can appeal as a right to the USCMA; 
the service may forward a Board of Review case to the Court for 
further review upon specific issues, and (3) Petition for Grant of 
Review; the most frequent basis of review is on grant of the accused's 
petition "on good cause shown."
Since its establishment, the Court, as of June 30, 1966, had
docketed 19,839 cases. Of these, 18,364 were by petition, 438 by
certificate, and only 37 mandatory. A tabulation of these statistics
23can be found in Table 2 and Table 3 in this chapter. The cases in­
clude review of almost every conceivable type of criminal action. It 2*
22USCMA Rule 3.
^Annual Report USCMA, 1962-1966.
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is now docketing approximately 800 to 1000 cases per year.
The Court will act only with respect to the findings and 
sentence as approved by the convening or reviewing authority, and as 
affirmed or set aside as incorrect in law, by a board of review. The 
Court has power to act only in regard to matters of law. In those 
cases which the Judge Advocate General forwards to the Court by certifi­
cate for review, action need be taken only with respect to the issues 
raised by him. In a case reviewed upon petition of the accused, action 
need be taken only with respect to issues specified by the Court in its
grant of review. The Court may, and frequently does, review other
24matters of law which materially affect the rights of the parties.
Of the thirty-seven mandatory review cases there have been two
flag or general officer cases (one Army and one Navy), and thirty-five
25death sentence cases (thirty Army, two Navy, three Air Force) . Follow­
ing affirmance by a board of review, a mandatory case is forwarded auto­
matically to the Court by The Judge Advocate General and may be accom­
panied by any assignment of errors or petition of the accused.
The Court has docketed a total of 427 certificates for review
26as follows: Army, 147; Navy, 208; Air Force, 77; Coast Guard, 6.
A certificate for review may be filed as a matter of right by the Judge 
Advocate General of the service or by the General Counsel of the De­
partment of the Treasury (Coast Guard), in any case reviewed by a board 





board of review is for or against the accused, or whether the Court
could otherwise review the case on petition for grant of review.
Normally, when such a case is forwarded to the Court for review, it
is because there is a question concerning the law of the case as
applied by the board or an issue concerning the sufficiency of evidence.
The UCMJ is silent as to the time limit for filing the certificate of
review; under the rules of the Court it must be filed within thirty days
after receipt by The Judge Advocate General of the decision of the 
28board of review.
The most common group of cases reviewed by the Court consists
of those in which it exercises its discretion and grants an accused's
petition for review on a showing of good cause. The accused has thirty
days from the time he is notified of the decision of the board of re-
29view, to petition the Court for a grant of review. The Court has
docketed a total of 19,364 petitions for grant of review as follows:
Army, 10,498; Navy, 4,442; Air Force, 4,375; Coast Guard, 49.38
Petition has been granted for 2,042 cases; cases granted are about 100
31in a typical year; cases denied are about 800.
Under the current practice of the Court, the concurrence of 
two judges is required for either granting or denying a petition for 
review. Denial of a petition amounts to affirmance of the decision of 2789301




30Tables 2 and 5.
31Tables 4-5.
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the board of review, for it serves to terminate the appellate review
of the case. The granting of a petition for review does not mean
that the case is reversed; it simply means that the Court will take
32cognizance of the case and render an opinion.
As stated, the Court has power to act only in regard to matters
of law; unlike the board of review, the Court has no authority to
weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine
controverted questions of fact. The Court does, however, have the
power to review the evidence to determine whether, as a matter of law,
33it supports the findings of guilty.
Although there are prescribed forms for petition for Grant of 
Review, the Court has never insisted on rigid adherence. Thus it has 
held, that a letter by the accused can properly be considered a 
petition (United States v.Marshall, 4 USCMA 607, 16 CMR 181). A tele­
gram can also constitute a petition (United States v. Korzeniewski,
7 USCMA 314, 22 CMR 104). A petition is forwarded through The Judge
q/
Advocate General of the service of the accused.
While the USCMA has been described as "the Supreme Court" for 
the military justice system, its function of review is different from 
that of the U. S. Supreme Court. Unlike the Supreme Court, the USCMA's 
principal function is to correct prejudicial errors in the proceedings 
below. "Good cause" therefore, consists of specific errors, not the 





Court. Not every error of law is grounds for reversal or even corrective 
action. Errors which do not affect a substantial right of the accused 
are disregarded. Error may have been waived by failure to make timely 
objection or by a guilty plea, or by the accused's admission of guilt 
in his own testimony. On the other hand, certain errors which affect 
fundamental elements of the court-martial procedure provide a ground
35for review notwithstanding a failure to raise objection at the trial.
Errors considered are: (1) sufficiency of evidence, which as
a matter of law can support a finding of guilty, (2) errors in admission
of evidence, and (3) instruction by the law officer. Errors are further
36classified into three classes:
Errors which deprive the accused of substantial proce­
dural rights and privileges (these errors will justify 
reversal of a conviction regardless of compelling evi­
dence of guilt) .
Errors which prejudice the accused in some material 
regard (such errors require corrective action only to 
the extent necessary to cure the harm).
Errors which do not present a fair risk of harm to 
the accused (these may be disregarded).
In considering a petition for grant of review, if the first
judge to review the record grants the petition his action is sufficient
to bring up the case for review. On the other hand, if he denies the
petition it is sent to a second judge. Two denials will normally end
the appeal, however the third judge may still request a grant if he
has a special interest. A denial of petition is announced by the Clerk
of the Court and no reasons are ordinarily given.
If petition for Grant of Review has been granted, the Court may
ask for final briefs to be filed and consider motions. A.fter all
35Feld, op. cit.
36Military Justice, V, 25.
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briefs have been filed the Clerk of the Court sets a date for the 
hearing, giving at least ten day's notice.
Hearings are normally held two weeks in every month from 
September or October to late June or early July. At least two judges 
must be present and a judge not present at the hearing cannot partici­
pate in the decision except by consent of counsel for both sides. The 
appellant is entitled to open and close the argument. Argument is 
normally limited to forty-five minutes for each side. Questions by 
the judges are appropriate.
From fifteen to twenty-five cases are heard during a normal 
two-week period. Cases are assigned to each judge by rotation at a 
conference held at the end of each day of hearing. Each judge then 
is directly responsible for five to eight decisions for the Court, and 
must also review the decisions of the other judges. He may concur out­
right, concur in part, dissent in part or dissent to the whole of a 
decision. Usually each judge has one of the commissioners of the Court
and a law clerk to assist him. Differences among the judges may be the
37subject of additional conferences to settle points of dispute.
The Court generally issues a written opinion in every case
heard, setting forth the reasons for its decision; this is in sharp
38contrast to other courts of appeal. The concurrence of two judges 
is required for the rendition of a final decision. The opinion bears 
the name of the author judge and an indication as to the concurrence or
~^Ibid.
38U. S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, Hearings, Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel, 87th 
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, p. 193.
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dissent of the other justices. It is not uncommon for judges to write
separate opinions which concur in the same conclusion but for different
reasons than those stated in the main opinion. Likewise, a dissenting
opinion which states the legal reasons for the nonconcurrence of one
39of the judges is often appended. Another type of opinion is that 
known as per curiam. In this type of opinion no author judge is in­
dicated. A per curiam decision is used in a case that falls squarely 
within the reasoning of a previous decision of the Court.4^
As of June 30, 1966 the Court had rendered 2,294 opinions; of 
these 2,275 were published. In forty-nine percent of the published 
opinions, decisions of boards of review were modified or reversed.4^
The published opinions of the Court are available in many large public 
libraries and in most bar association and law school libraries. The 
official reports of the Court are known as the Court of Military Appeals 
Reports (USCMA). The opinions of the Court may also be found in the 
Court-Martial Reports (CMR). One or more sets of the CMR's are main­
tained in each staff judge advocate office. In addition the most 
recent opinions of the Court are released weekly in unbound mineograph
/  r\
form. Printed pamphlets of opinions appear every two weeks.
Errors are corrected by the Court in several ways. If there is 
insufficient evidence in the record to support the findings of guilty, 
the Court will dismiss the charges. In a case involving prejudicial *40
•^Military Justice, V, 25.
40Mil itary Justice, V, 26.
4lTable 5, 6.
/ ÔStatement of Staff Judge Advocate, Grand Forks Air Force 
Base, N. D.
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error, the Court will set aside findings of guilty and usually will 
order a rehearing of the case. The Court occasionally dismisses the 
charges, however, if it appears that the interests of justice will 
best be served by such action. When the error affects some, but not 
all, findings of guilty, only those affected are set aside. The un­
affected findings are affirmed.
A rehearing may be ordered of offenses as to which the findings 
have been set aside. In a multiple charge case, however, the Court may 
return the record of trial to the Judge Advocate General for reference 
to a board of review with directions that the board order a rehearing 
or that it order dismissal of the findings of guilty that have been set 
aside and that it reassess the sentence on the basis of the affirmed 
findings. The Court may affirm the sentence on the basis of the 
affirmed findings of guilty if the offense set aside is relatively 
minor in relation to the remaining charges.
Where the findings are unassailable but error affects the 
sentence, other corrective action is appropriate. If the entire 
sentence as adjuged by the court-martial is affected, a rehearing on 
the sentence only may be ordered; or the case may be referred to the 
Judge Advocate General for submission to a board of review for re­
consideration of the sentence. When some but not all of the findings 
of guilty are set aside and dismissed, the case may be returned to 
The Judge Advocate General for redetermination of the sentence on the 
affirmed findings; however, if the affirmed findings are minor in re­
lation to those which are dismissed, the Court will order a rehearing 
on the sentence. Rehearings are always before a court-martial whose
49
, o
members have not acted previously in the case.
Errors committed during the post-trial proceedings, as for 
example, the inadequacy of a staff judge advocate review, will result 
in a case being returned for corrective action to the review level at 
which the error occurred. If the particular reviewing authority is 
unable to correct the error with impartiality and freedom from the in­
fluence of the previous erroneous action, the case will be referred to 
another competent reviewing authority. Thus, if the error occurred at 
a general court-martial reviewing level, the case might be sent to a 
neighboring general court-martial reviewing authority for the prepara­
tion of a new review, if appropriate.
It has been said that creation of the Court was the most re-
44volutionary change wrought by the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
"The decision of the Court of Military Appeals is final, and there is
45no further review by a United States Circuit Court of Appeals.
Numerous decisions of the Court have laid down far-reaching principles 
and have overturned many practices and procedures long used in the 
military system of law. The Court has invalidated, expressly or im­
pliedly, many portions of the Manual for Courts-Martial and has held
that its use by members of the court-martial is an error which denies
46the accused a fair trial. Specific opinions concerned with Con­
stitutional rights of the accused will be reviewed in chapters IV and V. *46
^^Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, p. 160.
^U. S., Congress, House, Report 491, UCMJ, H. R. 4080, 81st 
Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.
^~*Shaw v.United States, 209 F 2nd 811 (D. C. Cir. 1954).
46HOUnited States v. Boswell, 8 USCMA 145, 23 CMR, 369 (1957).
United States v. Rinehart, 8 USCMA 402, 24 CMR 212 (1957).
TABLE 2





June 30,'60 FY 1961 FY 1962 FY 1963 FY 1964 FY 1965 FY 1966 June 30,'66
PETITIONS
Army 8,099 371 431 353 371 471 402 10,498
Navy 2,745 330 323 268 302 245 229 4,442
Air Force 3,196 252 193 204 176 204 150 4,375
Coast Guard 39 1 1 2 2 1 3 49
Total 14,079 954 948 827 851 921 784 19,364
CERTIFICATES
Army 111 11 7 6 3 4 5 147
Navy 174 7 6 5 6 5 5 208
Air Force 43 6 4 9 8 5 2 77
Coast Guard 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Tocal 334 24 17 20 17 14 12 438
MANDATORY
Army 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 31
Navy 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Air Force 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
Coast Guard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 36 1 0 0 0 0 0 371
Total
Cases Docketed 14,449 979 965 847 868 935 796 19,839z
2̂ Flag Officer cases; 1 Army and 1 Navy,
219,521 cases actually assigned docketed numbers. Overage due to multiple actions of the same cases.
Ono
TABLE 3
UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS - CASES TRIED BY SERVICES, REVIEWED BY BOARDS OF REVIEW, AND DOCKETED
FY 1962 FY 1963 FY 1964 FY 1965 FY 1966
COURT MARTIAL 
CASES
Army 72,025 60,607 43,118 43,456 38,613
Navy 45,529 39,033 25,041 24,565 26,936
Air Force 15,429 12,850 7,551 4,821 3,315
Coast Guard 835 593 347 327 310
Total 133,818 113,083 76,057 73,169 69,174
CASES REVIEWED BY 
BOARDS OF REVIEW
Army 1,418 1,465 1,491 1,261 1,092
Navy' 3,212 3,208 2,727 2,376 2,411
Air Force 934 762 761 604 437
Coast Guard 27 27 13 9 14
Total 5,591 5,462 4,992 4,250 3,954
CASES DOCKETED 
WITH U.S. COURT 
OF MILITARY APPEALS
Army 438 359 374 475 407
Navy 329 273 308 250 234
Air Force 197 213 184 209 152
Coast Guard 1 2 2 1 3
Total 965 847 868 935 796
TABLE 4
UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS COURT ACTION





Denied by Memorandum Opinion 2
Dismissed 9
Withdrawn 299
Disposed of by order setting aside
findings and sentence 3
Disposed of on Motion to Dismiss;
With Opinion 7
Without Opinion 36
Remanded to Board of Review 115







Set for hearing-*- 0
Ready for hearing^- 1
Awaiting briefs’*- 6






FY FY FY FY FY FY Total as of
61 62 63 64 65 66 June 30,'66
114 101 88 99 86 112 2,042
842 799 765 758 823 672 16,871
0 0 0 0 0 0 2
1 2 0 2 1 0 15
8 14 6 5 6 6 344
0 0 0 0 0 2 5
1 0 0 0 0 0 8
2 1 1 0 0 0 40
23 5 6 4 10 5 168
57 88 57 38 47 42 42
25 25 25 25 20 18 18 LnNO
37 16 18 19 12 14 427
2 3 2 1 2 2 2
0 1 0 0 0 0 i
0 1 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 37
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
lks of June 30, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966.
TABLE 5
UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS OPINIONS RENDERED
Total as of 
June 30,'60
Petitions 1,228
Motion to dismiss 10
Motion to stay proceedings 1
Per curriam grants 22
Certificates 272
Certificates and petitions 37
Mandatory 35
Remanded 2
Petitions for a new trial 




Petition for new trial 1
Motion to reopen
Petitions in the nature of writ of
1
error cerram nobis 0
FY FY FY FY FY FY Total as of
61 62 63 64 65 66 June 30,'66
91 95 89 84 83 98 1,768
1 0 0 0 0 0 11
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4 1 2 1 6 4 40
34 15 17 15 11 11 375
3 1 1 4 1 2 49
1 1 0 0 0 0 37
0 0 0 0 0 0 2
0 1 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 3 2 5
0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Total 1 2,610 134 114 109 104 104 119 2,294
2,294 cases were disposed of by 2,275 published opinions. 120 opinions were rendered in cases involving 67 
Army officers, 29 Air Force officers, 16 Navy officers, 5 Marine Corps officers, 2 Coast Guard officers, and 
1 West Point cadet. In addition, 19 opinions were rendered in cases involving 20 civilians. The remainder 
concerned enlisted personnel.
TABLE 6
UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS COMPLETED CASES
Total as of FY FY FY FY FY FY Total as of
June 30,'60 61 62 63 64 65 66 June 30,'66
Petitions denied 12,212 842 799 765 758 823 672 16,871
Petitions dismissed 9 1 2 0 2 1 0 15
Petitions withdrawn 299 8 14 6 5 6 6 344
Certificates withdrawn 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 7
Certificates disposed of by order 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Opinions rendered 1,603 133 114 109 104 104 119 2,286
Disposed of in motion to dismiss:
With opinion 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 8
Without opinion 36 2 1 1 0 0 0 40
Disposed of by order setting aside
findings and sentence 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 5
Writ of error coram nobis by order 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
Motion for bail denied 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Remanded for board of review 115 23 6 6 4 10 5 169
Total 14,290 1,010 937 888 874 945 805 19,749
Pending completion as of June 30 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Opinions pending 38 16 19 15 20 10 17
Set for hearing 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ready for hearing 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
Petitions granted-awaiting briefs 9 17 14 9 10 9 7
Petitions-court action due 30 days 77 57 88 57 38 47 42
Petitions-awaiting replies 19 25 25 21 25 20 18
Certificates-awaiting briefs 6 1 0 2 1 2 0
Mandatory-awaiting briefs 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Total 150 118 146 104 95 89 84
CHAPTER IV
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL 
Scope of Military Justice
Before examining the constitutional rights of military personnel, 
we should first consider why this is important. Fallen and Pepper, in 
a very comprehensive study of the scope of military justice,'*' pointed 
out that this is really the largest judicial system in our nation. In 
comparing the military with other judicial systems the study pointed 
out that in 1945, there were approximately 730,000 trials by courts- 
martial; during the same period there were about 37,500 criminals tried 
in all the Federal courts--a ratio of twenty to one. In our most 
populous state, New York, there were 207,000 cases for the same period-- 
more than a three to one ratio. All figures excluded minor offenses.
....We conclude that the Armed Forces at peak mobilization 
in World War II not only handled one third of the nation's 
crime potential, but also that their courts handled one third 
of all criminal cases tried in the nation, with the remaining 
two thirds being divided between 49 civilian systems.2
The same study, estimating the peacetime situation of 280,000 
cases per year in the military, compared to New York's 267,000 went on 
to say.
Thus, even without a large-scale war, it would appear 
that the military system of justice handles a greater *2
^Delmar Karlen and Louis H. Pepper "The Scope of Military 
Justice." Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Political Science. 




volume of criminal business than that of the nation's largest 
civilian system.
....The conclusion seems justified that military justice 
is the largest single system of criminal justice in the 
nation, not only in time of war, but also in time of peace; 
now, and as far ahead as we can see.3 4
If we realize that the armed service is predominantly composed
of the sex and age group in which the incidence of crime is the highest,
and that the serviceman is liable for military offenses as well as
civilian offenses, we can appreciate the scope of military justice.
Actually military offenses, which are entirely beyond the jurisdiction
of civilian authority, account for approximately two thirds of all per-
4sons imprisoned by courts-martial sentences.
Further, if we consider that today most of our servicemen are 
draftees, and those not actually drafted were impelled to volunteer 
because of direct and indirect influence of the draft, we can appreciate 
a new peacetime situation. Now we are actually concerned about civilians 
temporarily in uniform, not the hard-core small regular force of the past
Today, in dramatic contrast to pre-World War II conditions, our 
armed services number approximately three million; every resident male is 
a potential member of the peacetime military; active and reserve obliga­
tion encompasses over ten percent of a normal lifespan. When the 
authority of the military has such a sweeping capacity for affecting 
the lives of our citizenry the wisdom of being concerned about the rights 
of the military citizen should be apparent.3
3Ibid.
4Ibid., citing MacCormick and Evjen, "Statistical Study of 
24,000 Military Prisoners," Federal Probation, No. 2, pp. 6-8.
~*Earl Warren, "The Bill of Rights and the Military." The James 
Madison Lecture for 1962, delivered at the School of Law, New York Univ­
ersity, Feb. 1, 1962. N.Y.U. Quarterly, 1962.
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Note the statistical tables at the end of this chapter which 
confirm the magnitude and scope of the military justice system.
These data indicate that the study referred to above, which was com­
pleted in 1952, is not completely valid today. The reduced number of 
cases is a direct result of a recent change permitting greater use of 
non-judicial punishment, and also reflects an improvement in discipline 
under UCMJ.
Fundamental Rights
The United States Supreme Court and the Court of Military Appeals 
both believe that military personnel are protected by "fundamental con­
stitutional rights."^ Recently Chief Justice Earl Warren stated in a
lecture at the School of Law, New York University:
....The Supreme Court indicated in Burns v. Wilson that 
court-martial proceedings could be challenged through 
habeas corpus actions brought in civil courts, if those 
proceedings had denied the defendant fundamental rights.
The various opinions of the members of the Court in 
Burns are not, perhaps, as clear on this point as they 
might be. Nevertheless, I believe they do constitute 
recognition of the proposition that our citizens in 
uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply be­
cause they have doffed their civilian clothes.^
The United States Court of Military Appeals unequivocally
stated in United States v. Jacoby, ".... the protections of the Bill of 
Rights, except those which are expressly or by necessary implication
g
inapplicable, are available to members of our armed forces." Chief
Judge Robert E. Quinn, USCMA, has stated:
B̂urns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 346 U. S. 844 (1953). United 
States v, Jacoby, 11 USCMA 428, 29 CMR 244 (1960).
^Warren, loc, cit.
8 'United States v. Jacoby, 11 USCMA 428, 29 CMR 244 (1960).
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I firmly believe that accused persons in the military 
services are entitled to the rights and privileges secured 
to all under the Constitution of the United States, unless 
excluded directly or by necessary implication by the pro­
visions of the Constitution itself.^
I believe we hold among the most important judicial appoint­
ments in the country with the exception of the Supreme Court.
Our jurisdiction is world-wide and with 3,000,000 men in the 
armed forces, we go into almost every home. The function of 
this court is to safeguard the rights of individuals which 
too often are ignored or violated by military organizations.
As the public becomes more familiar with our work, I believe 
that draftees and their families will be more reconciled to 
military service made necessary by world conditions.
At the time of the enactment into law of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, President Harry S. Truman remarked, "Under the pro­
visions of this new and modern code, the democratic ideal of equality 
before the law is further advanced."^
Testifying at the Senate Hearings on Constitutional Rights, 
General Alan B. Todd, U. S. Army Assistant Judge Advocate General, 
stated:
Congress has sought to insure that the provisions and 
protections granted by the Constitution extend to those 
individuals serving our Nation as members of the armed 
services. The Department of the Army and the Judge 
Advocate General believe that the intent of Congress 
that the protections of the Constitution of the United 
States extend to the members of the Military Establish­
ment has become a reality. We welcome the opportunity 
to discuss the constitutional safeguards extending to 
each of us in the military services.̂  *12
^United States v. Sutton, 3 USCMA 220, 11 CMR 220 (1953). See 
letter Quinn to Ervin
■^Stanley Frank, "The GI's Day in Court." Nations Business.
Jan. 1953, p. 36.
^ New York Times, May 7, 1950, pp. 82, 83.
12U. S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, Hearings, Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel, 87th 
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, p. 99.
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At the same hearings, General A. M. Kuhfeld, U. S. Air Force 
Judge Advocate General, said:
....I think there should be definite provisions for 
reviews that insure that the individual and all of his 
rights are protected. I can say this: I do not think 
that there is any question about his rights being pro­
tected under the present code. I was engaged 4 years as 
State's attorney, for years as Assistant Attorney General, 
and would say without any fear of successful contradiction 
that I know of no State or no system of the administration 
of justice in which the accused or the defendant has more 
protection than he has under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice
Testifying at the same hearings, the Honorable Paul B. Fay, Jr., 
Under Secretary of the Navy stated:
Relative to the matter of protecting and safeguarding 
constitutional rights in legal and administrative pro­
cedures, I feel that the rights of Navy men and Marines 
are adequately safeguarded under the provisions of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice.... The uniform code in­
sures the protection of individual rights from the time 
of having committed an offense until final review of 
his case by the U. S. Court of Military Appeals is completed.
The General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury, Fred B. 
Smith, demonstrated his concern for constitutional rights by this 
statement in the 1966 annual report pursuant to UCMJ:
On June 13, 1966, the Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in Miranda y, Arizona, 348 U. S. 436, 86 S.
Ct. 1662, enunciating concrete guidelines for the inter­
rogation of persons suspected of crime. On June 15, 
district legal officers of the Coast Guard were advised 
that in view of the Miranda decision, whenever an Arti­
cle 31 warning was given, the suspect so warned was also 
to be informed that he had a right to consult a lawyer 
before being questioned, and to be told specifically:
"You have the right to have the lawyer or the counsel 
designated for you present with you during the inter- 13
13Ibid., p. 155. 
^Ibid., p. 51.
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rogation." The Coast Guard was thus the first armed 
force to embrace the Miranda rules.^
The views of the members of our legislative branch are better 
known. Some have been cited in chapters 11 and 111; note Appendix.
In his introduction to the 1962 Senate Hearings on Constitutional Rights 
the Chairman, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., reviewed the objectives of 
Congress as follows:
The hearings that preceded enactment of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice indicate that Congress had in 
mind a number of fundamental rights which it wished to 
protect for the serviceman....In an effort to provide 
for minimal standards of "due process" in major cases,
Congress created the post of law officer,...The establish­
ment of direct civilian review of court-martial convict­
ions, an inovation in American military justice, furnished 
the serviceman a remedy for invasion of many important con­
stitutional rights....etc.
The recognition of individual rights of military personnel is 
a relatively recent concept. The relationship of the Constitution 
and more specifically the Bill of Rights has rapidly assumed increasing 
importance because of changing domestic and world conditions.
Traditionally, military organizations have been composed of in­
dividuals who gave up their citizen rights. They were in a kind of 
"Servitude." Blackstone referred to soldiers as occupying a "State of 
Servitude in the midst of a nation of Freemen", and added that the 
soldier's position was "The only State of Servitude" in England. In 
the early years of our own Republic our armed forces consisted of 
small bands of volunteers. The individual serviceman was not highly 
regarded and there was little worry about loss of rights on his part.
•^Annual Report, USCMA, 1966, p. 65.
Hearings, CRMP, Note 12 SUPRA, p. 4.16
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Strict discipline was the rule and was considered necessary for military
success. There is strong evidence that the framers of the Bill of Rights
did not consider that its provisions applied to any but civil trials.^
It is interesting to note that even the United States Court of
Military Appeals, whose members frequently espouse constitutional rights
of servicemen, in an early case concluded that such rights do not stem
from constitutional guarantees, but rather are based solely upon Federal 
18Legislation. In United States v. Clay Judge Latimer stated:
We look to the acts of Congress to determine whether it has 
declared that there are fundamental rights inherent in the 
trial of military offenses which must be accorded to an 
accused before it can be said he has been fairly convicted.
There are certain standards in the military accusatorial 
system which have been specifically set by Congress and 
which we must demand be observed in the trials of military 
offenses.
Some of them are more important than others, but all of 
sufficient importance to be a significant part of military 
law. We conceive these rights to mold into a pattern 
similar to that developed in federal civilian cases. For 
lack of a more descriptive phrase, we label the pattern as 
"military due process" and then point up the minimum stand­
ards which are the framework for this concept and which must 
be met before the accused can be legally convicted. The 
UCMJ contemplates that he be given a fair trial and it 
commands us to see that the proceedings in the courts 
below reach that standard.
Generally speaking, due process means a course of legal 
proceedings according to those rules and principles 
which have been established in our system of jurisprudences 
for the enforcement and protection of private rights. For 
our purposes, and in keeping with the principles of mili­
tary justice developed over the years, we do not bottom 
these rights and privileges on the Constitution. We base 
them on the laws as enacted by Congress. But, this does 
not mean that we cannot give the same legal effect to the
^General Hull was tried by court-martial and sentenced to 
death. At the trial he asked to have his lawyer speak for him and was 
refused. Since this was a case involving a General officer and death 
sentence it came before the President, James Madison, the draftsman of 
The Bill of Rights. He approved the proceedings. (from Frederick 
Bernays Wiener, "Courts-Martial and The Bill of Rights," 72 Harv Law 
Rev. 266 (1958), pp. 294-304).
18United States v. Clay, 1 USCMA 74, 1 CMR 74 (1951) .
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rights granted by Congress to military personnel as do civilian 
courts to those granted to civilians by the Constitution or 
by other federal statutes.
As we have stated in previous opinions, we believe Congress 
intended, insofar as reasonably possible, to place military 
justice on the same plane as civilian justice, and to free 
those accused by the military forces from certain vices which 
infested the old system. Believing this, we are required to 
announce principles consistent therewith.
A cursory inspection of the UCMJ, discloses that Congress 
granted to an accused the following rights which parallel 
those afforded to defendents in civilian courts: To be 
informed of the charges against him: to cross-examine 
witnesses for the government; to challenge members of the 
court for cause or peremptorily; to have a specified 
number of members compose general and special courts- 
martial; to be represented by counsel; not to be com­
pelled to incriminate himself; to have involuntary con­
fessions excluded from consideration; to have the court 
instructed on the elements of the offenses, the pre­
sumption of innocence, and the burden of proof; to be 
found guilty of an offense only when a designated number 
of members concur with findings to this effect; to be 
sentenced only when a certain number of members vote in 
the affirmative; and to have an appellate review.
....We impose upon military courts the duty of jealously 
safeguarding those rights which Congress has decreed are 
an integral part of military due process.^
The Court of Military Appeals later insisted that except for 
the right to presentment by grand jury and to trial by petit jury, 
an individual in the military service has every right and privilege 
guaranteed to any citizen by the Constitution. Also in United States 
v. Jacoby, The Court of Military Appeals ruled, "The protections of the 
Bill of Rights, except those which are expressly or by necessary im-
2plication inapplicable, are available to members of our armed forces."
Richard L. Tedrow, Chief Commissioner, USCMA, has stated:
There is no question but that all three members of the 
present Bench (Quinn, Ferguson, Kilday) hold that those *21
2QUnited States v. Burney, 6 USCMA 776, 21 CMR 9 (1956)
21United States v. Jacoby, 11 USCMA 429, 29 CMR 244 (1960).
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in the military are entitled to all constitutional 
rights unless they are excluded directly or by im­
plication. In the early days Brosnan had various 
doubts about this in finding necessary exceptions 
on occasion; Latimer took the position that a civilian 
constitutional right must first be granted by the Con­
gress to those in the military.22 *25
A sharp division has always existed between the military court-
martial system and the United States judicial systems. The United States
Supreme Court has maintained a hands-off attitude toward review of 
23military justice. The Court's interest has been concerned with juris­
diction only. The Supreme Court ruled in Dynes v. Hoover, that the 
court-martial system is not a part of the judicial system of the United 
States. Considering provisions of the Constitution the Court stated:
These provisions show that Congress has the power to 
provide for the trial and punishment of military and 
naval offenses in the manner then and now practiced by 
civilized nations; and that power to do so is given with­
out any connection between it and the Third Article of 
the Constitution defining the judicial power of the United 
States; indeed that the two powers are entirely independent 
of each other.^
Since courts-martial are not included among the "inferior courts"
of Article 3 and are not a part of the Federal Judicial system, there is
no direct appeal channel to the Federal Appellate courts. During the
civil war the system of military trials was challenged in the Supreme
Court. The Court dismissed the case, stating that it was without juris-
25diction to review the proceedings of a military tribunal.
22Richard L. Tedrow, Digest: Annotated and Digested Opinions, 
U, S. Court of Military Appeals (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 
1966), p. 658.
2%arren, loc. cit.
2\>ynes v. Hoover, 20 How. (61 U. S.) 65 (1857).
25Ex Parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243 (1864).
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For court-martial matters to come before the Federal courts, 
persons held or tried by the military must petition the Federal courts 
for writ of habeus corpus. By so petitioning, a person detained by or 
because of military authority raises the issue of whether the military 
has the power to detain and try him. This is the basic issue of juris­
diction. The petition may be made to the appropriate Federal District 
Court and may reach the Supreme Court by way of appeal. In an early 
example, which has been considered as one of the great landmark decisions 
in the cause of civil supremacy, Ex Parte Milligan, the court ruled that 
the military had no jurisdiction over a civilian, even in time of war,
if civil courts were operating. The Court was particularly concerned
2 6about the Constitutional rights of the civilian. In Grafton v. United 
States the Court ruled:
Courts-martial are lawful tribunals, with authority 
to determine finally any case over which they have 
jurisdiction, and their proceedings, when confirmed as 
provided, are not open to review by the civil tribunals, 
except for the purpose of ascertaining whether the 
military court had jurisdiction of the person and subject 
matter, and whether, though having such jurisdiction} it 
had exceeded its powers in the sentence pronounced.
Later Supreme Court jurisdictional cases, even after the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, have declared that military courts
have no jurisdiction over civilians, citing the lack of constitutional 
28guarantees. These rulings have declared unconstitutional certain 
provisions of the UCMJ granting jurisdiction over civilians. (Article 
3(a) and Article 2(11). 26*
26Ex Parte Milligan. 4 Wall. 2; 18 L. ed. 281 (1866).
2^Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333 (1907).
^ United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11; 76 Sup.
Ct. 1 (1955).
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But now with the decision in Burns v. Wilson, the Supreme Court
has shown that; "Court-martial proceedings could be challenged through
habeus corpus actions brought in civil courts, if those proceedings
29had denied the defendant fundamental rights."
In another case, although not directly involving a court-martial 
proceeding, the Supreme Court showed a special interest in the civilian 
serviceman's basic rights. In this case the court considered a provision 
of our law that acted retroactively to denationalize a citizen convicted 
of wartime desertion by a court-martial. Under this provision, over 
7000 men who had served in the Army alone, in World War II, were rendered 
stateless. It was the decision of the Court that by this act, Congress 
had exceeded its constitutional powers by depriving citizens of their 
birthright. Four members of the Court, including the chief justice, 
expressed the view that this law, effectively denying the person's 
rights to have rights, was a cruel and unusual punishment. The need
for military discipline was considered an inadequate foundation for
. . 30expatriation.
The executive branch of our government has also been reluctant
to recognize the constitutional basis for the serviceman's rights. As
late as 1911, it was generally denied that the personal guarantees found
31in the constitution applied to men in uniform. We even find under 
UCMJ that some court-martial officers believe that persons in the 
military do not have constitutional rights. The Court of Military 
Appeals reversed one conviction where the court-martial president stated *301
^Warren, loc. cit.
30Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86.
31James Snedeker, Military Justice Under The Uniform Code (Boston: 
Little Brown and Co. 1953), p. 445 N. 1 citing, JAG, Navy, June 29, 1911.
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his belief that servicemen have no constitutional rights except as
32given in the Code. Also in a most recent answer to a contention by 
the Navy's Judge Advocate General that, "military law is in nowise 
affected by constitutional limitations", the Court said, "the time is 
long since past when this Court will lend an attentive ear to the argu­
ment that members of the armed forces are by reason of their status,
O Oipso facto deprived of all protections of the Bill of Rights."
Even the United States Air Force, whose military justice ex- 
perience has been almost entirely under the UCMJJ has, at least in 
some cases, disregarded some of the basic rights. An editorial in the 
Washington Post was especially critical.
The case of Captain Joseph P. Kauffman, now before 
the United States Court of Military Appeals, has ex­
posed some thoroughly abhorrent conduct on the part 
of the United States Air Force. Captain Kauffman was 
convicted, of conspiracy to commit espionage--and was 
certainly guilty of conduct that was extremely foolish 
if not actually disloyal. But the Air Force, by its 
own admission, was guilty of conduct that violated the 
law--and violated fundamental standard of fairness and 
decency as well.
The Air Force admitted that, in its investigation of 
the Kauffman case, its agents illegally broke into the 
officer's off-base home four times and searched it with­
out a warrant. These agents also tapped his telephone 
and listened in on conversations between him and his 
attorney. This reckless disregard of the law and of a 
defendant's rights recalls the recent case of Airman 
Gerald M. Anderson from whom a confession was extorted 
after 40 hours of grilling by Air Force investigators 
less than a year ago in Idaho. What manner of Gestapo 
is the Air Force operating? *3
^ United States v. Deain, 5 USCMA 44, 17 CMR 44 (1954) .
33Time, May 5, 1967 Vol. 89 No. 18 p. 50.
The Air Force operated initially under the Army Articles of 
War until the UCMJ became effective in May 1951 (Act of June 25, 1948; 
c. 648, 62 Stat. 1014).
34
67
It is beside the point that the conduct of the Air 
Force was no doubt prompted by zeal and by concern for 
the national security. The Air Force was established 
as a defender of American values and what is proudly 
called an American way of life. It cannot protect those 
values and that way of life by disregarding them.33
The Anderson case referred to caused considerable notoriety for 
the Air Force and its Office of Special Investigations. In this case, 
Anderson confessed to a double murder after intensive interrogating.
Seven months later he was exonorated while in theElsinore County, Idaho,
jail awaiting trial. Another man confessed and convinced authorities of
, 36Anderson s innocence.
Of Course one would expect the military to be more concerned with 
overall discipline than with the rights of the accused. The armed forces 
have always considered military justice, or more specifically the court- 
martial, as an instrument to enforce discipline.
Not belonging to the judicial branch of the Govern­
ment, it follows that courts-martial must pertain to 
the executive department; and they are in fact simply 
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by 
Congress for the President as Commander-in-Chief, to 
aid him in properly commanding the Army and Navy and 
enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his 
orders or those of his authorized military representa­
tives ."
This followed the British concept, "It must never be lost sight of that
the only legitimate object of military tribunals is to aid the Crown to
38maintain the discipline and government of the Army."
33Washington Post, Oct. 23, 1963 (U. S. v. Kauffman, 14 USCMA 
283, 34 CMR 63).
O £aJames R. Phelan, "Innocent's Grim Ordeal," Saturday Evening 
Post, Feb. 2, 1963.
37William Winthrop, Military Law (Washington: W. H. Morrison, 
2 vo1s, 1886), Vol, I, p. 52.
38Ibid., p. 53 (citing Clodes, "Military Forces of the Crown,"
Vol. 6) .
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Professor Morgan, in discussing the background of the Uniform
Code, emphasized the problem of satisfying Secretary Forrestal's directive
to frame a code that would provide full protection of the rights of
persons subject to the code without undue interference with appropriate
military functions. "This meant complete repudiation of a system of
39military justice conceived only as an instrumentality of command."
Whether we consider that the serviceman's rights are constitu­
tional or statutory, or were given by the founding fathers or subsequent 
lawmakers, or were recognized by old or new judicial decisions, the fact
remains he now has protections equal to and in some cases greater than
40his civilian counterpart. Since our military justice system is based 
on constitutional authority let us examine those rights or guarantees 
based on the Constitution. The Uniform Code mentions some of them but
is silent on others, and nowhere enumerates the guarantees applicable.
Comparisons of Justice
All of the guarantees enumerated in the Constitution do not 
apply in courts-martial. Some are specifically excepted, and some are 
by their history inapplicable in whole or part. The prohibition of 39*
39Edmund M. Morgan, "The Background of the Uniform Code of Mili­
tary Justice," Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 6-169, Feb. 1953.
^®Carrol C. Moreland, Equal Justice Under Law: The American Legal 
System (New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1957) p. 55. William C. 
Hamilton, Jr., "Military Law: Drumhead Justice is Dead," American Bar 
Association Journal Vol. 43 Sept. 1957, p. 797. See statement by A. 
Kenneth Pye, Assoc. Dean and Prof, of Law,. Georgetown University Law 
Center. Senate Hearings, Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel,
1962, p. 567; and Testimony p. 787. Also see Michigan Law Review, Vol. 
63-1, Nov. 64. "...Courts-martial, unlike their civilian counterparts, 
are paternalistic and designed to deal with the internal affairs of the 
military when summary command discipline is appropriate. The maximum
limits on punishment, the stringent rules against self-incrimination, and
the elaborate system of automatic and discretionary review found in mili­
tary courts offer greater protection to a defendant before a court-martial 
than he would receive in civilian courts.
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prosecution for a capital or otherwise infamous crime except upon 
presentment or indictment of a grand jury is specifically excepted 
from operation in cases arising in the land or naval f o r c e s . T h e  
right to a jury trial is excepted by implication; that right is inter­
preted as applicable to those whom the right of grand jury action is
42guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. The right to a trial in the state 
where the crime was committed, and the protection against excessive bail 
have never been held applicable to courts-martial procedure; they were 
not so applicable at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, and 
it is upon the background of the conditions existing at that time that
/ Qthe language of the Constitution is interpreted. The prohibition of 
warrants issued upon other than probably cause, supported by oath, and
44being specific as to place, persons, and things does not apply to
courts-martial for the same historical reason; but the failure to make
any provision in the armed forces for the issuance of search warrants
does not operate to give to military authorities unlimited power to
45make searches and seizures. The guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures applies to persons in the armed forces, but greater latitude
is allowed, due to the exigencies of military service, in the determina-
46tion of what may be unreasonable.
u. S., Constitution Amend. V.
'Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. ed. 281 (1866) .
[Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 1 (1942) .
u. S., Constitution Amend. IV.
45Best v. United States, 184 F. 2nd 131, (C. C. A. 1st. 1950). 46
46Gillars v. United States, 182 F. 2nd 962, (APP. D. C. (1950).
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Although many scholars have shied away from comparing military
and civilian justice because of basic differences, a number of seemingly
valid comparisons can be made. Some of the fundamental guarantees which
47apply to an accused in military justice are the following:
1. Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation (U. S. Const. Amend, VI).
2. Right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense 
(U. S. Const. Amend. VI).
3. Right to a speedy trial (U. S. Const. Amend. VI).
4. Right to a public trial (U. S. Const. Amend. VI).
5. Right to be confronted with the witnesses against him
(U. S. Const, Amend. VI).
6. Right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses 
in his favor (U. S, Const. Amend. VI).
7. Protection against compulsory self-incrimination (U. S. 
Const. Amend. V).
8. Protection against unreasonable searches and seizures 
(U. S. Const. Amend. IV).
9. Due process of law (U. S. Const. Amend. V).
10. Prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments and excessive 
fines (U. S. Const. Amend. VIII).
11. Protection against double jeopardy (U. S. Const. Amend. V).
12. Other rights retained by the people and not delegated to the 
Federal Government (U. S. Const. Amend. IX).
The right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation agains.t. him entitles him to insist that the charges
Snedeker, op. cit. p. 447.47
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and specifications apprize him, in advance of trial, of the offense
charged, with such reasonable certainty that he can make his defense
and subsequently protect himself against another prosecution for the
48
same offense. Under the UCMJ, an accused must be immediately informed
of the specific wrong of which he is accused, if placed under arrest;
he must be informed of the charges against him as soon as practicable
after they have been formally drawn; he must be advised of such charges
when a pretrial investigation is ordered; and he must be served with a
copy of the charges prior to trial. The UCMJ is still subject to some
criticism because of the vagueness of the General Article 134. This
Article, although an improvement over the former AW 96 and AGN 22,
"Conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline", is criticized
because a potential offender cannot be sure of the nature of the offense.
Of course when actually being informed of the nature of the charge
specific language is used. In general the basic right is upheld.
The right to have assistance of counsel for the accused's
defense is recognized as essential to any fair trial of a case prosecuted
49by the Federal Government. Assistance of counsel means not only the
right to have counsel, but to have qualified counsel, and the right to
an opportunity for such counsel to examine the facts and the law and to
have reasonable time to prepare a defense. This right applies to 
50court-martial, and was denied in part under the old system. Under *49
^UCMJ 10, 30 (b), 31(b), 35. UCMJ 30 presupposes the existence 
and application of the Constitutional Right.
49The Supreme Court Miranda decision has made the right to counsel 
applicable to State Justice, even in pre-trial procedure. This decision 
has also resulted in some adjustments in military procedure.
5QJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 58 Sup. Ct. 1019 (1938).
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UCMJ, the accused has the right to counsel at the pretrial investigation,
51during the trial, and before appellate review agencies. Counsel will
be provided for him. The USCOMA has ruled that the right to obtain his
own counsel even applies in the police investigation of a suspect as
52part of military due process. The UCMJ provides that defense counsel
for a general court-martial must be a fully qualified lawyer certified
by the Judge Advocate General as competent to perform as defense counsel.
In a special court-martial he need not have legal qualifications unless
54the tiral counsel (prosecutor) is so qualified. The accused has the 
right to choose his military counsel; he will be provided if reasonably 
available. In any case the accused can obtain the services of civilian 
counsel at his own expense."’"’ In general the basic right is fully pro­
tected .
The right to a speedy trial must be considered as relative and 
must be dependent upon the circumstances of a particular case. Reason­
able delay is acceptable. Unjustified delays, however, if they deprive 
the accused of support of witnesses or prejudice his defense are violations 
of the right. Under UCMJ, the right to a speedy trial is protected by 52*4
51UCMJ 32(b), 38(b), 70(c), (d) .
52United States v. Gunnels, 8 USCMA 130, 23 CMR 354 (1957) . 
This seems to be a forerunner of the Miranda rule.
53UCMJ 27(b).
54UCMJ 27(c). In practice, the Air Force now provides counsel 
in special courts-martial if the offense is serious enough for a possible 
bad conduct discharge as punishment. The Army always refers such cases 
to general court-martial where counsel is provided.
55
56
UCMJ 38(b). "Reasonably available" depends on military priority.
Beavers v. Haybert, 198 U. S. 77, 25 Sup. Ct. 573 (1905).
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the provision that immediate steps be taken to try the accused or to
dismiss the charges."^ There is also a requirement that general court-
martial charges must be forwarded to the officer exercising general
58court-martial jurisdiction within eight days after arrest. Article 
33 contains the provision "if practicable." This condition has been 
the subject of some criticism by the U. S. Court of Military Appeals, 
which in one particular case stated:
While, under the particular circumstances of this case, 
we find neither a denial of due process nor prejudice 
to the substantial rights of the accused, we emphasize 
the duty and responsibility of every officer to comply 
with the mandates of the Uniform Code. In the past, we 
fear, Article 33 has been observed more often in the 
breach than in following its clear terms. In order to 
avoid future controversies in this area, we suggest 
that the attention of all concerned with the processing 
of court-martial matters be forcibly drawn to its un­
ambiguous command.59
While there is punitive action provided against offenders^ for violating 
Article 33, there is no Code remedy provided for the accused. In general
the right is upheld and most military cases are completed more quickly
. ... 61 than civilian cases.
The right to a public trial is a right to have the court sit 
"with open doors" during the presentation of evidence. It originated 
because of aversion to Star Chamber practice, and was imprinted on the 
minds of our country's founders by fears arising from memory of the *5860
“*^UCMJ 10. The constitutional right was discussed in the 
hearings on the Code. House Hearings UCMJ, 829, 906, 911, 983, 1012.
58UCMJ 33.
-^United States v. McKenzie, 14 USCMA 261, 34 CMR 141 (1964).
60UCMJ 98.
iMorris 0. Edwards and Charles L. Decker, The Serviceman and
The Law (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1961) p. 93.
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Spanish Inquisition. The scope of the right has been subject to dis­
agreement, but according to the Supreme Court, the purpose is to allow
the public to see that the accused received fair treatment and to act
63as an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial powers.
The accepted practice is to exclude young persons when public decency
may be offended. Under the Uniform Code the same general rules apply.
The right to a public trial is not specifically mentioned in UCMJ, but
in the House hearings on the Code, it was discussed and agreed that the 
64right applied. The U. S. Court of Military Appeals has indicated
that except in security matters, the right to a public trial is the
65same in the military as in civilian courts. There is a provision in 
the Code to extend the Statute of Limitations if trials must be deferred 
during wartime.
The right of confrontation is a common law right which has always
had some exceptions. Typical exceptions are dying declarations and
67former sworn testimony of a witness now deceased. The Sixth Amendment 
preserved and continued the common law right. This right assures an 
accused that only those witnesses who personally appear at his trial 
and are subject to his cross examination can testify against him.
Under UCMJ this right is only partially upheld. The Code provides that 
the prosecution may, upon notice to the accused, take depositions of *65
62
62In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 68 Sup. Ct. 499 (1948)
63t, . , Ibid.
64House Hearings UCMJ, 743, 983, 1044.
65United States v. Brown, 7 USCMA 251, 22 CMR 41 (1957).
66
67
UCMJ 43(e). See also MCM 53(e).
Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S. 47, 19 Sup. Ct. 878 (1899)
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witnesses who are unable or refuse to testify in person. Such deposi-
68tions may be read in evidence. The U. S. Court of Military Appeals,
however, has ruled that valid depositions require the presence of accused
or defense counsel at the taking, and that written interrogatories are
insufficient protection for the rights of the accused. Of course the
69accused can waive this right. This ruling is considered an exception­
ally strong pronouncement for the accused's constitutional rights. 
Statutory authority for depositions based on military necessity date 
back to AW 25 and AGN 68. The unconstitutional aspects have been 
argued many times in the past.^ With the USCMA ruling, the right is 
substantially upheld in military justice.
The right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the 
accused's favor is not an absolute right; it should not be denied, 
however, unless the demand for witnesses is unreasonable. It was not 
a common law right and the constitutional guarantee does not compel 
the prosecution to secure the attendance of defense witnesses.^
Examples of unreasonableness might be the immaterial nature of the ex­
pected testimony, or the accumulation of extra corroborative witnesses.
In Federal criminal cases it is the duty of the Judge to issue subpoenas
and to send for defense witnesses within jurisdiction of the court. This
72may be at government expense if the accused is unable to bear the cost. 68*71
68UCMJ 49.
^ United States v. Jacoby, 11 USCMA 428, 29 CMR 244 (1960) .
^Antieau, "Courts-martial and the Constitution," 33 Marq. L.
Rev. 25 (1949) .
71Keller v. State, 123 Ind. 110, 23 N. E. 1138, 18 AM. St.
7 Ûnited States v. Kenneally, 26 Fed. Cas. 760, No. 15, 522,
(N. D. 166, 1870) .
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Under UCMJ the right to have compulsory process to obtain defense
witnesses is authorized, "The trial counsel, defense counsel and the
court-martial shall have equal opportunity to obtain witnesses and
other evidence in accordance with such regulations as the President may 
73prescribe," There has been some anxiety concerning the "equal 
opportunity" condition. "The issuances of subpoenas for distant 
witnesses has sometimes been dependent upon the state of the budget,
not upon the materiality of the testimony „74 The United States Court
of Military Appeals has had relatively few issues of compulsory process,
but has been careful to protect the right of the accused.
The right against compulsory self-incrimination is one of the
most publicized in our society. The basic rule is aimed at physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications which would expose to criminal
76prosecution the person from whom they are extorted. It is not limited
to oral testimony, but protects against the use of legal process to
compel production in evidence of written communications, such as books
and papers, of an incriminating character.^ It applies to a witness as
well as to the accused. The accused cannot be compelled to testify at
78his own trial; if he becomes a witness it must be at his own request. *7
73UCMJ 46.
7^Snedeker, op. cit. p. 453.
75United States v. Thorton, 8 USCMA 446, 24 CMR 256 (1958). 
United States v. Hawkins, 6 USCMA 135, 19 CMR 261 (1955). United States 
v. Daniels, 11 USCMA 52, 28 CMR 276 (1960).
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Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 31 Sup. Ct. 2 (1910). 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (1886).
78u. S., Constitution Amend. V . "....nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself...."
77
The right extends to joint trials in that one accused may not be com­
pelled to testify against the other. Of course voluntary confessions, 
statements, etc, are not self-incrimination if introduced into evidence. 
The requirements for accused persons to undergo intoxication tests, 
display parts of the body, assume a specific stance, etc. are not con­
sidered compulsory self-incrimination in Federal Courts. Under UCMJ
7 9this right is more than adequately protected. This constitutional
right was covered in the old AW 24 and AGN 42, but the Code goes even
further. The UCMJ prohibits anyone subject to the Code from interrogating
or taking any statements from an accused, before informing him of the
nature of the accusation, and advising him of his right to refuse to
make any statement. Compulsion of any sort is prohibited and may itself
be punishable by the Code. Although the right is legally established,
the superior-subordinate relationship in a military society has some 
, 80tendency to be a form of compulsion. Winthrop, one of the most revered
authorities on military law, long ago recommended that, in view of the
authority and influence of superior rank, confessions made by military
81subordinates held in confinement should be held incompetent. The 
United States Court of Military Appeals negated certain provisions of 
the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, by rulings on the 
privilege against self-incrimination. The USCMA decisions said that 
the privilege is violated: by requiring an accused to make a sample
79UCMJ 31. House Hearings UCMJ, 988.
80
oi
Winthrop, op. cit. , p. 329.
See Professor Arthur Keefe's description of the Navy's "Sugar
Cane Rape Cases" in Hawaii in 35 Cornell L. Q. 164 (1949). See also
notes 35 and 36 Supra.
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of his handwriting; by requiring an accused to utter words for the
83purpose of voice identification; and by compelling a person to furnish
a urine specimen for the purpose of using an analysis of it, as evidence 
84against him. These decisions have made it clear that Article 31,
UCMJ, is much broader than the Fifth Amendment and affords greater pro­
tection to the military accused.
85The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is 
dependent upon the reasonableness of a search or seizure made without 
a search warrant, considering all the circumstances. The boundaries 
of the right of privacy are not necessarily those of reasonableness, 
and the opportunity to secure a search warrant in advance is but one 
factor, not a conclusive test. A search may be reasonable if made as
O £
an incident to a lawful arrest. Also the Supreme Court has held 
that, a search without a warrant may be conducted on "probable cause" 
if an offense is in progress. The Rabinowitz v. United States and 
other recent decisions demonstrate that easy generalizations in this 
field are extremely dangerous; it is difficult to formulate a precise 
rule which can be applied to every case. The law of search and seizure
^ United States v, Rosato, 3 USCMA 143, 11 CMR 143 (1953) . 
United States v. Eggers, 3 USCMA 191, 11 CMR 191 (1953).
^United States v. Greer, 3 USCMA 576, 13 CMR 132 (1953).
84United States v. Jordan. 7 USCMA 542, 22 CMR 242 (1957).
85In general, the Fourth Amendment forbids police officers to 
search persons, houses, papers and effects without a warrant issued by 
a proper judicial officer.
88A search may be made without a warrant as an incident to a
lawful arrest. United States v. Rabinowitz, 359 U. S. 56, 70 Sup. Ct.
430 (1950).
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is uncertain and extremely complex. For example, even though probable
cause for arrest of a person may justify the arrest, a subsequent search
88may be made unreasonable because of the method used. Related to the
basic right of the Fourth Amendment is the right of privacy in the use
of communications media. This is supported by section 605, Federal
89Communications Act of 1934, which provided that, "no person not being
authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge
or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person." The basic
use of wiretaps and other communications interception techniques is a
90controversial legal issue. In the military, under UCMJ, the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures applies fully to the private
homes and property of persons subject to military law when they are
91located outside the limits of areas under military control. The pro­
tection applies also to quarters and property inside areas under 
military control, but the reasonableness test might well be different; 
consider, for example, the responsibility of the commanding officer for 
safety, order, and discipline in such areas. "The mere fact that the 
issuance of search warrants by the armed forces is not provided for,
8^Rocco J. Tresolini, American Constitutional Law, (New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1959), p. 546.
88Forcible use of a stomach pump without consent was held un­
reasonable. United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S. D. Calif., 1949).
8948 Stat. 1103; 47 U. S. C. 605.
98W. S. Fairfield and Charles Clift, "The Wiretappers," The 
Reporter, Dec. 23, 1952, p. 9; Jan. 6, 1953, pp. 9-20.
9^House Hearings UCMJ, 1062.
9^Best v. United States, 184 F. 2nd. 131 (CCA 1st. 1950).
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however, does not confer upon such forces the power to make unreasonable
93searches and seizures." Evidence is inadmissible against an accused
if it was obtained as a result of an unlawful search or in violation of
the Federal Communications Act of 1934. Additionally, all evidence
obtained through information supplied by such illegally obtained evidence
94is likewise inadmissible. In general, the Federal rules are applicable
and the right is well protected. "The general principles governing
search and seizures are simple, but not always easy to apply. Essentially
95each case must depend upon its own facts." USCMA decisions will be
discussed in the following chapter.
The right to Due Process of Law has been another highly publicized
and controversial doctrine in constitutional law. The major controversy
has been concerned with its application to States, as a clause in the
96Fourteenth Amendment. The basic right, ....nor be deprived of life,
97liberty, or property, without due process of law....," is the concern 
of Federal and therefore Military Justice. Due process is generally a 
procedural right and is the recognition and respect of substantial rights 
other than the specific fundamental rights listed in the Constitution 
and Amendments. These rights have generally been deemed essential to 
a fair trial in American Justice. When any of these rights are denied
93Ibid.
94MCM 152, Also see Major Fenton J. Mee, USMC, "Search and 
Seizure," Navy JAG Journal, Mar., 1948, p. 2.
95United States v. Wilcher, 4 USCMA 215, 15 CMR 215.
96Walton H. Hamilton, "The Path of Due Process of Law," The 
Constitution Reconsidered (Conyers Read, ed.) (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1938), p. 167.
97U. S., Constitution Amendment, V.
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and the denial is a substantial prejudice against an accused, there has
98
been a denial of due process. In military justice, the right to due
process is not well covered under UCMJ. There has developed, however,
a "military due process" pattern for fair treatment. This pattern is
based on the laws enacted by Congress and generally parallel civilian
justice. The United States Court of Military Appeals has assumed the
role of enforcing this concept. "We impose upon military courts the
duty of jealously safeguarding those rights which Congress has decreed
99are an integral part of military due process." The Supreme Court 
moreover in Burns v. Wilson stated:
....For the constitutional guarantee of due process is 
meaningful enough, and sufficiently adaptable, to protect 
soldiers-as well as civilians-from the crude injustices 
of a trial so conducted that it becomes bent on fixing 
guilt by dispensing with rudimentary fairness rather than 
by finding truth through adherence to those basic 
guarantees which have long been recognized and honored 
by the military courts as well as the civil courts.
There are of course, many military due process rights and protections
for the accused, in the Code and the Manual for Courts-Martial, but 
they are not defined as such. As cited by USCMA these are:^^
1. To be informed of the charges against him. (UCMJ 10, 30).
2. To cross-examine witnesses for the Government. (MCM 149).
3. To challenge members of the court for cause or per­
emptorily. (UCMJ 41).
4. To have a specified number of members compose General and 
Special court-martial (UCMJ 29).
Snedeker, op. cit., p. 456 citing House Hearings UCMJ 1013. 
" United States v. Clay, 1 USCMA 74, 1 CMR 74 (1951) .
100Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 73 Sup. Ct. 1045 (1953). 
’'‘̂ United States v. Clay, Supra, pertains to 1-10 only.
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5. To be represented by counsel (UCMJ 27).
6. Not to be compelled to incriminate himself (UCMJ 31).
7. To have involuntary confessions excluded from consideration 
(UCMJ 31) .
8. To have the court instructed on the elements of the offenses, 
the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof (UCMJ 51).
9. To be found guilty of an offense only when a designated 
number of members concur with findings to this effect (UCMJ 52).
10. To be sentenced only when a certain number of members vote 
in the affirmative (UCMJ 52).
10211. The pre-trial investigation (UCMJ 32).
In summary, the concept of military due process serves as a substitute 
to the civilian constitutional right to due process of law.
The protection against cruel and unusual punishments and ex­
cessive fines was directed principally at the brutality of early 
English law. Some of the cruel and degrading punishments presumedly 
considered were: beheading and quartering, dragging through the streets,
disembowelling alive, burning at the stake, mutilation by cutting off
103hands and ears, and the use of many barbarous forms of torture.
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death,
104or are inhuman or barbarous. Flogging, keel-hauling, and confinement 
in irons were not unusual in the armed services at the time of adoption
Politics
United States v. Allen, 5 USCMA 626, 18 CMR 250, (1955).
10 3David Fellman, "Cruel and Unusual Punishments," Journal 
, Feb. 1957, p. 35.





of the Bill of Rights; they were, however, prohibited by law by 1861.
Confinement on a bread and water diet was upheld as not cruel and un-
106usual punishment when inflicted by a civilian court in 1907. This
is still an authorized punishment in the United States Navy. In the 
military today, UCMJ prohibits punishment by flogging, branding, 
marking or tattooing on the body, or any other cruel or unusual punish­
ment. The Code also prohibits the use of irons, except for the purpose 
107of safe custody. The Code still authorizes confinement on bread and
water, but limits its imposition to not more than three consecutive days
as a non-judicial punishment against enlisted offenders attached to or
108embarked in a vessel. Since it is not a prohibited punishment, a
navy court-martial could adjudge up to thirty days confinement on bread 
and water; the three consecutive day restriction for bread and water 
still applies. Loss of pay within the limits prescribed by the President 
or provided for as a fine by statute is not excessive. The right is 
adequately protected.
The protection against double jeopardy as stated in the Fifth
Amendment, "....for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life and limb," has been liberally construed to preclude a second
109prosecution for the same offense regardless of punishment.
1059 Stat. 515 (1850). 12 Stat. 317 (1861).




UCMJ 15(b) (2) (A). Revision effective Feb. 1, 1963, but see 
Chap. V, Note 94.
109 .Ex Parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (U. S. 1874).
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Although a controversial subject for many years, jeopardy is considered
to begin at the time of arraignment.11  ̂ Since state and federal courts
derive their authority from a different sovereign source, an accused can
be prosecuted by both without being in double jeopardy. Many states
have, however, extended protection against trial in state courts after
trial for the same offense under federal authority. Although the
question has not been definitely decided, the Supreme Court indicated
that the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment apply to 
111courts-martial. In the military, under UCMJ, Article 44 provides
that no person shall, without his consent, be tried a second time for
the same offense. The major distinction, which carries over from the
old Article of War 40, provides that a trial is not terminated, if
112found guilty, until review of the case has been fully completed.
Since a court-martial is a federal court an accused may not be tried
for the same offense in another federal court. He may, however, be
tried by both a state court and a court-martial. In practice, the
armed services do not prosecute by a court-martial if there has been
a conviction in a civil court. There are circumstances of course which
113may prompt the military to prosecute. The right against double
jeopardy is inferior to the civilian constitutional right.
H^Ibid., Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 24 Sup. Ct.
797 (1904).
U 1 Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684, 69 Sup. Ct. 834 (1949).
112UCMJ 44(b). Rehearings are provided to prevent "an obviously 
guilty man" from escaping punishment "on a technicality." Hearings 
UCMJ 1180. An exception is lack of sufficient evidence, UCMJ 63.
See statement by Brigadier General Alan B. Todd, Appendix C.113
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The other rights "retained by the people" statement of the
Ninth Amendment is designed to dispel any theory that the enumerated
rights in the Constitution form a complete list. It preserves to the
people those safeguards which are inherent in Anglo-Saxon justice. The
concept that a person is presumed innocent until proved guilty is such
a right. This right is expressly covered by UCMJ which provides that
the presumption of innocence be brought to the attention of a court-
114martial before a vote is taken as to guilt or innocence. The Code
also provides for the burden of proof.
Those rights enumerated and discussed above are also not a
complete and closed list. Note Table 9 at the end of this chapter
116which makes a comparison of civilian and military rights. Beyond
these rights of the accused, are other constitutional and natural 
rights which are not directly related to criminal justice. For example 
the right to marry enters into a military justice case, when a conviction 
of failure to obey a lawful order was set aside; the order requiring a 
six months' waiting period was not lawful, as it was an unreasonable 
restraint of personal f r e e d o m . T h e  guardian role of the United 
States Court of Military Appeals in specific cases will be discussed 
in the next chapter.
114UCMJ 51(c) (1) and (2).
115UCMJ 51(c) (4).
116Edwards and Decker, op. cit. Table 9.
^^Earl Snyder, Every Serviceman's Lawyer (Harrisburg: The 
Stackpole Company, 1960), p. 28. Similarly, unlawful restraints of 






























NUMBERS OF COURTS-MARTIAL BY TYPE FOR FISCAL YEARS SHOWN - U. S. ARMY
General Special Summary All Courts-Martial
Convicted Total Convicted Total Convicted Total Convicted Acquit­ted Total
7,155 7,737 3,604 , 3,942 75,509 79,097 86,268 4,508 90,776
10,348 12,357 13,294 14,734 202,173 211,913 225,815 13,183 239,004
14,184 16,547 21,307 24,452 197,585 209,445 233,076 17,368 250,444
5,944 6,769 5,116 5,838 54,198 59,961 65,308 7,260 72,568
6,660 7,905 6,717 7,410 39,004 40,778 52,381 3,712 56,093
5,577 6,468 7,863 8,545 20,639 21,362 34,079 2,296 36,375
3,839 4,310 6,550 7,139 16,194 16,812 26,583 1,678 28,261
4,379 4,671 6,022 6,536 13,091 13,556 23,492 1,271 24,763
5,170 5,475 6,948 7,517 13,656 14,129 25,774 1,347 27,121
5,196 5,493 5,751 6,428 13,129 13,566 24,076 1,411 25,487
4,983 5,239 4,804 5,491 10,540 11,798 20,327 2,201 22,528
5,465 5,743 5,760 6,176 12,470 12,906 23,695 1,130 24,825
4,638 4,861 5,410 5,744 12,417 12,750 22,465 890 23,355
4,701 4,909 5,301 5,650 12,554 12,906 22,556 909 28,465
3,656 4,052 5,461 5,805 12,763 13,072 21,880 1,049 22,929
2,783 2,954 4,719 4,983 12,115 12,331 19,617 651 20,268






1,959 2,046 4,016 9,596 15,658
1,776 1,851 4,208 4,431 10,000 10',141 15,984 439 16'428
3,187 3,388 9,473 9,926 23,481 23,821 36,141 994 37,135
3,225 3,725 36,650 38,418 63,923 65,919 103,798 4,264 108,062





General Special Summary All Courts-Martial
Convicted Total Convicted Total Convicted Total Convicted Acjujt- Total
1944 7,507,000 21,547 22,815 204,123 292,172 519,110
1945 8,131,000 24,102 25,671 168,675 175,591 272,163 279*146 464,940 15,468 480*408
1946 4,816,000 32,657 35,977 48,027 50,402 98,707 101,625 179,391 8,613 188,004
1947 1,417,000 9,382 9,977 44,130 97,104 151,211
1948 585,000 8,928 9,561 36,971 81*794 128*326
1949 657,000 5,130 5,532 25,119 52*597 83*246
1950 632,000 4,736 5,090 30*359 68*128 103*577
1951 1,090,000 4,819 5,206 25,484 27*404 79*226 111*836
1952 1,597,000 7,376 8,037 50,335 53,483 88,564 90*950 146,275 6,195 152*470
1953 1,536,000 10,444 11,168 62,079 65,547 97,266 100,888 169,789 7,807 177,596
1954 1,477,000 9,642 10,149 50,995 54,144 76,922 79,498 137,559 6,232 143,791
1955 1,311,000 9,359 9,884 43,030 45,852 60,615 62,613 113,004 5,345 118,349
1956 1,083,000 7,404 7,750 34,203 36,451 48,857 50,702 90,464 4,439 94,903
1957 1,004,000 5,308 5,586 32,594 34,761 49,907 51,978 87,809 4,516 92,325
1958 939,000 3,560 3,767 26,424 28,125 43,368 45,156 73,352 3,695 77,048
1959 889,000 2,251 2,376 19,075 20,287 34,875 35,224 56,201 2,686 58,887
1960 921,760 1,959 2,060 19,279 20,424 33,414 34,682 54,652 2,514 57,166
1961 923,828 1,768 1,899 22,108 23,471 36,499 38,049 60,575 3,044 63,419
1962 1,053,706 1,762 1,876 25,254 26,607 41,694 43,542 68,710 3,315 72,025
1963 1,015,142 1,762 1,843 25,147 26,448 30,939 32,316 57,848 2,759 60,607
1964 ' 1,015,287 1,763 1,865 23,102 24,327 16,055 16,926 40,920 2,198 43,118
1965 1,016,832 1,463 1,553 23,757 24,813 16,106 17,090 41,326 2,130 43,456
1966 1,096,803 1,386 1,476 22,169 23,121 13,169 14,016 36,724 1,889 38,613
88





Service 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
General Army 1,876 1,843 1,865 1,553 1,476
Navy 495 420 440 339 355
A. Force 483 492 421 406 258
C. Guard 4 6 3 1 3
All 2,858 2,761 2,730 2,309 2,092
Special Army 26,607 26,448 24,327 24,813 23,121
Navy 15,782 15,724 13,816 13,174 14,647
A. Force 3,257 2,809 2,707 2,287 1,825
C . Guard 148 139 89 95 95
All 45,794 45,120 40,939 40,369 39,688
Summary Army 43,542 32,316 16,926 17,090 14,016
Navy 29,252 22,756 10,785 11,052 11,934
A. Force 11,689 9,549 4,423 2,128 1,232
C . Guard 683 448 255 231 212
All 85,166 65,069 32,389 30,501 27,394
Total Army 72,025 60,607 43,118 43,456 38,613
Navy 45,529 39,033 25,041 24,565 26,936
A. Force 15,429 12,850 7,551 4,821 3,315
C . Guard 835 593 347 327 310
All 133,818 113,083 76,057 73,169 69,174
t
TABLE 9
TABLE SHOWING COMPARISON OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN 
SAFEGUARDS OF ACCUSED PERSONS
Rights of Civilians Rights of Servicemen
(1) Court must have jurisdiction
a. over person
b. to try offense
c. to award punishment
(2) Presumption of innocence (reasonable doubt 
resolved in favor of accused)
■(common law)
(3) Habeas Corpus (liberty of person)
(Article 1, Section 9) 45678*
(4) No. ex post facto law (Article 1,
Sec. 9)
(5) Grand jury indictment (V Amend)
(6) Against double jeopardy (V Amend)
(7) Against self-incrimination (V Amend)






(2) Same (Article 51c)
(3) Essentially same (MCM 8,214)
CO
VO
(4) Essentially same (MCM 8)
(5) Impartial investigation (includes 
right to counsel) (Article 322 and b)
(6) Essentially same (Article 44)
(7) Essentially same (Article 31)
(8) "Due process" includes trial in 
accordance with law, regulation, 
customs of the service not in­
consistent therewith (Article 42)
TABLE 9--Continued
Rights of Civilians Rights of Servicemen
(9) Opportunity to be heard (V & XIV Amend)
a. Testify (Title 18, U. S. C. Sec. 
3481)
b. Remain silent
(10) Be present during trial (V & XIV Amend)
(11) ■Speedy and public trial (VI Amend)
(12) Jury, impartially selected (includes
right to challenge) (VI Amend; common 
law)
(13) Be informed of charge (notice) (VI Amend)
(14) Confront hostile witnesses (Cross examine) 
(VI Amend)
(15) Compulsory process to obtain favorable 
witnesses (VI Amend)
(16) Assistance of counsel (VI Amend)
(9) Essentially same
a. To testify as witness (includes 
right to testify for limited 
purpose)
b. Option to remain silent (MCM 
Article 31)
(10) Essentially same (MCM 11c, 53a)
(11) Essentially same (Article 30b, 
Article 98; MCM 30h) (court may 
be closed to public in special 
cases MCM 53e) 123456
(12) Court members, impartially selec­
ted; 1/3 enlisted if accused re­
quests (Article 25); challenges 
for cause and one peremptory 
challenge (Article 41)
(13) Essentially same (Article 35)
(14) Same (MCM 117, 149b; Article 49)
(15) Same (Article 46; MCM 115a)
(16) Essentially same (Article 27; MCM 
6, 44, 46)
TABLE 9— Continued
Rights of Civilians Rights of Servicemen
(17) No excessive bail (VIII Amend) (17) Not applicable (but there is cor­
responding prohibition against con­
finement for minor offenses) (Arti 
cle 56; MCM 18b, 127c)
(18) No excessive fines (VIII Amend) (18) Essentially same (MCM 126h (3)
(19) No cruel or unusual punishment (VIII 
Amend)
(19) Same (Article 55; MCM 125)
(20) Right to appeal in 
(Statutory)
certain cases (20) Three automatic reviews in serious 
cases plus right to petition for 
appeal thereafter - right to free 
counsel at each step (Articles 65- 
73; MCM 98-105)
CHAPTER V
DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT 
OF MILITARY APPEALS
Typical Procedure
In this chapter I will refer to specific decisions of the United 
States Court of Military Appeals, how those decisions protect the rights 
of those subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and the impact 
of those decisions on the military justice system. There were many 
significant improvements in the Uniform Code of Military Justice over 
the old systems, but the most significant was the creation of the Court 
itself. In an annual report to the Congress, the Court stated:
In June 1951, when the Court, the first civilian judicial 
body in this Nation's history to sit in final review upon 
military courts-martial, was constituted, it was immediately 
faced with an enormous task. Those accustomed to the pro­
visions of the Articles of War and the Articles for the 
Government of the Navy found its terms revolutionary.
Lawyers for the accused and the Government-a law officer 
who did not deliberate with the court-instructions on the 
law in open court-verbatim records of trial in all serious 
cases-a meaningful system of appellate review had, for the 
first time, been provided for all branches of our Armed 
Forces by a Congress and Executive determined to uproot 
the last vestige of evil which flowed from practices 
under antecedent legislation. But, in the manner of most 
Codes, these provisions of law supplied only the skeleton 
of military due process. Their interpretation, pursuant 
to the intent of Congress was left to this Court, composed 
of civilian judges in accordance with the well-tried 
American tradition of ultimate civilian control over the 
military, and thoughtfully balanced by devolution upon 
the Executive of the right to prescribe rules of evidence 
and procedure as well as limitations upon maximum punish­
ment .
At the outset, the Court was met with hostility on the 
part of many Armed Forces officers, accentuated by the
92
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fact it began its role as a supreme judicial body in the 
midst of war. Nevertheless, from the beginning, it in­
sisted that rights granted by the Constitution and the 
Congress not be sacrificed in the face of preconceived 
and untested notions of guilt and fashioned on the frame­
work of the Code, a sound system of military justice, 
designed fairly to arrive at a proper verdict and sentence, 
and proven to be workable both in time of war and peace.^
Before examining specific actions of the USCMA it would be wise 
to review the working of military justice before a case reaches that 
level. To make this review more meaningful we will make comparisons 
with the civil judicial system, and point out some similarities and 
distinctions, particularly those related to the rights of an accused.
Anyone subject to the code may initiate sworn charges against
an individual subject to military jurisdiction. It is customary,
however, that a person subject to the code report the facts to the
2accused's commander who may then prefer charges. The commander must
make a preliminary inquiry in order to make intelligent disposition of
the case. If he decides that charges should be preferred, he then
takes appropriate action. This step corresponds to action of the dis-
3trict or county attorney in issuing a warrant for arrest.
If the accused's commander determines that the alleged offense
4is of a serious nature, he forwards the charges with his report of
Annual Report of the United States Court of Military Appeals, 
1965, p. 11. The war referred to in the quote was the Korean conflict.
^Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, par. 29b. 
Henceforth cited as MCM, 1951.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 4. Henceforth cited 
as FRCP. Note that preliminary inquiry is not required as in military 
law. A sworn complaint is sufficient for issuance of warrant of arrest.
^MCM, 1951, 32. Less serious 
non-judicial punishment under Article 
discussion of this Article.
offenses may be disposed of by 
15, UCMJ. See chapter VI for a
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investigation to the next higher commander who reviews the case and 
decides what action to take. This intermediate commander relies upon 
the advice of his Staff Judge Advocate, an experienced lawyer, and his 
own experience and judgement. He may decide to refer the case to a 
summary or special court-martial at this level of command, or to refer 
it with his recommendations to a higher commander exercising general 
court-martial jurisdiction. His decision will depend, to a great extent, 
upon the seriousness of the charges.
Let us assume that the intermediate commander recommends trial 
by general court-martial. The charges and allied documents (including 
sworn statements of witnesses, summary of evidence, documentary exhibits, 
and recommendations), go to the Staff Judge Advocate of the commander 
exercising general court-martial jurisdiction. This senior legal 
officer thoroughly reviews the case and advises his commander of the 
action to take. The commander at this level is usually a general or 
flag officer.
If the allegations are of such serious nature that the senior 
commander feels that reference to trial by general court-martial should 
be considered, an officer is appointed to formally investigate the 
charges.^ As a result of this investigation the commander may decide 
to convene a general court-martial. Charges cannot be referred for 
trial however, unless the Staff Judge Advocate can certify that the
^MCM, 1951, 33. See table chapter II for comparison of scope 
of courts-martial.
^lCM, 1951, 32, 33.
^Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 32. Henceforth 
cited as UCMJ. This Article 32 investigation may already have been 
ordered and conducted under lower authority.
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specification states an offense and the evidence is legally sufficient
g
to make out a prima facie case as to each element. The comparable
civilian procedure is issuance of a warrant of arrest, commissioner's
9hearing and grand jury action. The pretrial investigation is com­
parable to the preliminary hearing and the grand jury action.^
It is interesting to note that in the military procedure at 
the pretrial investigation, an accused is entitled to military counsel
at no expense to himself, to present his own witnesses and to cross-
11
examine government witnesses. This pretrial investigation is a new 
procedure for the Navy. Compare the right of the civilian defendent 
under Rule 6, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes 
only the presence of attorneys for the Government, witness under exam­
ination, interpreter if needed, and stenographer, in grand jury sessions.
The investigating officer makes his report in which he can 
recommend dismissal, trial by a lower court, or referral to trial by 
general court-martial. Let us assume that the investigating officer 
recommends trial by general court-martial. The case is then referred 
to a court composed almost entirely of senior officers (or one-third 
enlisted men if the accused so requests) serving in a capacity com­
parable to a jury. The court is supervised by a law officer, an 
experienced lawyer who is certified as competent to perform such duties *910
^CM, 1951, 35.
9FRCP, Rules 5, 6.
10United States v. Lee, 1 USCMA 212, 2 CMR 118 (1952)
^The Article 32 investigating officer is usually a field 
grade (major or above) officer. When workload permits a legal officer 
is sometimes directed to this duty. This author has conducted such an 
investigation.
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by the Judge Advocate General of the service; this position is com­
parable to that of a federal district judge. He is the directing
12authority of the trial. A further matter of interest is the fact
that counsel, in all cases an attorney who is certified as competent
to perform the duties of defense counsel by the Judge Advocate General
of the service, is furnished the accused free of charge.
13Trial procedure in a military court-martial is similar to
that in a Federal District Court. Furthermore, the United States Court
of Military Appeals has stated that if fair trial requires it, the Court
will adopt procedure contrary to civil practice or former military rule.
The United States Supreme Court ruled, "any ambiguity in a provision of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice must be resolved in favor of the
accused. All the safeguards of federal trial procedure apply. The
punishment which a court-martial may direct for an offense shall not
16exceed such limits as the President may prescribe for that offense.
The manual for courts-martial including the table of maximum punishment 
is prescribed by executive order.^
To continue the comparison, let us assume that the accused is 
convicted and sentenced to a punitive discharge and confinement in 1234*6
14
12United States v. Blankenship, 7 USCMA 328, 22 CMR 118 (1956). 
United States v. Berry, 1 USCMA 235, 2 CMR 141 (1952).
13UMCJ, 36(a); MCM, 1951. Appendix 8 contains trial procedure
guide.
14United States v. Hemp, 1 USCMA 280, 3 CMR 14 (1952).
^ Jackson v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 569, 77 Sup. Ct. 1027 (1957).
16UCMJ, 56.
Initially executive order 10214. President Harry S. Truman, 
Feb. 8, 1951. There have been numerous revisions of the manual by 
executive order. UCMJ is public law and can only be revised by full 
legislative action.
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excess of one year. He is furnished a verbatim record free of charge 
and appellate steps then begin. A lawyer in the office of the Staff 
Judge Advocate thoroughly reviews the case for error, sufficiency of 
evidence, and with a view toward clemency action. The record of trial, 
the written review, and the recommendations of the reviewing officer 
then go to the commander who convened the court. He can approve, dis­
approve or modify the sentence, in addition to exercising the power to
18grant clemency. This constitutes the first appellate step.
If the sentence as approved includes a punitive discharge or
confinement for one year or more, the record goes forward to a board 
19of review. This board of review is composed of three experienced 
senior military attorneys, at the highest Department level. The Board 
thoroughly reviews the case without petition from the accused, it has 
the power to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses 
and determine controverted questions of fact, a power unique in 
appellate procedure. During this second appellate step, the accused 
is entitled to the services of experienced appellate attorneys who are 
authorized to present briefs and oral arguments, precisely as in the 
Federal Court of Appeals.
If this conviction is sustained by the board of review, notice
of such action is served upon the accused. Within thirty days he may
indicate his intention to petition the United States Court of Military
20Appeals for a review of his case. This notice can take the form of 






channels, a statement to his counsel, or completion of a form given him
at the time of service of the action of the board of review. At the
time he takes action to transmit his desire to appeal, his right to
petition the court accrues, and he is again entitled to appellate
counsel at government expense. This is his third appellate step.
Contrast his appellate rights with the appellate rights of a civilian
defendent. Contrast also the mentioned thirty-day period with the
period allowed a civilian defendent under Rule 37(a) (2), Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which requires that an appeal be perfected within
ten days from the final order. Consider also the appellate steps in
civilian courts where a defendent is allowed normally one appellate
review upon the law of the case, and at considerable expense to himself
21for attorney fees, transcripts, filing fees and the like.
When these appellate steps have been finished, the military 
procedure is not yet complete. After final action by the board of 
review or the United States Court of Military Appeals as the case may 
be, the record is examined in the Office of the Judge Advocate General 
for possible clemency action. The accused must also be considered for 
clemency within six months after confinement and each year thereafter 
during his confinement. Contrast these several opportunities for 
clemency afforded a military accused with the one opportunity afforded 
a civilian defendent by reference of his case to a busy probation 
officer in a Federal District Court.
A further point that may be of considerable interest is the 
fact that this military appellate procedure is not limited to those 21
21William C. Hamilton, "Military Law: Drumhead Justice is 
Dead," American Bar Association Journal, Vol. XLIII, pp. 797-800.
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accused individuals who plead not guilty at trial level and require 
the government to prove its case. The same rights and appellate steps 
are afforded an accused who pleads guilty and offers no evidence in 
his behalf.22
The procedure in the United States Court of Military Appeals 
was described in Chapter III. In discussing the goals of UCMJ and 
USCMA, the Court has said that it has been its desire to establish for 
the military a body of law under which all who serve in the military 
can rely on receiving a fair and impartial trial if they are charged 
with a crime subject to military jurisdiction. This does not mean 
that the Court considers itself the be-all and end-all of the military 
justice system. Rather, it is the belief of the Court and its members, 
that a good military justice system begins as soon as it is known that 
a crime has been committed. Thus, the system must be impregnated with 
honesty, fairness, and impartiality throughout the whole procedure; 
commencing with the investigation, the charges, the appointing of the 
members of the court-martial as well as the counsel who will appear 
before such members; the proceedings before the court-martial, the 
staff judge advocate's or legal officer's review, the convening 
authority's action; the proceedings before the Boards of Review, and 
ultimately by the review of the United States Court of Military Appeals. 
Each step is an important cog in the military justice machine. It is 
the aim of the Court to achieve at every level that excellence in
22MCM, 1951, 84a. "General. After every trial by court- 
martial, etc." The code provides for an automatic review in all cases- 
first by the convening authority and then by the Judge Advocate General. 
The three appellate steps in the assumed case were a result of the 
serious sentence. (dishonorable discharge and confinement for one year).
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operation, which is not only desirable but also necessary to the
23administration of military justice.
USCMA In Action: Jurisdiction
In this attempt to show how the Court accomplishes the mission 
of guardian of military justice let us examine some cases and decisions. 
Before any trial can begin the Court must have legal jurisdiction. The 
Uniform Code is very specific. The Court of Military Appeals monitors 
jurisdiction in the exercise of its normal appellate function. In doing 
so four questions are considered: (1) was the court-martial duly con­
stituted? (2) did it have jurisdiction of the person tried? (3) did 
it have jurisdiction of the offense charged? (4) was the sentence 
imposed within the prescribed maximum limit?
In discussing the first question, "was the court-martial duly 
constituted?" one should realize that courts-martial unlike ordinary
civil courts, do not possess any high degree of permanance. They come
24into existence by direct written orders of the convening authority, 
usually a senior commander; in the case of a general court-martial he 
is normally a general or flag officer. Large commands often have 
several general and special courts appointed at one time. Due to the 
nature of the military occupation, court members are often unavailable; 
this requires frequent amendments and the creation of new courts. The 
Uniform Code requires members of general and special courts-martial, all
23The United States Court of Military Appeals, pamphlet 0-774-858 
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 5.
24UCMJ, 22, 23, 24. These Articles respectively specify who may 
convene a General, Special and Summary court-martial. Also see Table 1.
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counsel, the law officer and the reporter to take an oath in each
case "in the presence of the accused to perform their duties faithfully." 
USCMA has said:
General courts-martial, being tribunals of special and 
limited jurisdiction, must be convened strictly in accordance 
with statutory requirements. . . . members of a court- 
martial must have been lawfully appointed thereto in order 
that they may enjoy status as members.26
The eligibility of all members is carefully evaluated. In one case a
security watch officer on the night of the offense in question made an
investigation and later sat as a member of the special court that tried
the accused. The USCMA. found "a probability of specific prejudice"
against the accused, and ruled that the prejudice was not waived by
27failure to challenge even though the accused had pleaded guilty.
There must also be careful scrutiny of the eligibility of the law
officer, trial and defense counsel, and the status of the convening 
28authority. The following is an interesting case concerning con­
vening authority.
An airman at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D. C., 
burglarized the house of General Edwards, and four days later made a 
similar attempt at the house of General Lee, the Base Commander.
25
25UCMJ, 42(a).
2 Ûnited States v. Padilla and Jacobs, 1 USCMA 601, 5 CMR 
31 (1952).
27United States v. Bound, 1 USCMA 224, 2 CMR 130 (1952).
28MCM, 1951, par. 5, 6, 7. Eligibility even concerns the 
Reporter. An accuser, whether actual or nominal, is disqualified from 
acting as Reporter or interpreter in court-martial proceedings in which 
he is the accuser nor can the accuser take depositions. United States 
v. Moeller, 8 USCMA 275, 24 CMR 85 (1957). United States v. Martinez, 
11 USCMA 224, 29 CMR 40 (1960). United States v. Payne, 12 USCMA 455, 
31 CMR 41 (1961).
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General Lee was interviewed as part of an investigation. The charge 
involving General Lee's house was dropped. The accused was tried, for 
the offense at General Edwards' house, by a court convened, after the 
event, by General Lee as Base Commander. The accused was convicted and 
sentenced to a dishonorable discharge and five years confinement. In 
his review as convening authority, General Lee reduced the confinement 
to two years. The Court of Military Appeals held that General Lee was 
disqualified to act as convening and reviewing authority. The Court 
ruled:
.... reasonable persons would impute to General Lee at
the time he appointed the court a personal feeling or 
interest in the matter . . .
While General Lee reduced the sentence, who can say 
what, if any, additional remission might have been 
made by one who had no interest in the matter.
.... we find substantial rights of the accused were
O Qmaterially prejudiced . . .
In another case involving the convening authority, two Navy
hospital men (enlisted), were charged personally by their commander,
a Navy captain, for a regulation violation. The captain forwarded the
charges to his superior, the Commander, Naval Forces, Far East. This
latter officer then referred the case to the Officer Commanding the
Naval Base at Pusan, Korea. This Base Commanding Officer, whose rank
was commander convened a special court-martial for the trial. Of
course in the Navy the rank of commander is inferior to captain. This,
the Court of Military Appeals ruled, was contrary to the intent of the 
30Code, in that only a "superior" could be a "competent convening 
authority." The court held: "The provisions with which we deal require
29United States v. Gordon, 1 USCMA 255, 2 CMR 161 (1952).
30UCMJ, 23(b).
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a superior to convene the court; and these provisions having been
violated, the tribunal designated was not authorized by law to try these
31accused and render a judgement against them." This was clearly a
case of the court's concern for enforcing a procedure that had been
adopted to lessen command control.
In civil life the court is taken much for granted. Rarely is a
judicial appointment or election questioned, and rarely are judicial
acts declared void because the court was not duly constituted. In
contrast we have seen some of the problems in this regard in the
military justice system. So too with personal jurisdiction. The
question is much more likely to occur in the military sphere. Rare 
32exceptions emphasize the general rule in civil life, that, exemption
from criminal jurisdiction cannot be predicated upon the status of the
accused. Under civil law the locus of the offense is all important;
the status of the accused is not. Under military law, in contrast,
quite the reverse is true. Unlimited geographic jurisdiction of the
court-martial has been traditional and supported by U. S. Supreme Court 
. . . 33decision. The Uniform Code expresses this inrefutable view with appro-
34priate conciseness: "This code shall be applicable in all places."
31United States v. LaGrange and Clay, 1 USCMA 342, 3 CMR 76 (1952)
32Such exceptions are Ambassadors and other diplomats, and in­
fants under seven.
33Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wallace (U. S.), 2 (1867). Chief Justice 
Chase said, "and wherever our Army or Navy go beyond our territorial 
limits neither can go beyond the authority of the President or the 
Legislation of Congress."
34UCMJ, 5. An exception is the third clause of Article 134, The 
General Article, "crimes and offenses not capital." For example, a 
person subject to military law cannot be prosecuted under this clause 
for having committed a crime or offense, not capital, when the act 
occurred in occupied foreign territory, merely because the act would 
have been an offense against the law of the District of Columbia if it 
had been committed there. MCM, 1951.
104
This simplicity of place is in sharp contrast to the elaborate specific
provisions of the code with respect to what persons, in what status,
, . ’ . . 35at what time are subject to military jurisdiction.
In discussing the next question, "Did the court-martial have 
jurisdiction of the person tried?" we enter one of the most contro­
versial issues of The Uniform Code. The United States Supreme Court
36invalidated those provisions applying to the jurisdiction over civilians.
This created a jurisdictional gap for which legislation has been proposed 
37several times. This problem will be discussed in the next chapter.
With respect to military personnel, USCMA has had relatively few cases 
to decide.
It should be remembered that military personnel, in general,
continue to be subject to civil court jurisdiction for offenses against
ordinary criminal law. Courts-martial have exclusive jurisdiction
38over purely military offenses. But a person subject to the code is, 
as a rule, subject to the law applicable to persons generally. We
39have seen in the discussion of protection against double jeopardy, 
that aside from policy consideration, military personnel may be tried 
before a court-martial and a civil court for the same offense, provided
35UCMJ, 2 and 3.
36UCMJ, 2(11), Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 77 Sup. Ct. 1222 (1957). 
Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U. S. 234, 80 Sup. Ct. 297 (1960). Gresham v. 
Hagan, 361 U. S. 278, 80 Sup. Ct. 310 (I960). McElroy V. Guargliardo,
361 U. S. 281, 80 Sup. Ct. 305 (1960). Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11,
76 Sup. Ct. 1 (1955).
37S. 761, 89th Congress 1st Sess.
38Examples of purely military offenses are: absence without 
leave, desertion, disrespect toward officers, willful disobedience.
39Chapter IV. Supra. Also statement by General Todd, Appendix.
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the courts derive their jurisdiction from different sovereigns. Our 
concern now is, simply, does the court-martial have jurisdiction of the 
person, and need not be complicated by determining whether the jurisdiction 
is exclusive or concurrent.
If we now limit this discussion to military personnel we also 
narrow our concern for what persons. It is obvious that military 
personnel would be subject to the code, and we can summarize the 
categories of military personnel to include: (1) personnel on active 
duty with any of the Armed Forces, (2) cadets attending any of the 
service academies, (3) reserve personnel voluntarily accepting inactive 
duty training, when the orders specify they are subject to the code, 
and (4) prisoners of war.
The requirements for discipline demand that all such persons in
the above list be subject to court-martial jurisdiction. The questions
usually under consideration are what status, and what time. A military
person cannot be tried by court-martial for a criminal offense committed
by him before he acquired military status, even though the offense is
contrary to military law. This demands a precise rule for determining
the instant a person ceases to be a civilian and acquires military
status. As a result of numerous draft-dodging incidents subsequent to
40the Selective Service Act of 1940, the U. S. Supreme Court supplied 
the precise rule.
41The case was Billings v. Truesdale, Billings, a teacher at 
the University of Texas, who claimed to be a conscientious objector, 40*
4054 Stat. 894 (1940).
^ Billings v. Truesdale, 321 U. S. 542, (1944).
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was ordered by both his draft board and appeal board to report for in­
duction at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He did so and the next morning 
was found physically and mentally qualified, whereupon he refused to 
take the oath of induction and refused to submit to fingerprinting.
For this latter refusal, he was tried and convicted by court-martial 
for wilful disobedience of a lawful order. The Supreme Court, on 
habeas corpus attack, granted certiorari and held the court-martial 
was without jurisdiction; since Billings had not taken the oath of in­
duction, he had not been "actually inducted" into the Army. It pointed 
out that Billings was subject to criminal prosecution in the federal 
district court, for a violation of the Selective Training and Service 
Act in refusing to be inducted. This was wholly consistent with a 
Supreme Court statement of 1890, "that the taking of the oath of 
allegiance is the pivotal fact which changes the status from that of 
civilian to that of soldier.
The Court of Military Appeals has applied the oath test in
finding that a court-martial was without jurisdiction to convict an
43accused of desertion. In another desertion case it extended the rule 
in affirming jurisdiction, by holding that the taking of the oath of 
allegiance was not necessary. In this case the accused, a Mexican 
citizen, without objection reported for induction and remained in a
44military status for ten days before deserting. Additionally, the 
Court has held that a person below the minimum age of enlistment is, 
under the law, incompetent to acquire military status, and any such *43
^ In Re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147, (1890). Actual delivery of 
discharge terminates military jurisdiction, U. S. v. Scott, 11 USCMA 646 
29 CMR 462.
43United States v. Ornelas, 2 USCMA 96, 6 CMR 96 (1952).
^ United States v. Rodriguez, 2 USCMA 101, 6 CMR 101 (1952).
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enlistment is considered void.4-’ Furthermore, there is no jurisdiction
to try such underage enlistees for desertion, an offense presupposing 
46military status. The court held that such enlistment is void even 
if the individual stayed in service beyond the age of lawful enlistment.4  ̂
Court-martial jurisdiction over cadets and midshipmen has been 
a settled matter for many years. For a period of time, however, mid­
shipmen (then referred to as cadets) were held to be in a class by them­
selves and not subject to courts-martial jurisdiction. The Attorney 
General in 1877 wrote such an opinion, basing his reasoning upon lack
of statutes on the subject applicable to the Navy as distinguished from
48 49the Army. This untenable situation was corrected, however, in 1895.
A cadet case decided by the United States Court of Military Appeals in 
1958 discussed jurisdiction from a historical point of view, but the 
emphasis was upon a related but different problem, that of determining 
the kind of punitive separation a court could adjudge in such a case.
The opinion referred to cadets as "inchoate" officers and decreed that 
dismissal was the only legal punitive separation for them.^^
The reservist who voluntarily accepts written orders for in­
active duty training submits to the jurisdiction of courts-martial if 
his orders specify that he is subject to the Code. He is in a poor 
position to contest jurisdiction to which he has submitted. In short, 456789
45United States v. Blanton, 7 USCMA 664, 23 CMR 128 (1957).
46United States v. Taylor, 8 USCMA 24, 23 CMR 248 (1957).
47United States v. Overton, 9 USCMA 684, 26 CMR 464 (1958) .
4815 OP. Atty. Gen. 634 (U. S.).
4928 Stat. 838 (1895), 34 U. S. C. 1061.
5°United States v. Ellman, 9 USCMA 549, 26 CMR 329 (1958).
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when the provisions of UCMJ are complied with, the reservist becomes
in every sense of the word a member of the "land and naval forces"
52
within the meaning of the Constitution.
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
53of War, August 12, 1949, recognizes that the detaining power should 
and does have jurisdiction over prisoners of war in its custody. To 
be more specific, the Convention prescribes that unless the detaining 
power has jurisdiction to try its own Armed Forces in civil courts for 
the particular crime involved, the prisoner of war must be tried by a 
military court. This, of course, is a recognition of court-martial 
jurisdiction. Our Armed Forces were instructed during the Korean con­
flict to abide by the principles of the Geneva Convention, though the 
United States did not formally subscribe to the Convention until 1955.
Questionable categories of persons are retired regulars on pay 
status and retired reservists in service hospitals. There are few 
cases contesting jurisdiction in these two categories. A case involving 
a retired regular naval officer was viewed by the United States Court of
Military Appeals in 1958. The jurisdictional question was decided 
54against him. A retired regular is not only subject to duty if recalled 
but has the continuing obligation that attaches because of his pay 
status and because of the rights and privileges due his rank. In short 
he is considered still in the service and is subject to dual pay pro­
hibition applicable to Federal employment. A reservist, however, is 51
51UCMJ, 2 (3).
-^United States, Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8.
"^Geneva Convention, ch. 3, Arts. 82 and 84 (pow), 1949.
“̂ United States v. Hooper, 9 USCMA 637, 26 CMR 417 (1958).
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looked upon in an entirely different light. He is often referred to 
as a civilian in uniform. Thus when he is no longer on active duty or 
no longer subject to inactive duty training as previously discussed, 
he is, generally speaking, not subject to court-martial jurisdiction.
The Code provides for jurisdiction in the case of retired reservists, 
however, when they seek and obtain the services of our Armed Forces 
hospitals. The Uniform Code of Military Justice is a public law, and 
knowledge of its contents may be presumed. Thus the hospitalized 
reservist may be said to have voluntarily submitted to jurisdiction.
In a sense he has returned to duty when hospitalized, for he has again 
become part of a community made up almost entirely of military personnel. 
Since discipline must be maintained in military hospitals as in other 
military organizations and agencies, the exercise of courts-martial 
jurisdiction in this instance is reasonable.
Another questionable area of jurisdiction is that over discharged 
servicemen. UCMJ, Article 3(a) provides that, subject to the statute of 
limitations, a person charged with committing, during his term of 
service, an offense against the Code punishable by confinement at hard 
labor for five years or more and for which the person cannot be tried 
in any United States, State, or Territorial court, or the District of 
Columbia, is not relieved from amenability to trial by court-martial by 
reason of the termination of such term of service. This area of 
jurisdiction was not seriously contested until 1955. The question is 
now settled that, after normal discharge and serverance of all military 
connection, jurisdiction over ex-servicemen does not exist. The
”*“*UCMJ is not the first statutory provision for this jurisdiction. 
Former statutes relating to Army and Navy hospitals were: 34 Stat. 255 
(1906), and 35 Stat. 748 (1909).
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unconstitutionality of article 3(a) as applied to certain cases can 
best be discussed by reference to the leading cases arising both prior 
and subsequent to enactment of the Code.
The following case is of historical interest, having occurred 
prior to enactment of the Code. The accused, a member of the Navy, was 
captured during World War II by the Japanese. He was liberated in 1945 
and returned to duty with the Navy in January 1946. In March of the same 
year his enlistment expired. He was returned to the United States and 
was honorably discharged but re-enlisted the following day. About one 
year later he was tried by court-martial for offenses including mal­
treatment of fellow prisoners while a prisoner of the Japanese. Upon 
conviction he was sentenced to dishonorable discharge and a period of 
confinement. Military appellate agencies upheld his conviction, but in 
a habeas corpus proceeding in a Federal District Court he was ordered 
released. This judgement was reversed upon the first appeal, but upon 
appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment was in favor of the accused. 
After pointing out that jurisdiction ceased upon his discharge and 
that under no theory would the Navy have considered bringing him to 
trial except that the accused chose to re-enlist in the Navy, the Court 
stated "Jurisdiction to punish rarely, if ever, rests upon such illogical 
and fortuitous contingencies." The Court in its short opinion observed 
that there was no congressional authorization for such jurisdiction 
and quickly concluded that jurisdiction once dead is not revived by 
subsequent re-enlistment.^ Of interest also is the District Court's 
reasoning in the same case that each contract of enlistment is a 56
56United States ex rel Hirschberg v. Cooke, 336 U. S. 210 (1949).
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separate entity and that subsequent enlistment, since it did not make 
reference to the prior contract, could not preserve jurisdiction 
obtained under it but lost it by its expiration.^ This case established 
the "Hirschberg" rule.
Another striking application of this jurisdictional gap is the
58case of former Sergeant Lo Dolce in which a confessed killer was per­
mitted to go free. The murder and robbery were committed in Northern 
Italy in 1944 when that area was occupied by Germany as a hostile 
belligerent and after Italy had entered into an armistice with the 
United States. The accused, then on active duty as an American army 
sergeant, killed his commanding officer, an American major, and threw 
the body into a mountain lake. The offenses were not discovered until 
long after Lo Dolce had returned to the United States, been discharged 
and reverted to civilian status. No attempt was made to try Lo Dolce 
by court-martial. The effort made by Italy to extradite was rejected 
by the federal district court upon dual grounds. First, that since 
at the time of the crimes Italy had capitulated, and American forces
were present as friendly visiting forces, the rule of Schooner Exchange 
59
v. M'Faddon vested jurisdiction of the offense in the military 
authorities of the United States, and not Italy. Second, that, 
following the rule of Coleman v, Tennessee, ^  even if a state of 
belligerency still existed between Italy and the United States,
^ United States ex rel Hirschberg v. Macanaphy, 73 F. Supp. 990 
(D. C. E. D. N. Y., 1947) .
58
59
In Re Lo Dolce, 106 F. Supp. 455 (W. D. N. Y., 1952). 
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch (U. S.), 116 (1812)
60Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509 (1878).
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jurisdiction over its own forces vested exclusively in the United States 
as a hostile occupant. Since the exercise of this jurisdiction by the 
United States was impossible due to Lo Dolce's fortutious change of 
status from soldier to civilian, and because murder committed in Italy 
normally is not punishable by any American civil court, federal or
state, complete immunity resulted for this confessed homocidist.̂  This
_ . . . , . . 62 fantastic situation has arisen many times.
Article 3(a) of the Uniform Code was designed to remedy this 
glaring jurisdictional hiatus. The following case arose after the Code 
went into effect. Toth, the accused (an ex-serviceman legally discharged 
from the Air Force and living as a civilian), was apprehended and re­
turned to his former base in Korea, the scene of his alleged crimes of 
murder and conspiracy to murder, to stand trial by court-martial. His 
sister instituted habeas corpus proceedings to obtain his release. The 
Government's theory of jurisdiction was, of course, Article 3(a) of the 
Code. A United States District Court ordered his release, and the case 
thereafter went before the Supreme Court on appeal. The Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision of the District Court. "The powers granted 
Congress 'to make rules' to regulate 'the land and naval forces' would 
seem to restrict court-martial jurisdiction to persons who are actually 
members or part of the Armed Forces. . . Any expansion of court-martial *62
^Lo Dolce and a co-accused, Icardi, were tried in absentia for 
this offense by the Italian Government. On November 6, 1953 they were 
found guilty of murder by a trial court at Novara, Italy. Lo Dolce was 
sentenced to seventeen years confinement; Icardi to life imprisonment.
New York Times, November 8, 1953, p. 2E.
62William B. Aycock and Samuel W. Wurfel, Military Law Under 
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 1955), pp. 43-44.
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jurisdiction like that in the 1950 act necessarily encroaches on the 
jurisdiction of Federal courts set up under Article 3 of the Con­
stitution where persons on trial are surrounded by more constitutional
63safeguards than in military tribunals."
In the following closely related case, the accused allegedly
committed offenses contemplated under Article 3(a) while a prisoner of
war in Korea. His term of enlistment expired while he was a prisoner.
After his release he was returned to the United States where he requested
re-enlistment. He was therefore discharged but re-enlisted the following
day. Charges were preferred following his re-enlistment. The United
States Court of Military Appeals distinguished this case from Hirshberg,
stating that by enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
Article 3(a), Congress intended to provide for continuance of jurisdiction
in cases such as this and that as applied to a discharged serviceman
who has re-enlisted, this statutory provision is constitutional. As
applied to persons in accused's position, it held that the cited
Article may be sustained under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 14, of the
Constitution, empowering Congress to make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces. The concurring opinion
declared the Toth case to be applicable only to ex-servicemen who have
64severed all connection with the military.
Since status and time are so closely related, the applicable 
ruling for termination of military status is the time of presentation
C  O
United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955).
^ United States v. Gallagher, 7 USCMA 506, 22 CMR 296 (1957) . 
Jurisdiction also extends to service personnel who having been relieved 
from active duty and transferred to a reserve component for completion 
of their military service deligation, have been voluntarily recalled 
to active duty. United States v. Wheeler, 10 USCMA 646, 28 CMR 212 (1959) .
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of discharge. Within the time span of oath to discharge numerous other 
problems of status have arisen and will probably continue to arise. An 
accused may not terminate jurisdiction by his own wrongful act. For 
example, the contention of an accused that his three-year term of en­
listment having expired while he was in disertion negated jurisdiction, 
was disallowed. Similarly, where an accused after arraignment, voluntarily 
absents himself from his trial the court-martial retains jurisdiction to 
complete the trial, findings and sentence. This doctrine has received 
the approval of the U. S. Court of Military Appeals, even in a capital 
case. The Court made this observation:
Of necessity military personnel are highly mobile, and 
on occasion are scattered to the four winds within a 
matter of hours. In oversea theaters, and particularly 
in combat areas, witnesses, both military and civilian, 
are exposed to uncommon hazards which make their assembly 
for trial difficult always and too often impossible.
Certainly the degree of prosecution hardship sharply 
increases as the time of trial is delayed. The capital 
offense escapee may thus gain great advantage, which 
will vary directly with the length of time he is able 
to prolong his absence. This is, of course, true in 
all areas of law enforcement, but it is greatly in­
tensified in that of military judicial administration.
We discern no reason for impending (sic)-perhaps even 
defeating the prosecution of those who choose not to 
be present for trial, regardless of the offense with 
which they are charged. This would, we believe, be 
distinctly in derogation of the just claims of the 
military society, an interest often disregarded in 
febrile evaluation of the rights of frequently un­
deserving individuals."
"....In the civilian community there is no rigid 
rule demanding that a convicted man be sentenced only 
by the judge who presided over his trial. However,
There is no provision in military criminal law pro­
cedure for the imposition of any sort of sentence 
save by the court which tried and convicted the 
accused. As a practical necessity, the court which 
convicts a man in absentia must have the power to 
sentence him as well, otherwise the conviction will 
have gone for naught. It will always be difficult,
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and usually impossible, ever to reassemble a court- 
martial-and the longer the delay, the greater the 
difficulty and threat of impossibility."8^
Consideration of the variety of cases under the question of
jurisdiction of the person tried is further complicated by concurrent
or discretionary jurisdiction. The determination of jurisdictional
responsibility in cases arising in countries visited by military personnel
is frequently subject to agreement. The members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization have entered into such an agreement. There is
6 7also an agreement between the Departments of Justice and Defense, as 
well as informal arrangements at local level in civilian communities.
Since arrangements of this type concern the offense as well as the 
person let us proceed to the next question.
The question of jurisdiction of the offense is answered in 
simplest terms by recognizing that a court-martial's jurisdiction is 
confined to those offenses expressly denounced by Congress in the 
punitive Articles. Congress has also specified in UCMJ, Article 18: 
"General courts-martial shall also have jurisdiction to try any person
69who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal. . ."
This latter jurisdiction, by natural derivation of the law of war must 
extend to offenses as well. *68
^ United States v. Houghtaling, 2 USCMA 230, 8 CMR 30 (1953).
88Status of Forces Agreement, NATO, Art. VII par. 80, 1953.
6 7Memorandum of Understanding between the Departments of Justice 
and Defense relating to the investigations and prosecution of crimes over 
which the two Departments have concurrent jurisdiction, July 19, 1955.
68UCMJ, 77-134.
8^This does not apply to Special or Summary courts-martial.
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Let us limit this discussion of offenses to those denounced 
in the punitive Articles of the Code. We must remember that certain 
offenses can be committed only by certain categories of persons. For 
example, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman^ pertains only 
to a commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman. The offense of in­
subordinate conduct in Article 91 pertains only to enlisted persons; 
contempt toward government officials, of Article 88, pertains to 
officers. But with few exceptions the punitive Articles apply to anyone 
subject to the Code.
In general, the concern of the Court of Military Appeals is
whether the offense charged is one denounced by the Code and is it
properly identified. The general rule as to the sufficiency of the
wording of a specification is that it must fairly inform the accused
of the offense of which he stands charged, and must be sufficiently
definite to prevent the accused from being tried again for the same
offense, but it need not be framed in technical language nor with the
exactitude of a common law indictment.^’*' The Court has aptly observed,
"Sight must not be lost in the fact that the prosecution of crime-
military or civilian-is not a fox hunt, and that rather different
72ground rules should obtain."
On the other hand, the Court is especially wary when the right 
of the accused is involved in jurisdiction of offense. Of course 
general courts-martial have jurisdiction over all offenses made punish­
able by the Code, from the most serious capital offenses, such as 7012
70UCMJ, 133.
71United States v. Marker, 1 USCMA 393, 3 CMR 127 (1952).
72United States v. Aldridge, 2 USCMA 330, 8 CMR 130 (1953).
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murder, to the most minor, such as failure to report for a routine
duty. Special and summary courts-martial have specific limitations.
The following case illustrates the Court's concern.
During the Korean conflict the accused was tried and convicted 
by Navy special court-martial for sleeping on post, which in time of 
war is a capital offense. The case had been referred to trial by an 
officer having special court-martial jurisdiction. There had been 
no action on the part of any officer exercising general court-martial 
jurisdiction or of the Secretary of the Navy which would vest jurisdiction 
for such cases in special courts-martial. USCMA held: The Korean con­
flict constituted a state of war within the meaning of the Code. Though 
not mandatory, capital punishment is authorized for the offense. While 
special courts-martial may exercise jurisdiction over nonmandatory 
capital cases, it is necessary that all the prescribed requirements 
be met. Since the court was convened by an officer whose authority 
extended only to special court-martial and he had not been authorized 
to refer a case of this nature to such court, jurisdiction was lacking 
and the proceedings were void.^
The question of the offense itself frequently enters into the 
area of constitutional rights of the accused. The case regarding 
restriction against marriage was mentioned in the general discussion 
of constitutional rights above.73 *75 An example of violation of an order, 
which infringed on the accused's right of freedom of speech, was
73See Table 1.
7^United States v. Bancroft, 3 USCMA 3, 11 CMR 3 (1953).
75
73
Chapter IV, p. 117, Supra.
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United States v. Voorhees, In this case the Court held that the right 
of a military superior to impose silence on a subordinate is not absolute. 
In part, the principal opinion by Chief Judge Quinn is as follows:
Plainly AR 360-5 imposes restrictions on the free ex­
pression of ideas by Army personnel. The question then 
is whether those limitations set out in the regulation 
constitute an illegal departure from the Constitutional 
prohibition on legislation 'abridging the freedom of 
speech,' which is contained in the First Amendment.
"The right to free speech is not an indiscriminate 
right. Instead, it is qualified by the requirements 
of reasonableness in relation to time, place, and cir­
cumstance. Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47, 63 L 
ed 470, 39 S Ct 247. Thus, there is no doubt that re­
straints which reasonably protect the national interest 
do not violate the Constitutional right of free speech.
See Dennis v. United States, 341 US 494, 95 L ed 1137,
71 S Ct 857. With these principles for our frame of 
reference, we proceed to inquire into the legality of 
the regulation.77
7 8In United States v. Wysong, the Court held that an order by
a commanding officer to a subordinate to refrain from talking to other
persons under any and all circumstances for an indefinite period of
time was an illegal and unenforceable restraint on the subordinate's
79freedom of speech. And in United States v. Milldebrandt, the Court 
held a commander could not compel a member of the command to disclose 
information of his financial actions during leave when such actions 
were not related to military duty or discipline. In a separate con­
curring opinion Chief Judge Quinn said:
Persons in the military service are neither puppets 
nor robots, They are not subject to the willy-nilly push 
or pull of a capricious superior, at least as far as trial 
and punishment by court-martial is concerned. In that
7 f)
^ United States v. Voorhees, 4 USCMA 509, 16 CMR 85 (1954).
77t, . ,Ibid.
United States v. Milldebrandt, 8 USCMA 635, 25 CMR 139 (1958).
78United States v. Wysong, 9 USCMA 249, 26 CMR 29 (1958).
79
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area they are human beings endowed with legal and 
personal rights which are not subject to military order.
Congress left no room for doubt about that. It did not 
say that the violation of any order was punishable by 
court-martial, but only that the violation of a lawful 
order was.
The Court has been especially alert to offenses against Article 
134, the General Article. It has stated that this article is limited 
to recognized military offenses and those crimes not specifically 
delineated by the other punitive articles. The Court has reversed 
cases where it appeard that Article 134 was being used as a catchall 
to supply a basis for punishment where some essential element of an 
offense covered by some other article of the code was missing either 
in the pleading or proof. In this regard, it has stated, "We cannot 
grant to the services unlimited authority to eliminate vital elements 
from common law crimes and offenses expressly defined by Congress and 
permit the remaining elements to be punished as an offense under
O  1Article 134." The possible constitutional violation of this article
continues to be the subject of considerable criticism due to the
82vagueness of some of the. offenses alleged.
As the question of jurisdiction of person is related to offense,
so too is offense, as well as person, related to punishment. This is
83because of the authority within the Code to increase the penalty for 
certain offenses in time of war. For example, during the Korean conflict 
Executive Order no. 10247 suspended the Table of Maximum Punishments 
for certain offenses in the Far East area in 1951. The normal limitations
^ Ibid. The case referred to UCMJ, 92.
Ol
United States v. Norris, 2 USCMA 236, 8 CMR 36 (1953).
82Senate Hearings 1962, CRMP op. cit. p. 785.
83UCMJ, 85, 90, 101, 106, 113.
120
were restored in 1955.8^ By making certain offenses capital, the
jurisdiction of the summary court-martial is thereby negated. As we
8 5have seen in the case above, ' special courts-martial must be given 
particular authorization.
Therefore, with respect to the question of the sentence being
within the prescribed maximum limit, the Court of Military Appeals must
consider time, place, persons, and other special circumstances, in
order to judge the jurisdiction of the court-martial. The prescribed
86maximum punishments are specifically listed in the manual; courts-
martial must be briefed as to their own authority before determining
sentence; Congress has directed the convening authority to approve,
". . .such part or amount of the sentence as he finds correct in law 
87and fact;" and the board of review must affirm, ". . .such part or
88amount of the sentence as it finds correct in law are fact." With
all of the above it is unlikely that the Court would have much exercise
in this regard. There have been some interesting decisions none-the-less.
89In United States v. Whitman, the record of trial in a special 
court-martial case was in part a narrative summary and in part a 
verbatim record. The Court said: "The punitive discharge . . . cannot 
stand without the support of a verbatim record. This portion of the
^Executive order no. 10628, Aug. 1955.




89United States v. Whitman, 3 USCMA 179, 11 CMR 179 (1953).
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sentence is, therefore, illegal."
In the period of transition between the old Articles of War and
the new Uniform Code, this case came to the attention of the Court:
91Lieutenant Colonel Downard was charged under Article of War 95 with
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, which involved assaulting
and cursing his wife in the vicinity of the Fort Monroe Officers' Club.
The acts involved occurred prior to May 31, 1951, the effective date of
UCMJ, but the case was tried thereafter. The mandatory penalty upon
conviction prescribed by Article of War 95 was dismissal, whereas the
successor Article 133 prescribed that punishment shall be as a court-
martial may direct. The law officer instructed that dismissal was
mandatory and the court imposed that sentence. The Court of Military
Appeals reversed, held this instruction constituted prejudicial error,
and stated that a proper instruction would have been that the court
might assess punishment at its discretion, not in excess of dismissal.
It pointed out that anything in excess of dismissal would constitute
an ex post facto application of the new Code, but that the accused was
entitled to the benefit of the possibility of a lesser sentence under 
93
it. Jurisdiction was not directly involved since under proper in­
struction the court could have imposed dismissal.
The Court has also invalidated certain provisions of the Manual 
as a result of its ruling and concern for a constitutional right,
90UCMJ, 19. A bad conduct discharge shall not be adjudged un­
less a complete record of the proceedings and testimony before the court 
has been made.
^Articles of War, 1920; 41 Stat. 806 (1920).
92* UCMJ, 133.
93United States v. Downard, 1 USCMA 346, 3 CMR 80 (1952) .
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Article 55 of the Code, in part, provides that "cruel or unusual punish­
ment, shall not be adjudged by any court-martial . . . "  However,
Article 15(a) (2) (F) thereof expressly permits, "if imposed upon a 
person attached to or embarked in a vessel, confinement on bread and 
water or diminished rations for a period not to exceed three consecutive 
days." The Manual purported to prohibit Army and Air Force courts from 
imposing bread and water punishment but to authorize Navy and Coast
Guard courts to adjudge confinement on bread and water for up to exceed 
94thirty days, in keeping with unbroken Navy practice. In the case of 
Marine Private Wappler, shore-based at Camp Pendleton, California, a 
special court in an absence without leave and missing movement case, as 
part of its sentence included a bad conduct discharge and thirty-days 
confinement on bread and water with a full ration every third day. This 
set the stage for one of the more spectacular decisions rendered by the 
Court of Military Appeals. It held confinement on bread and water was 
cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by Article 55 and that 
accordingly that part of the sentence "was illegal and void." It 
further held that since confinement on bread and water was included in 
the Table of Equivalent Punishments it could in no event be imposed as 
part of a sentence which also included a punitive discharge. The Court 
stated:
Although we do not believe that the proscription 
against punishments of this nature contained in the Con­
stitution's Eighth Amendment-if applicable-would bar the 
punishment adjudged here, it is to be noted that the 
Amendment does not necessarily define the limits of 
'cruel and unusual' as used by Congress in Article 55.
^^MCM, 1951, 126a, Medical certificate, that serious injury to 
health would not result, was required; a full ration could not be de­
prived for more than three consecutive days.
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Use of the phrase by Congress, therefore, raises a 
problem of legislative rather than constitutional con­
struction. Certainly Congress intended to confer as 
much protection as that afforded by the Eighth Amend­
ment . . .  we believe it intended to grant protection 
covering even wider limits. Accordingly, we think 
Article 55 quite broad enough to bar confinement on 
bread and water, except to the extend permitted by 
Article 15.^
This last decision must have come as a shock to the Navy. 
Something that was accepted punishment for 175 years suddently became 
"cruel and unusual." We must remember, however, in the study of this 
and other decisions in this discussion, that the Court is primarily 
concerned about those areas that create a substantial prejudice 
against the accused. The court itself has stated in substance:
It is true that courts-martial are special tribunals 
of a limited jurisdiction, and strict compliance with 
the creative statute is required.
. . . However, we have repeatedly held that not every 
violation of a statutory provision with respect to court- 
martial proceedings constitutes a jurisdictional defect.
. . .On the contrary we have said that proceedings are 
rendered void only by a failure to comply with those pro­
visions which constitute "indispensable prerequisites" 
to the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction. . .̂ 6
97We have seen in earlier discussion that the United States
Supreme Court has extended its traditional interest in military courts-
98martial beyond jurisdiction into the area of Due Process. It should 
be fitting therefore to follow the same road. As one military lawyer 
commented:
While the decisions since Burns do not support de­
finitive analysis, they are at least consistent with
95United States v. Wappler, 2 USCMA 393, 9 CMR 23 (1953).
96United States v. Vanderpool, 4 USCMA 561, 16 CMR 135 (1954).
97Chapter IV, supra.
98?°Burns v. Wilson, 346-U. S. 137, 346 U. S. 844 (1953).
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the conclusions that: (1) The administration of mili­
tary justice since Burns, either at the trial or appellate 
level, has been more in line with the constitutional re­
quirements of due process than in the decade proceding 
Burns.
The Supreme Court, in an earlier case upholding the action taken by
military authorities stated; "to those in the military or naval service
100of the United States the military law is due process." Let us now
turn to the "G I Supreme Court" and due process.
USCMA In Action: Military Due Process
Certain rulings and opinions of the United States Court of 
Military Appeals have been referred to above in chapter IV. Because 
Military Due Process is such an inclusive grouping of categories of 
rights, there are a number of additional cases worthy of discussion. 
On the other hand, because of the vast number of cases and the scope 
of interest, only a cursory examination can be within the purview of 
this thesis.
Describing Military Due Process in a legal periodical, Chief 
Judge Quinn stated:
It can be said, therefore, that Military Due Process 
begins with the basic rights and privileges defined in 
the Federal Constitution. It does not stop there. The 
letter and background of the Uniform Code add their 
weighty demands to the requirements for a fair trial.
Military Due Process is, thus, not synonomous with 
Federal Civilian Due Process. It is basically that 
and something more and something different. How much
^Captain Rudolph G. Kraft, Jr., "Collateral Review of Courts- 
martial by Civilian Courts," JAG Bulletin, USAF, Vol. V, no. 2, 1963, 
p. 21.
^^Reeves v. Ainsworth, 219 U. S. 296, 31 Sup. Ct. 230 (1911).
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more and how much different is indefinable in general 
terms for all possible situations.^01
102In keeping with the Clay case in which the Court first 
aspoused Military Due Process, we can include almost every action in a 
judicial proceeding. In that case in addition to mentioning all of 
the safeguards granted by Congress to a military accused, Judge Clay 
said, "Due Process, means a course of legal proceedings according to 
those rules and principles which have been established in our system
103of jurisprudence for the enforcement and protection of private rights."
The Court of Military Appeals, preempting the Supreme Court 
104Miranda decision, held that an accused could not be deprived of the 
right to consult a lawyer when he is held for interogation by law en­
forcement a g e n t s . T h e  accused is not entitled to appointed military 
counsel prior to the Article 32 investigation, but he has the right to 
retain civilian counsel at any time he is a suspect. He also is entitled 
to consult generally with the Staff Judge Advocate, in the role of im­
partial advisor for the command. This has become an especially signifi­
cant pronouncement for the military, because the Court dismissed the 
charges for deprivation of counsel.
". . .It seems to us to be a relatively simple matter 
to advise an uninformed and unknowing accused that while 
he has no right to appointed military counsel, he does
^"'■Robert E. Quinn, "The United States Court of Military Appeals 
and Military Due Process," St. John's Law Review, XXXV (1961), 225.
102United States v. Clay, 1 USCMA 74, 1 CMR 74 (1951).
103Ibid.
104Miranda y. Arizona, 348 U. S. 436, 86 Sup. Ct. 1662 (1953). 
105United States v. Gunnels, 8 USCMA 150, 23 CMR 354 (1957).
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have a right to have his counsel present with him during 
an interogration by a law enforcement agent."106
The SJA erroneous refusal to provide proper information to accused was 
held to preclude any use of a statement subsequently obtained from him.
The Court has stated it considers the pretrial, Article 32, in­
vestigation as a fundamental part of Military Due P r o c e s s . I t  has
further stated that the investigation constitutes a "discovery proceeding,"
1 08and as such the accused is entitled to "qualified" legal representation. 
Prior to the enactment of The Uniform Code it was the commonly accepted 
view that counsel at the pretrial investigation did not have to be a 
lawyer. This view prevailed during the first several years of operation 
under the Code.
Consider this case, which involved an Air Force sergeant with 
almost 19 years of military service who, had declined to exercise his 
right to counsel at the Article 32 investigation. During the course of 
the investigation the accused made an incriminating statement which was 
subsequently received into evidence at the trial. During the trial the 
defense counsel objected to the evidence because the accused was deprived 
of qualified counsel at the investigation.
The Court of Military Appeals, in reversing the conviction 2 to 
1, held that if an accused desires counsel and selects neither civilian 
nor particular military counsel, the convening authority must appoint a 
lawyer qualified in the sense of Article 27(b) of the Code. "It would
107United States v. Allen, 5 USCMA 626, 18 CMR 250 (1955).
108United States v. Tomaszewski, 8 USCMA 266, 24 CMR 76 (1957).
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defeat that purpose if a person unskilled in the requirements of proof,
109or knowledge of legal defenses represents the accused."
The holding in the Tomaszewski case was the signal for numerous 
appellate decisions based upon alleged failure to provide certified 
counsel at the Article 32 investigation.
The Court's concern for the right to counsel was further 
emphasized by the pronouncement concerning qualifications of counsel 
selected and provided by the accused at a general court-martial.
Even at his own insistence and with full advice as to 
his right to be represented by qualified counsel, an 
accused cannot be permitted to elect to be represented 
by a nonlawyer before a general court-martial. It is 
imperative that only qualified lawyers be permitted to 
practice before a general court-martial. Accordingly, 
it is directed that the practice of permitting non­
lawyers to represent persons on trial before a general 
court-martial be completely discontinued. However, this 
is not to be construed in any manner as prohibiting an 
accused from conducting his own defense should he desire 
to do so without the assistance of counsel. Nor does 
it in any manner infringe upon his right to consult with 
a nonlawyer, or even have a nonlawyer present at trial 
and seated at the counsel table
The Court also insisted that the accused must be advised of his right 
to counsel during appellate procedure and denounced an Army policy of 
discouraging representation at boards of review.
The right to counsel is so closely guarded because it is up to 
the counsel, in discharging his official duties, to be concerned about 
all of the rights of the accused. The Court has reversed cases where 





United States v. Kraskouskas, 9 USCMA 607, 26 CMR 387 (1958).
United States v. Darrlng, 9 USCMA 651, 26 CMR 431 (1958).
128
rights of the accused.
We have seen some references to USCMA rulings in the discussion
in chapter IV above on self-incrimination, search and seizure, and other
rights. Most of the categories are included in the Court's summation
113of Military Due Process. Search and seizure is not, but since federal
rules apply in general, the right is adequately provided for. The Court
has not ignored this area. The illustrations in the following discussion
describes the Court's point of view.
It is well established that where property is owned or controlled
by the United States, the commanding officer having jurisdiction of the
place concerned has authority to search or to authorize others to do so
for him. Likewise, in foreign countries or occupied territories, the
commander having jurisdiction over the person concerned may search or
authorize search of that person's off-base quarters.
The power of a military commander in this field has long been
recognized, and numerous decisions of the United States Court of
114Military Appeals uphold it. He has great responsibilities with regard 
to property entrusted to him, as well as responsibilities of command 
and discipline. Additionally, someone must be readily available to 
exercise this extraordinary power. There being no one comparable to 
the civilian magistrate in the military community, it must devolve upon 
someone who can exercise it in a dispassionate manner. The commander is 
the best choice. However, the commander, too, is bound by the requirement
11 2United States v. McMahan, 6 USCMA 709, 21 CMR 31 (1956).
United States v. McFarlane, 8 USCMA 96, 23 CMR 320 (1957) .
113Chapter IV.
114United States v. Florence, 1 USCMA 620, 5 CMR 48 (1952).
United States v. Doyle. 1 USCMA 545, 4 CMR 137 (1952).’
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that probable cause must exist for belief that an offense had been 
committed by the person searched for possession of the criminal goods 
sought. Mere suspicion, without factual basis, will not support this 
requirement. He may delegate his authority with discretion.
Consider this case. The accused and nine other soldiers, while 
on pass, were transported by an Army truck. Six or seven of the ten 
were suspected narcotics users and one of them was reputed to have been 
previously "caught" with narcotics but never tried for the offense.
Still another was known to have borrowed money before leaving on his 
pass. Upon return of the truck to the unit area, the commander ordered 
the apprehension and search of all ten soldiers based upon the foregoing 
information. This was done and two bottles of heroin were found on the 
accused's person. The Court of Military Appeals held that, search and 
seizure was illegal and its product was inadmissible in advance. Reason­
able or probable cause was lacking for both the apprehension and the 
search. The commander acted on mere suspicion in ordering a wholesale 
search of a group which included "suspects" and those regarded as 
innocent. The search was general and exploratory in nature and "wholly 
lacking in reasonable cause."^^
In the following case a search was made by the provost marshal 
of a Marine Corps Supply Center. The commanding general of the center 
had, by general order, delegated search authority to certain personnel, 
including the head of the administrative branch of the center. The 
provost marshal conducted the search after permission from the head of
the administrative branch. The Court held that the search was properly
. . . 116 authorized.
115United States v. Brown, 10 USCMA 428, 28 CMR (1959).
116United States v. Weaver, 9 USCMA 13, 25 CMR 275 (1958).
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Often searches are conducted by persons, who assume that they 
have authority to act and who do so in good faith, without receiving 
specific approval of one with unquestionable authority. Such instances 
have produced a volume of legal controversy. Cases in this category 
have been upheld on appeal where it could be determined that under the 
particular circumstances of the case the person either had sufficient 
authority or the need for immediate action made the search reasonable.
The Constitution protects only against unreasonable searches.
If immediate action is required to prevent destruction or removal of
criminal goods, it is reasonable that such action be taken. On the
other hand, it takes only a short time, ordinarily, for law enforcement
officers to arm themselves with appropriate authority. The peculiar
circumstances of the case (each case is decided on its own facts) will
determine reasonableness. Thus when six law enforcement officers
expecting to seize a storage of narcotics had staked out the accused's
shack for 24 hours without result and rushed in to search without
warrant when he was subsequently apprehended approaching it, the United
States Court of Military Appeals felt the search was unreasonable.
There were sufficient officers present that one could have gone for the
117warrant while others restrained the accused and waited.
The Court of Military Appeals defined the nature of a serviceman's 
"home", the place in which he had a right to be free from the uninvited 
and unauthorized intrusion of others.
A dwelling house is not a mere physical structure of a 
particular kind; it is a place in which human beings live.
It may be a hotel room, an apartment, an entire building, 
as in the case of a single family residence, or a tent.
117United States v. Alaniz, 9 USCMA 533, 26 CMR 313 (1958).
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State v. Holbrook 98 Or. 43, 188 Pac. 947. Cf. United 
States v. Love, 4 USCMA 260, 15 CMR 260. Generally a 
military person's place of abode is the place where he 
bunks and keeps his few private possessions. His home is 
the particular place where the necessities of the service 
force him to live. This may be a barracks, a tent, or 
even a foxhole. Whatever the name of his place of abode, 
it is his sanctuary against unlawful intrusion; it is his 
castle. And he is there entitled to stand his ground 
against a trespasser to the same extent that a civilian 
is entitled to stand fast in his civilian home. No reason 
in law, logic or military necessity justifies depriving 
the men and women in the armed forces of a fundamental 
right to which they would be entitled as civilians. Con­
sequently, when the accused retired to his own tent, he 
retreated as far as the law demands. The law officer 
erred in failing to make that clear to the members of the 
court.
The trial procedure in courts-martial has been carefully monitored. 
This encompasses a complete review of all rights up to the appellate 
level. We have seen how many of the decisions discussed up to this 
point are based on discovery by the Court in reviewing the record of 
the trial. Here is a case on illegal testimony; this appears in a 
service newspaper:
WASHINGTON - The Court of Military Appeals has just 
reversed the conviction of an airman second class be­
cause his wife was illegally compelled to testify against 
him.
In his unanimous (3-0) opinion, Chief Judge Robert F.
Quinn came out strongly in favor of preserving a marriage 
rather than ending it because of occasional "bouts" be­
tween spouses. The airman was accused of "cuffing" his 
wife.
Court-martial testimony revealed that the airman 
slapped his wife only after she beat him in the head 
with a shoe. Quinn noted that the wife's testimony 
raised a serious doubt about whether the airman should 
have been charged in the first place with assault and 
battery.
The airman testified at his trial that he loved his 
wife very much. She indicated she felt the same about him.
118United States v. Adams, 5 USCMA 563, 18 CMR 187 (1955).
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"To burden (the airman) with a bad-conduct discharge 
in these circumstances borders on the unconscionable,"
Quinn wrote,
At the court-martial, the wife said repeatedly that 
she did not wish to testify against her husband, but the 
prosecutor told her she had to. Quinn held that the 
prosecutor was wrong and ordered the conviction set aside.
Quinn wrote:
" . . .  the general rule is that, as to offenses against 
third persons, one spouse cannot testify against the de- 
fendent-spouse . . . as to offenses against the spouse, the 
victim-spouse may testify voluntarily, but cannot be com­
pelled to testify over her protest."119
The law officer in a general court-martial has gradually
assumed the status comparable to that of a trial judge in the civilian
federal system. This has had the complete approval of the Court; in
120fact the Court has largely contributed to his concept. It has held
that the law officer must always be completely impartial, should never
be placed in a partisan status and must function as a judge at all
121times. The Court has reversed numerous cases because it found the
law officer's rulings and instructions prejudicial to the accused. On
the other hand if it found the error not sufficiently serious, there
would be no reversal. Such cases have been a major contribution to
improving military judicial proceedings. Obviously a fair trial is a
122vital part of Military Due Process.
The law officer's functions are discharged by the president of 
a Special court-martial. Since this officer presides by right of
119The Air Force Times, July 15, 1964, p. 8.
120Unlted States v. Biesak, 3 USCMA 717, 14 CMR 132 (1954).
121United States v. Renton, 8 USCMA 697, 25 CMR 201 (1958). 
See Judge Ferguson's dissent for a discussion of law officer's duties 
in United States v. Mortensen, 8 USCMA 233, 24 CMR 43 (1957) .
122United States v. Jenkins, 1 USCMA 329, 3 CMR. 63 (1952).
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seniority only, he frequently has no legal training. The Court of 
Military Appeals carefully evaluates the president's behavior, in those 
limited cases which reach the Court. The Clay case, referred to several 
times above as the basis of the Military Due Process Doctrine, was re­
versed because of the omission by the president of a Navy special court- 
martial. He failed to instruct as to the presumption of innocence,
burden of proof and the elements of an offense to which the accused had
123pleaded not guilty.
Aside from the legal complexities, even conduct comes under
124scrutiny. In United States v. Lynch, a conviction on a guilty plea 
was nullified due to the conduct of the president of the Court. He re­
monstrated in open court saying, "you, as a civilian lawyer, may not be 
aware that an officer of the United States Army is bound to tell the 
truth."
We recall our own anxieties as president of special courts- 
martial in numerous serious situations. The decisions involved, when 
punitive discharge and confinement may be adjudged, are not to be taken 
lightly. As president of a general court-martial we welcomed the 
secondary role, subordinate to the law officer. In contrast to those
125serious cases the one we recall most vividly was a ludicrous incident.
A young lady, who had allegedly been molested by the accused, was called 
in by the trial counsel to testify, and to identify the accused. We 
had always wondered about the setting of the courtroom which almost 
labels the accused by his position. The trial counsel had elicited the
123United States v. Clay, 1 USCMA 74, 1 CMR 74 (1951).
124United States v. Lynch, 9 USCMA 523, 26 CMR 303 (1958).
125Burtonwood, United Kingdom, 1952-1954.
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testimony about the alleged molesting. He then asked the witness to 
look around the courtroom to see if the person who had molested her 
was present, and if so to point him out. She looked all around the 
room, at the spectators, the counsel, the accused and finally at the 
court. Then with perfect confidence she pointed to a lieutenant seated 
at the table as a member of the court. "There he is," she said, "That's 
the one." After order was restored-even the accused joined in the 
laughter- the witness realized her mistake and properly identified the 
accused. But a reasonable doubt was established and the accused was 
found not guilty. The poor innocent lieutenant who was our squadron 
adjutant, with good nature, enjoyed the notoriety for a long time.
t
In considering trial procedure as a part of Military Due Process 
we must include the protection against self-incrimination and the right 
to remain silent. The Court of Military Appeals has of course been 
particularly alert to enforce these rights and pays special interest to 
confessions. Confessions must be affirmatively shown as voluntary.
Since this is not an interlocutory question, the law officer must in-
, , . . . . .  126 struct the court that it must decide if voluntariness is in issue.
Since confessions are seldom made during the trial, they are more likely
obtained in the investigation stage of Military Due Process. Early in
its tenure in reversing a conviction the Court made this exceptionally
strong pronouncement:
At the outset of the investigation, the officer con­
ducting it did not fully advise petitioner of his rights 
under Article of War 24, supra. This was a clear viola­
tion of that Article. Nor did he advise petitioner of 
the nature of the investigation, or of the charges against 
him. This officer then conducted a searching and in­
quisitorial examination utilizing all the devices of an
126United States v. Minnifield, 9 USCMA 373, 26 CMR 153 (1958).
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expert prosecutor cross-examining a hostile witness, 
accompanied by shouting, accusations of falsehood, 
reprimands, and castigations of character. All these 
factors inevitably lead to the conclusion that petitioner 
was, in effect, compelled to incriminate himself. This 
smacks too much of Star Chamber proceedings. Petitioner 
does not have a free choice to admit or deny his guilt or 
to refuse to answer the questions asked.
It follows automatically that the testimony given at 
this investigation should not have been received in evi­
dence at the trial. Article of War 24, supra, and Article 
31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 50 U. S. C.
Sec. 602, so command. Further, it matters not that there 
may be other evidence of guilt. The right here violated 
flows, through Congressional enactment, from the Con­
stitution of the United States. Military due process re­
quires that courts-martial be conducted not in violation 
of these constitutional safeguards which Congress has seen 
fit to accord to members of the Armed Forces, United States 
v. Clay, 1 USCMA 74, decided November 27, 1951. These 
safeguards are for the protection of all who are brought 
within the military disciplinary system, and are not to be 
disregarded merely in order to inflict punishment on one 
who is believed to be guilty.^27
There are innumerable cases, which we cannot discuss here, 
where the Court of Military Appeals demonstrated that disregard for sub­
stantial rights or activity prejudicial to the accused cannot be tolerated. 
The Code states that "a finding or sentence of a court-martial shall not 
be held incorrect on the ground of an error of law unless materially pre-
1 O Ojudiced the substantial rights of the accused."1 ° In this respect, the 
Court has frequently disagreed with boards of review in recognizing the 
extent of error as harmless or prejudicial. The totality of harmless 
error cannot become prejudicial by mere cumulative effect. The Court so 
held in this case:
Appellate defense counsel, admitting arguendo that, 
considered individually, none of the errors listed above 
prejudiced the accused, argues that their cumulative





effect was such as to warrant a finding of prejudice.
Counsel refers to several Federal cases in support of 
this proposition. Without analyzing those decisions in 
detail, we note that the individual errors in each of 
them contained some, although slight, possibility of 
prejudice. Such is not the case here. The errors dis­
cussed above are formal in nature and we fail to see how, 
individually or collectively, they could have in any 
way materially harmed the accused. Since we find no 
substantial prejudice, we are bound by Article 59 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 50 USCMA Sec. 646, to 
hold that the errors considered by the board of review 129 
do not require disapproval of the findings and sentence.
The Court is certainly more alert than the boards of review and 
thereby justifies its existence as a civilian supervising agency. The 
following testimony before the Senate hearing on constitutional rights 
should emphasize the value of the Court.
. . . it is impossible to expect the services without 
the supervision of the Court of Military Appeals to 
stamp out the endemic existence of command influence, 
and I have here a list of the horribles. I don't want 
to go into them in detail, Mr, Chairman, perhaps if I 
either submit the citations to the reporter or submit 
them separately. These are shocking cases that weren't 
caught by the Board of Review.
There is the Deain case (5 USCMA 44), a Navy case.
They had a permanent general-court. I think the Navy 
has now got away from that. The admiral who was presi­
dent of the general court was challenged and on challenge 
admitted that when "I see him come in there, I know he 
is generally guilty otherwise he wouldn't be here," and 
then he made out the fitness reports on the members of 
the court.
Well, you can imagine how much dissent you were going 
to get from the members of the court in that situation.
Passed by a board of review, reversed by the Court of 
Military Appeals.
Whitley (5 USCMA 786): The president of a special 
court was ruling in favor of the defense. At a recess 
he was relieved and another officer was substituted in 
his place. Passed by the Board of Review, reversed by 
the Court of Military Appeals.
Sears (6 USCMA 661): There was an Air Force special 
court-martial in England. The accused hired an English 
solicitor who, of course, has the right of audience.
^ ^ United States v. Zimmerman, 1 USCMA 160, 2 CMR 66 (1952).
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The convening authority put two lawyers on the court on 
the special court, who advised the president to overrule 
every one of the solicitor's objections. Passed by the 
Air Force Board of Review, reversed by the Court of 
Military Appeals.
Parker (6 USCMA 75): A soldier put on trial for a 
capital case, death sentence adjudged, 1 day to prepare 
for trial. Passed by the Board of Review, reversed by 
the court.
McMahan (6 USCMA 708): A soldier on trial for a cap­
ital offense. His counsel, a major, J. A., made no 
closing argument although it was a very thin case on 
premeditation, said nothing in mitigation when the ques­
tion before the court was whether it should be a death 
sentence or a life sentence. Death sentence was ad­
judged, passed by the Board, reversed by the court.
Kennedy (8 USCMA 251): A cooked-up scheme, I don't 
think any other characterization would be accurate, be­
tween trial counsel, the law officer and the staff 
judge advocate to get a conviction. Passed by the 
Board, reversed by the court, and finally Kitchins 
(12 USCMA 589), when an Army lieutenant made a spirited 
defense his superior, the staff judge advocate, gave 
him a low efficiency report. Passed by the Board, 
reversed by the court.
So, I am convinced you need a court not only to take 
you gentlemen and the Congress out of the court-martial 
business so you don't have to go see the Secretary on 
behalf of constituents but also to look over the 
shoulders of these people who just can't be relied upon 
to do a completely decent job by themselves.l^O
The cases, opinions and statements cited in this chapter are 
not inclusive enough to be considered as a valid survey. Nor have they 
included all the areas of interest. We do believe, however, that a 
firm conclusion can be drawn that the United States Court of Military 
Appeals is indeed a protector of the rights of the service personnel.
We have come a long way since the case described here.
In a rather bizarre case involving a young Army lieu­
tenant named Shapiro, a federal district court decided 
that the Army conducted its court-martial with more 
speed than due process allowed. Shapiro, an Army defense
Frederick Bernays Wiener (before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Rights) Hearings, CRMP, op. cit. pp. 780-81.
130
138
counsel, had substituted one Mexican for another who 
was charged with rape, which caused the chief government 
witness at the court-martial to identify the pretended 
defendant as the guilty party. Shapiro revealed the 
hoax only after the party was convicted. The Army, 
thrown off stride by this ingenious defense tactic only 
momentarily, freed the innocent defendant and charged 
the "original", who was then convicted. There is no 
need to speculate about the Army's feeling toward Shapiro.
It then charged him with delaying a general court-martial, 
a violation of that military catchall, the ninety-sixth 
Article of War. Shapiro was arrested at 12:40 P.M., and 
the tiral was set for 2:00 P.M., at a place forty miles 
away. At that time and place Shapiro's request for con­
tinuance was refused. This treatment was held to be a 
denial of counsel and of due process in what apparently 
was an enjoyable case for the district court, whose 
opinion lashed military "justice" thoroughly. ■'-31-
In contrast to that horrible example of military justice,
compare this case, tried under the old Articles of War but reviewed
132by the Court of Military Appeals under the Uniform Code.
In the past year and a half the Court of Military 
Appeals has protected the constitutional rights of more 
than 2000 servicemen. The DeCarlo case involved a typical 
case the court will not tolerate.
Private DeCarlo was moving up to the front with his in­
fantry regiment in March 1951 (in Korea) when he asked 
Poe Kaiwan, a Korean boy working in the outfit's supply 
branch, for a bar of candy. Poe frequently had given 
candy to the soldiers but on that occasion said he had 
none. All witnesses testified that private deCarlo was 
kidding when he told Poe, "If you don't give me some 
candy I'll shoot you" - and then his gun went off.
Just before Poe died he said he knew the shooting was 
accidental. The law officer (Judge) of the court that 
tried private DeCarlo on May 15, 1951, refused to admit 
Poe's statement in evidence and private DeCarlo was 
found guilty of unpremeditated murder. The law author­
izing C. M. A, to review court-martial convictions went 
into effect May 31, 1951, The Court of Military Appeals 
whose decisions are final, ruled that the supression of 
Poe's voluntary statement was a prejudicial error and 
ordered another trial. Private DeCarlo was tried with
131William M. Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts. 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955), pp. 51-53.
132United States v. DeCarlo, 1 USCMA 91, 1 CMK 90 (1951) .
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negligent homicide at the retrial and received a sen­
tence of six months. He since has returned to active
I  9 9duty (original sentence was 25 years).
The balance between the military's concern for discipline and 
the Court's concern for the accused is a perplexing problem. As the 
late Judge Brosman put it in the early days of the Court:
We can't solve it simply by giving the accused the 
benefit of every possible doubt. There are times when 
military considerations of necessity are overriding 
factors in a case. It is essential for the public to 
remember that military service takes place in an ab­
normal social situation governed by limitations growing 
out of the realities and necessities of military oper­
ations . . . each case involves considerations peculiar 
to itself.
The Court has well deserved the praise heaped upon it. Let us 
turn now to the effects of its case law on the Uniform Code and future 
military justice.
Stanley Frank, 
January 1953, p. 36.
133 "The G I's Day in Court," Nations' Business
134Ibid .
CHAPTER VI
TRENDS IN MILITARY JUSTICE 
Progress Under the Uniform Code
We have seen how the Uniform Code of Military Justice was developed 
to cure many of the ills of former military codes. We have also seen that 
the Code in action is an extremely effective device, and a protector of 
the basic rights of an accused. We have examined the legislative history, 
structure and operation of the United States Court of Military Appeals.
We have also examined some of its decisions and observed how the Court 
strives to maintain a balance between the military requirement for 
discipline, and the constitutional requirement for the protection of 
individual rights. Let us turn to the effects of the Court on the Code, 
by noting some of the provisions of the Code that have undergone modifi­
cation as a direct result of judicial review. The power of judicial 
review is usually associated with the United States Supreme Court,^ and 
in fact we shall see that the Supreme Court has also had an impact on 
the Code. The judicial review of the Court of Military Appeals has 
resulted in the invalidation of certain provisions of the Manual for 
Courts-Martial, which is an executive order forcing the executive to 
promulgate new orders to be in consonance with military case law, and 
causing Congress to amend the law.
■*-Rocco J. Tresolini, American Constitutional Law, (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1959), p. 55.
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The Uniform Code of Military Justice was originally Section 1
of Public Law 506, 81st Congress, Act of May 5, 1950, and was codified
as part of Title 50 U. S. C. (Chapter 22). The Act of August 10, 19562
revised, codified, and enacted the Uniform Code into law as part of
Title 10 U. S„ C. (Chapter 47). This change was effective January 1,
1957. Chapter 47, titled Uniform Code of Military Justice, contains 
3sections 801 - 940, which are synonomous with Articles 1-140, UCMJ. All
subsequent changes to the Uniform Code are therefore amendments to the
Act of August 10, 1956, and are codified in the appropriate section of 
4Title 10 U. S. C. Four minor amendments changed some language due to 
the status changes of Hawaii and Alaska, and extended the power to ad­
minister oaths.There have been only three significant amendments in 
fifteen years of operation under the Uniform Code.
6The first major change was the insertion of Article 58a in the 
Code. This Article provided statutory authority for automatic reduction 
of enlisted persons to the lowest grade. Upon approval by the convening 
authority, any sentence that includes (1) a dishonorable or bad-conduct 
discharge; (2) confinement; or (3) hard labor without confinement; will 
automatically effect reduction to the lowest grade. The usual appellate 
procedures remain; if the sentence is set aside, or as finally approved
2P.L. 1028, 84th Cong., 70 A Stat. 1 (1956).
3See appendix for sec. 801, chapter 47 (UCMJ, Art. 1), 10 
U. S. C. 801.
4e.g, 10 U. S. C. 815 (UCMJ, Art. 15) was revised by P.L. 87- 
648 in 1962.
5P.L. 86-70, 73 Stat. 142 (1959); P.L. 86-624, 74 Stat. 411 
(1960). P.L. 86-589, 74 Stat. 329 (1960), oaths, UCMJ, 136. There 
should be another language change due to transfer of the Coast Guard from 
Dept, of Transportation.
6
P.L. 86-633, 74 Stat. 468 (1960).
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does not include any of the punishments listed above, all rights and 
privileges will be restored retroactively.
The Article 58a amendment to the law, the first significant 
change in the Uniform Code, was a direct result of judicial review by 
the United States Court of Military Appeals. The Court's reasoning 
followed a general pattern.^ Certain provisions of the Manual appeared 
to be in conflict with the Code, or at least what the Court determined 
to be the intent of Congress in adopting the Code. In the 1953 Wappler
g
decision, noted above, the Court first held a provision of the Manual 
to be invalid, when a long recognized punishment in the Navy was 
declared "cruel and unusual." That decision, by ipvalidating a pro­
vision of the Manual, negated part of an executive order. In 1958 in
Qthe Varnadore decision, the Court again took issue with the same section 
in the Manual, concerning punishment. UCMJ, Article 56, authorizes the 
President to prescribe maximum punishments. This is implemented in the 
Manual by a table relating punishments to specific violations. In the 
same paragraph the Manual^ states that a sentence of confinement for 
a period greater than six months results in automatic punitive discharge 
as part of the sentence. In the Varnadore case the Court reasoned that 
this was setting a minimum limit in conflict with Article 56.
Apparently the Court applied the same reasoning in invalidating 
a long standing practice that confinement resulted in automatic reduction
^Major General Stanley W. Jones, "What's the Law Today," Army,
X (1960), 52-58.
8United States v. Wappler, 2 USCMA 393, 9 CMR 23 (1953).
^United States v. Varnadore, 9 USCMA 471, 26 CMR 251 (1958).
10MCM, 1951, par. 127.
11Since 1917.
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to the lowest enlisted grade, and that total forfeiture resulted in
punitive discharge. The writer can recall specific instructions by
the Staff Judge Advocate on many occasions (not in court), to be sure to
include the reduction or discharge as part of the sentence, if that was
the intent of the court. If the court failed to include the proper
sentence it would be corrected by the convening authority in his review
of the case. However the automatic features created administrative 
12 13problems. An Executive Order, amending the Manual in 1956, was pro­
mulgated to clarify the automatic reduction provision. The Court, how­
ever, invalidated that Executive Order and the automatic feature of the
14Manual in United States v. Simpson. The Court recognized that an
accused sentenced to an extended period of confinement is worthless and
perhaps a liability to the services; but it held that reduction, if added
by the convening authority, operates to increase the sentence and is
therefore invalid. Reduction must be part of the sentence. By this
ruling a senior non-commissioned officer conceivably could be sentenced
to confinement and discharge and continue to receive full pay and
allowances. The average time for full appeal in 1959-1960 was 344 days.^~*
These decisions worked a real hardship on the services and were
16severely critized by many legal authorities. Relief was granted by 
12A case is not final with the pronouncement of the court- 
martial's sentence.
^Executive Order 10652, 1956.
1̂ United States v. Simpson, 10 USCMA 229, 27 CMR 303 (1959).
United States v. Littlepage, 10 USCMA 245, 27 CMR 319 (1959).
-'■-’Jones, loc. cit.
16william G. Fratcher, "Presidential Power to Regulate Military 
Justice: A Critical Study of Decisions of the Court of Military Appeals," 
N.Y.U. Law Review, XXXIV, (1959), 861.
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the Amendment to the Code which, in effect, placed the invalidated 
Executive Order within UCMJ, Article 58a.^ This legislation was 
sponsored by the Department of Defense as a result of an Army study of
the first seven years operations under the Uniform Code. 18
The second significant change was implemented by inserting 
19Article 123a, the "bad check" provision. Before this amendment 
became effective, the services had struggles for ten years with the in­
adequate provisions of the Uniform Code. It was especially difficult 
to obtain a bad check conviction due to the lack of specific language 
in the Code. Serious violations were prosecuted as larceny under 
Article 121, while less serious offenses were charged under Article 134,
the General Article. The new Article spelled out the offense with
20clarity, and of course required a new Executive Order to revise the
table of maximum punishments and other parts of the Manual. It is
interesting to note here, that USCMA decisions were not the motivating
force in this instance. In fact, the Court, as part of the Code
Committee^ recommended legislation to correct this inadequacy ten 
22years earlier. The Code Committee recommended legislation similar
17Note 6, supra.
18The Committee on the Uniform Code of Military Justice Good 
Order and Discipline in the Army, Report to Honorable Wilber M. Brucker, 
Secretary of the Army, 18 Jan. 1960, known as "The Brucker Report."
See Appendix C for extract summary. Note the critical letter to Cong­
ressman Kilday, later to become USCMA judge.
19
20
P.L. 87-385, 75 Stat. 814 (1961). 
Executive Order 11009, 1962.
21 The Code Committee includes the USCMA, the Judge Advocates 
General of the Armed Forces and the General Counsel of the Dept, of the 
Treasury.
22USCMA Annual Report, June 1, 1952— Dec. 31,'1953, p. 9.
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to the District of Columbia bad check law. The services welcomed the 
new law and the \<»ord soon circulated that there was a "crack down" on 
bad check offenses.
The third and perhaps the most significant change was the im~
23provement of Article 15., non-judicial punishment. This amendment to
the Uniform Code resulted in a sharp reduction in summary courts-
24martial, and has received popular acceptance by all the services.
The Code Committee expressed approval with this comment:
Although in effect less than one year, the new Article 
15 has already reduced the court-martial rates in the 
Armed Forces substantially. Most minor offenses are now 
appropriately punished non-judicially without imposing 
the stigma of criminal convictions. ^
The new Article 15, was a major revision in non-judicial punish­
ment. It has been extensively used by all the services since it went
into effect February 1, 1963. The attendant reduction in summary
2 6courts-martial is especially noteworthy. The following comments 
express typical approval:
There was a sharp reduction in summary courts-martial 
trials, from 43,542 last year to 32,316, or approximately 
30 percent. This decrease can be attributed primarily to 
the amended article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, which was in effect during 5 months of the re­
porting period, and which provided commanders with more 
extensive and effective non-judicial punishment authority.^
23P.L. 87-648, 76 Stat. 447 (1962).
24See Table 8, Chap. IV.
23USCMA Annual Report, 1963, p. 1.
2 6Army - 61 percent, Navy - 65 percent, Marines - 57 percent, 
Air Force - 56 percent (estimate).
27USCMA Annual Report, 1963, p. 61.
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Courts-martial of all types--general, special, and sum­
mary- -convened within the Navy and Marine Corps totaled 
39,033 in fiscal year 1963 as compared to 45,529 in fiscal 
year 1962. This represents an overall decrease of 6,496 
cases, or 14.2 percent. Since service strengths have re­
mained relatively unchanged, a decrease in courts-martial 
case-load may be attributable to Public Law 87-648 which 
increased the Article 15, UCMJ, non-judicial punishment 
authority of commanding officers. The new article 15 has 
received universal command approval, with many noting an 
improvement in discipline. Despite the relatively short 
period of time that the new article 15 has been in effect, 
it is apparent that not only are we saving many of our 
people from criminal records, but discipline and morale 
are being enhanced.28
The first months of experience with the operation of the 
new Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice, indicates 
that the powers granted by the article are being employed 
with discretion and that a beneficial effect on discipline 
has resulted. Of more importance is the fact that the 
drastic reduction in the number of cases tried by summary 
courts-martial is due primarily to the use of the powers 
granted by the new article. During the last quarter of 
fiscal year 1963, the only period for which I have com­
plete statistics, the authority granted by the new article 
was used by commanders on 51,683 occasions. No informa­
tion is available with respect to the number of times the 
powers granted under the former article 15 were employed 
in the last quarter of the previous fiscal year. However, 
during that quarter, 11,143 cases were tried by summary 
courts-martial, while only 4,419 cases were tried by that 
forum in the last quarter of fiscal year 1963. The summary 
court-martial rate per thousand dropped from 9.96 in the 
last quarter of fiscal year 1962 to 4.39 in the last 
quarter of fiscal year 1963. There was, however, no signi­
ficant change in the special court-martial rate during 
the same periods.^9
Courts-martial of all types--general, special, and sum­
mary- -convened within the Navy and Marine Corps totaled 
25,041 in FY 1964 as compared to 39,033 in FY 1963. This 
represents an overall decrease of 13,992 cases or 36 per­
cent. The decrease in case load cannot be attributed to 
a decrease in service strengths since they have increased 
slightly, but may be attributable to PL 87-648 which in­
creased the Article 15 UCMJ non-judicial punishment 
authority of commanding officers. A comparative analysis 
of the first two quarters of FY 1963 (before the new
28Ibid. , p. 89. 
^ Ibid., pp . 66-67.
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Article 15 became law) with the first two quarters of FY 
1964 (during which time the new law was in effect) shows 
a 65 percent decrease in Navy and a 57 percent decrease 
in Marine summary courts-martial cases, ®
. . .  a remarkable reduction in summary court-martial 
trials from 32,316 last year to 16,926, or approximately 
47 percent. The decreases may be attributed primarily 
to the amended Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, which was in effect for the entire fiscal year 
as compared with only 5 months during Fiscal Year 1963.
There were 61 percent fewer summary court-martial cases 
in Fiscal Year 1964 than in a similar period immediately 
preceding the amendment of Article 15. ^
The recommendations by the Code Committee had included dispensing
with the summary court-martial, as well as increasing the authority of
Article 15. Note the following testimony, by Chief Judge Quinn, USCMA,
before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights:
MR. CREECH. Sir, with regard to the Uniform Code, are 
there any suggestions which you would care to make in re­
gard to amendments to it in areas in which your experience 
has indicated that perhaps amendments should be made in 
order to safeguard the constitutional rights of the service 
personnel?
JUDGE QUINN. I think Mr. Chairman, that perhaps those 
rights are adequately safeguarded as far as we are able 
to safeguard them. Certainly we will and have, to the 
best of our ability, protected the constitutional rights 
of every serviceman. We have recommended some 17 rather 
minor changes in the code, and those recommendations are 
before the Armed Services Committee for consideration.
Now, I have not before me the other 17 changes that we 
have recommended, but we are on record in our annual re­
port several different times as to what we think ought to 
be done to somewhat streamline the Uniform Code.
MR. CREECH. It has been indicated to us that there is 
no right to counsel in summary courts-martial, and I 
wonder, Sir, what your feeling is with regard to the lack 
of counsel in view of the sixth amendment guarantee of the 
right of defendants to counsel in criminal cases?
■^USCMA Annual Report, 1964, p. 65. 
31Ibid., p . 57.
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JUDGE QUINN. This is before summary courts? Of course, 
we have more or less concurred in recommendations that 
article 15 punishment be increased to some extent, and that 
the summary court be dispensed with.
So that perhaps would obviate any necessity for counsel.
Of course, I am a firm advocate of the right of counsel, 
and I think if any boy, whether it is before a summary or 
special or general court, asks for counsel, that he ought 
to have it, if it is reasonably available.
MR. CREECH. Sir, with regard to changing article 15, 
there have been some proposals made for the increase of 
article 15 authority of the commanding officer to impose 
non-judicial punishment.
Do you feel, Sir, that this would be desirable?
JUDGE QUINN. Yes, I do.
MR. CREECH. Do you care to elaborate on your state­
ment, Sir?
JUDGE QUINN. Well, of course, whatever punishment he 
gets under article 15 would leave no record and, after 
all, I think that perhaps conviction in a summary court 
which leaves a boy with a record is far more dangerous 
than maybe even a little more severe punishment in the 
matter of fine or 8 or 10 days in jail.
So that I think, at least to some extent, it is a 
lesser punishment. And most of the commanding officers 
around the world that we have talked to--and Judge 
Ferguson and I have been in many parts of the world:
Judge Kilday has just come on the court and has not 
had an opportunity to get out into some of the theaters 
of war; he undoubtedly will--they have indicated to us 
that a little more power in the field of non-judicial 
punishment would be very useful to them; that it would 
promote discipline, improve the situation in their 
commands, and, yet, would leave no record as far as the 
boy is concerned.
In other words, there would be no record of any con­
viction, and, therefore, no permanent blot upon his 
record.
So it seems to me that the increase in powers that we 
have recommended to the Armed Services Committee would 
actually be in the boy's favor. It would do him little 
or no harm, and it would remove any possibility of a 
conviction remaining on his record.32
Likewise in his testimony before the same Subcommittee Mr.
Zeigel W. Neff, civilian member of a Navy board of review, noted
U. S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on The 
Judiciary Hearings, Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel, 87th 
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, pp.-181-183.
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the possibility of expanding Article 15 and thereby eliminating the 
summary court-martial. He pointed out;
. . . The punishment limitations of commanding officers 
under article 15 of the code should be increased to in­
clude punishment reserved for the summary court-martial, 
and the summary court should be abolished. This change 
has been recommended by the judges on the Court of Mili­
tary Appeals, the service Judge Advocate Generals, and 
other individuals who have studied the matter. The com­
manding officer needs this additional authority so that 
he can correct a youngster by taking him out to the wood­
shed, so to speak, without being forced to give him a 
summary court-martial for a minor infraction. Conviction 
by summary court becomes a conviction of record. Two 
such convictions will support a punitive discharge in a 
special or general court and in any event will follow an 
accused for the remainder of his life. Before a summary 
court, an accused has no right to qualified counsel as 
such, yet he may come out with a relatively serious con­
viction of record, involving such derelictions as insub­
ordination, assault, petty larceny, et cetera.^
Note this comment from the report, dated 1963, by the Senate 
Subcommittee, which conducted the Hearings on Constitutional Rights in 
1962. (The Article 15 legislation was passed before the report was 
completed).
Thus, the expansion of non-judicial punishment, taken 
together with the continued existence of the summary 
court-martial, creates a threat that the serviceman will 
be deprived of important rights which Congress intended 
him to retain. Indeed, aside from furnishing commanders 
with a weapon to use against the rights of service 
personnel, the summary court-martial has no role left 
to play. Accordingly, the subcommittee recommends the 
elimination of summary courts-martial,-^
It therefore appears that one amendment leads to another. This 
proposal, to abolish the summary court-martial, is one of many which
33Ibid., p. 299.
U. S.., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on The 
Judiciary, Summary Report of Hearings, Constitutional Rights of Military 
Personnel, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, p. 36.
34
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have been recommended to Congress every year since 1953. Before examin­
ing this and other proposals now under consideration, let us first 
review certain United States Supreme Court decisions. There is now a 
proposal to revise the Uniform Code with respect to jurisdiction of 
certain civilians, because the Supreme Court has declared UCMJ Article 
3(a) and Article 2(11) unconstitutional.
35Article 3(a) was discussed briefly in chapter V above. It was
supposed to fill the jurisdictional gap over persons who had committed a
serious offense while in service, but had been discharged without pro- 
36
secution. The Supreme Court in effect declared it unconstitutional
37in United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, when it held:
Determining the scope of the constitutional power of 
Congress to authorize trial by court-martial presents 
another instance calling for limitation to "The least 
possible power adequate to the end proposed." We hold 
that Congress cannot subject civilians like Toth to 
trial by court-martial. They like other civilians, are 
entitled to have the benefit of safeguards afforded 
those tried in the regular courts authorized by Article 
III of the constitution,^
The Toth case concerned prosecution in a court-martial of an ex- 
serviceman for an offense committed by him while in an active status as
•^Chap. v, p. 92.
36°UCMJ, Art. 3. "Jurisdiction to try certain personnel. (a) 
Subject to the provisions of article 43 (Statute of Limitations), any 
person charged with having committed, while in a status in which he was 
subject to this Code, an offense against this Code, punishable by con­
finement of five years or more and for which the person cannot be tried 
in the courts of the United States or any State or Territory thereof or 
the District of Columbia shall not be relieved from amenability to trial 
by courts-martial by reason of the termination of said status." Original 
article.





expressly authorized by Article 3(a). The United States Court of Military
39Appeals in United States v. Gallagher reasoned that Article 3(a) is con­
stitutional when applied to service personnel who have been discharged 
but re-enlist. USCMA declared the Toth case applies only to ex-servicemen 
and civilians who have severed all connections with the U. S. Armed 
Forces. This ruling has not been tested by habeas corpus.
So it appears that UCMJ, Article 3(a) retains jurisdiction over 
those who re-enlist-, but does not extend to those who are discharged and 
do not re-enlist. In this latter group there is a jurisdictional gap 
over a serviceman who commits a crime overseas which is not discovered
until after he returns to the United States and is discharged. To
40correct this situation there have been proposals to amend the Code to
allow such violations to be tried by Federal District Courts. As of
this writing legislation is still pending.
With respect to the Supreme Court decisions regarding Article 
412(11), jurisdiction over civilians, there is another jurisdictional 
gap. This came about by the rulings in a series of cases following the 
Toth decision.
39United States v. Gallagher, 7 USCMA 506, 22 CMR 296 (1957).
40Proposals have been recommended and introduced many times. 
Latest proposal is S. 761 introduced by Senator Ervin, January 26, 1965, 
Hearings were held in January and March 1966. Parallel bills were in­
troduced in the House. Legislation is expected in 90th Congress.
41UCMJ, Art. 2 "Persons subject to the Code. The following 
persons are subject to the Code: . . . (11) all subject to any treaty 
or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any 
accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, employed by, 
or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States and outside 
the following: the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands." 
Revised Article.
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The Supreme Court had considerable difficulty in deciding
whether or not the power granted by Congress in UCMJ, to military courts-
martial to try civilians overseas should be sustained. Article 2(11)
was first tested with respect to civilian dependents "Accompanying the
Armed Forces without the continental limits of the United States." The
Supreme Court was required to decide constitutionality in two similar
cases arising from murders committed on American military installations 
/ o•in foreign land.
Mrs. Covert killed her husband, a sergeant in the United States 
Air Force, at an air-base in England. Mrs. Covert was residing on base 
with her husband. Mrs. Smith killed her husband, an Army officer on a 
post in Japan where she was living with him. Neither accused as a 
service member. Both were tried and found guilty by general courts- 
martial and sentenced. The sentence in the Smith case was affirmed by 
the United States Court of Military Appeals. The Covert case was re­
manded for a rehearing on an issue of insanity, which rehearing was 
never held. Subsequent to the Toth decision, each brought habeas corpus 
proceedings in different District Courts where Mrs. Covert was ordered 
released and Mrs. Smith was refused the writ. Their cases came to the 
Supreme Court by government appeal in the Covert case and by appeal on
behalf of Mrs. Smith in the other.
43The cases were decided together. The Court held that civilians 
accompanying members of the Armed Forces abroad could be tried by courts- 
martial. In each case, however, the decision was five to four. Justice
42Tresolini, op, cit., pp. 488-489.
43Reid y. Covert, 351 U. S. 487 (1956).
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Frankfurter wrote a separate opinion deciding that he needed more time
44to consider the issues. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black stated 
in their dissent:
. . . The questions raised are complex, the remedy drastic, 
and the consequences far reaching upon the lives of civilians.
The military is given new powers not hitherto thought con­
sistent with our scheme of government. For these reasons 
we need more time to write our dissenting views.
In the next term the Court granted a rehearing for both women.
A rIn June 1957, in the second Reid v . Covert case, ° the Court reversed
its previous stand and held that they could not be tried by military
authorities. Again the justices were far from being in agreement. The
majority opinion, written by Justice Black, and joined in by the Chief
Justice and Justices Douglas and Brennan, concluded that the power of
Congress to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces does not extend to civilians overseas, even though they be
dependents living with servicemen on military bases, and that under our
Constitution, courts of law alone are given power to try civilians for
offenses against the United States. The Court expressed its agreement
with the well-known military judicial authority, Colonel Winthrop, when
he said "A statute cannot be framed by which a civilian can lawfully be
47made amenable to the military jurisdiction in time of peace." In two 
separate concurring opinions Justices Frankfurter and Harlan limited 






Note 43, supra. 








77 Sup. Ct., 1222 (1957) . 
in this thesis.
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justification for trial of civilian dependents for capital offenses in 
time of peace (emphasis supplied).
The following case also involved UCMJ Article 2(11), USCMA and 
the Supreme Court. A Mrs. Dial and her serviceman husband were tried 
and convicted by a general court-martial in West Germany of involuntary 
manslaughter in the death of their 1 year-old son, a noncapital offense. 
An Army board of review affirmed the conviction and the Judge Advocate 
General of the Army submitted the jurisdictional question to the United 
States Court of Military Appeals for clarification under UCMJ Article 
67(b) (2), The defense urged the same arguments used in Reid v . Covert. 
The Court affirmed the decision of the board of review. The Court 
alluded to the fact that certain language of the majority opinion in 
Reid v. Covert, was to the effect that Congress could not subject 
civilian dependents, accompanying the Armed Forces in peacetime, to 
courts-martial jurisdiction regardless of the nature of the offense, and 
that certain of the justices had concurred in the result only on the 
ground, that the offense was capital. The Court of Military Appeals 
then concluded that with regard to non-capital offenses:
Dependents of military personnel in foreign lands who 
are associated with the military in every way but for the 
performance of military duties . . . (could) constitution­
ally be considered by Congress as part of the Armed Forces 
for the purpose of regulating their conduct on the same 
basis as those in uniform.
The Court of Military Appeals thus refused to restrict the field 
any further than required by Reid v. Covert, which was a capital case.
Immediately after the United States Court of Military Appeals 
announced its decision, Mrs. Dial obtained a writ of habeas corpus from
48United States v. Dial, 9 USCMA 541, 26 CMR 321 (1958).
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the United States District Court in West Virginia. The Government
appealed the judgement directly to the Supreme Court under Title 28,
United States Code, Section 1252, on 8 October 1958. The habeas corpus
action in this case is entitled Singleton v. Kinsella. (The action was
brought on her behalf by Mrs. Dial's mother, hence the name Singleton.
The defendant, Miss Nina Kinsella, was the warden at Alderson Federal
Reformatory for Women where Mrs. Dial was confined.) The Supreme Court
held that military jurisdiction is based on the status of the accused
rather than on the nature of the offense; and accordingly, trial by
court-martial of civilian dependents for non-capital as well as capital
offenses could not be constitutionally justified. The Supreme Court
thereby ended the distinction previously made in the Covert case between
49capital and non-capital offenses.
The Supreme Court was again called upon to act in this area, via 
the habeas corpus route, in Grisham v. Hagan, McElroy v. Guagliardo, 
and Wilson v, Bohlender, all decided on January 18, 1960.^  Grisham, 
an Army civilian employee in France, was tried for premeditated murder, 
a capital offense, while Guagliardo and Wilson, Armed Forces civilian 
employees overseas, were tried for non-capital offenses. The Court 
held in Grisham, that there is no valid distinction between civilian 
employees and dependents as concerns court-martial jurisdiction over 
them in capital cases; the rule expressed in Covert applies. In 
Guagliardo and Bohlender the Court equated the status of civilian 
employees to that of dependents in non-capital cases such as Singleton.
49Kinsella v. Singleton, 351 U. S. 234, 80 Sup. Ct. 297 (1960).
50Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U. S. 278, 80 Sup. Ct. 310 (1960). 
McElroy v. Guagliardo. 361 U. S. 281, 80 Sup. Ct. 305, (1960). Wilson v. 
Bohlender, 361 U. S. 281, 80 Sup. Ct. 305 (1960).
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Accordingly, Article 2(11) provising for jurisdiction of courts-martial 
over dependents and civilian employees in both capital and non-capital 
cases in time of peace cannot be constitutionally applied. Presumably 
in time of war UCMJ, Article 2(11) would be valid.
The jurisdictional loophole created by these Supreme Court 
decisions is still open. No American tribunal, military or civil, can 
try American civilians who violate the law overseas. They must be tried, 
if at all, in foreign courts under foreign procedures. In order to bring 
such persons under the protection of constitutional safeguards, and to 
have them liable to the UCMJ, there have been proposals to extend juris­
diction to the Federal District Courts. This may also be unconstitutional; 
the matter is before Congress for further s t u d y . T h e  constitutional 
issue concerning the status-of-forces agreements involving military
52personnel was sustained by the Supreme Court. In Wilson v. Girard, 
the Court in a unanimous opinion held that there are "no constitutional 
or statutory barriers" which prohibit surrendering American military 
personnel to foreign courts.
We have seen in a few cases, how the United States Court of 
Military Appeals and the United States Supreme Court have used the 
power of judicial review in military justice. There have been other
-’■'■William A. Creech, "Serviceman's Rights," American Bar Ass'n, 
Journal, XCIX (Nov. 1963), 1074.
~^Wilson v. Girard, 354 U. S. 524 (1957). Army Specialist 
William S. Girard was charged in 1957 with the death of a woman, who 
had been picking up scrap at an Army firing range north of Tokyo. The 
soldier's lawyers contended that since he had been carrying out the 
duties of a guard he could not be tried by a Japanese court. The 
United States, however, said Girard had not been authorized to shoot 
the woman. The U. S. waived jurisdiction and turned him over to 
Japanese authorities. He was convicted and given a three-year sentence, 
which was shortly suspended.
157
opinions and rulings of USCMA too numerous to list which have directly
affected the instructions in the Manual for Courts Martial, United States,
1951. At the end of the first ten years under the Uniform Code, the
services published a forty page booklet of annotations to reflect recent 
53case law. Each paragraph of the Manual was annotated if applicable. 
Perhaps most significant was the ruling"^' by the Court of Military 
Appeals, which prohibited the use of the Manual by members of the Court. 
This had been a well-established custom in the services. The Court 
reasoned that such use was prejudicial to the accused.
Par. 33h. Court members must reach a decision on the 
findings and sentence on the basis of the evidence pre­
sented and the law officer's instructions, uninfluenced 
by any policy directives whether contained in the Manual 
or elsewhere. Calling the court's attention (by TC) to 
that part of par. 33h which states that retention in the 
armed forces of thieves and persons guilty of moral turpitude 
reflects upon the good name of the military service and its 
self-respecting personnel, has been held p r e j u d i c i a l . 55
With the exception of a few executive orders, the writer has 
discussed all changes so far implemented in the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice and the Manual. Before turning to proposed legislation, note 
the following Executive Order, the most recent revision in military 
justice.
On December 3, 1966, President Johnson signed Executive Order
11317, which increased from one year to ten years the maximum period of
confinement which may be adjudged by a court-martial for the offense
5 6of misbehavior of a sentinel. The new maximum applies only when the
Military Justice: Annotations to 1951 MCM, (Air University, 1962) .
Ûnited States v. Rinehart, 8 USCMA 402, 24 CMR 212 (1957).





offense is committed in any of the areas authorizing entitlement to 
special pay for duty subject to hostile fire,^ These are the areas in 
which critical sentinel duty takes on even greater importance. While 
Vietnam is the area of principal concern at this time, the Executive 
Order would have future application in any geographical area designated 
as a hostile fire area. This is the only change in the Table of Maximum 
Punishments which the commanders concerned have generally recommended 
or feel to be warranted as a result of the conflict in Vietnam. Suspension 
of the limitations on all offenses as to which the Table of Maximum
Punishments was suspended during the Korean conflict was considered and
• - j 58rej ected.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice has worked well in the last 
fifteen years. It worked well in Korea and it is working well in Vietnam 
today. But some changes are in order; even the Judiciary Act adopted by 
the first Congress in 1789 is still being amended. Proposed legislation 
to modify the military justice system will be discussed next.
Proposed Legislation 
59The three major amendments, were passed by Congress only after 
being sponsored by the Department of Defense, The Code Committee, or 
other interested agency or individual. While the three measures re 
ferred to above have been enacted into law, a greater number of pro-1 
posals have not fared so well. Congress in enacting the Code clearly
■*̂ As designated by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to 10 U. S.
C. 310,
"^USCMA Annual Report, 1966, p. 3.
59UCMJ, 58a (1960); UCMJ, 123a (1962); UCMJ, 15 (1963).
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recognized that amendments to the Code would be required from time to 
time. It specifically provided for recommendations in UCMJ, Article 
67(g) .
The Court of Military Appeals and the Judge Advocates 
General of the armed forces shall meet annually to make 
a comprehensive survey of the operation of this code and 
report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate 
and of the House of Representatives and to the Secretary 
of Defense and the Secretaries of the Departments the 
number and status of pending cases and any recommendations 
relating to uniformity of sentence policies, amendments 
to this code, and any other matters deemed appropriate.
Each year many proposals have been advanced, most have obtained
bill status, but we have seen that only a few have been enacted into
law. The Code Committee made several valuable recommendations to
6oCongress in its second annual report0 for the period ending December 
31, 1953. This report contained seventeen proposed amendments to the 
Code, Subsequent annual reports, reflected continuing study and refine­
ments of the changes originally recommended.
The seventeen proposals were incorporated in a Defense Depart-
, , 61ment sponsored bill and introduced in the 84th Congress. This omnibus
bill went further than the proposals advanced by the Code Committee.
In fact if enacted, the power of the Court of Military Appeals would
have been considerably reduced. This Pentagon action reflected some
animosity then felt by high ranking military officials against the 
6 2
Court. The American Legion opposed the proposed legislation and
63made some recommendations of its own. No legislation was enacted.
60USCMA Annual Report, June 1, 1952 - Dec. 31, 1953.
^H.R. 6583, 84th Congress., 2nd Sess.
62 • ...
American Legion Report on the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 1956, p. 11.
^ Ibid, p. 53.
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The omnibus bill underwent various changes from time to time.
By January 1959, all proposals, after complete screening, were incorporated 
into one revised omnibus bill. This bill was processed through IJSCMA,
The Departments of Defense and Justice, the Bureau of the Budget, and 
introduced by the Chairman of the House and Services Committee, 
Representative Carl Vinson as H.R. 3387.^ The American Legion had by 
this time drawn up its own proposals0 which were introduced by Repre­
sentative Overton Brooks, Louisiana. No legislation was enacted.
In October 1959 the Special Committee on Military Justice, of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, undertook to study
the bills pending in Congress, and to consider independently what
changes in the Uniform Code were necessary. In its study, the Committee
was extremely conscious of the necessity of striking a balance between
the interest of the military in performing its mission on the one hand,
and the importance of providing fundamental judicial guarantees to
66military persons accused of crime on the other. This Special Committee 
found that the Vinson Bill contained many worthwhile provisions, which 
were designed to do away with costly and unnecessary administrative 
duplication, ineffeciency, and ambiguity. But it did not go far enough 
in enlarging substantive rights. The Committee found that a number of 
the American Legion's proposals (H.R. 3455) merited enactment, but con­
cluded that they went too far in circumscribing the military judicial
^H.R. 3387, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
^H.R. 3455, 86th Cong,, 1st Sess.
^Arnold I. Burns and Donald J. Rapson, "Sounding the Death 
Knell of Drumhead Justice," American Bar Ass'n. Journal. XLVIII 
(Sept. 1962) 843-847.
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system. In short the Committee found provisions of merit in each of
the bills, and also found each to be seriously lacking.
The Special Committee presented an alternate proposal, which
was adopted by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. In
April 1961, that proposal * 7 was introduced in the Senate by Jacob
Javitts and in the House by John V. Lindsay. Both sponsors were members
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
In January 1961, the Defense Department omnibus amendments were
again transmitted to Congress as part of the new Kennedy administration's
legislative program. The amendments were not introduced. Since the
proposed legislation appeared to be bogged down, the Defense Department
abandoned the omnibus technique and established priorities in individual 
68proposals. Thus Article 123(a) and Article 15 amendments became law
69in the 87th Congress.
The 87th Congress showed an exceptionally avid interest in
military justice. In addition to enacting the two major amendments,
The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights conducted extensive
hearings on the constitutional rights of military personnel. The 
70hearings were prompted in part by the Supreme Court's decisions in 
Burns v. Wilson, Wilson v. Girard, Reid v. Covert, Kinsella v. Singleton 
and McElroy v. Guargliardo; all were concerned with constitutional rights, 
the Uniform Code and court actions. The subcommittee noted also that
67S. 1553, H.R. 6255, 87th Cong,, 1st Sess.
6ft°This was recommended informally by the House Armed Services 
Committee.
69Notes 19 and 23, supra.
7 0 _ „Note 32, supra.
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in Harmon v. Brucker, the Supreme Court ruled that the character of 
an administrative discharge issued by the Army could be judicially re­
viewed. This decision paved the way for successful collateral attacks 
against administrative discharges by means of suits for back pay in the 
U. S. Court of Claims.
Despite these recent safeguards for the serviceman, 
provided by the courts, the subcommittee members and 
individual Senators continued to receive complaints 
concerning military justice and the issuance of admin­
istrative discharges by the armed services. In view of 
a decade's having passed since the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice was enacted, the subcommittee was dis­
turbed by claims that abuses persisted which the code 
was designed to eliminate. Furthermore, there were re­
ports that the safeguards of the Uniform Code, vigorously 
implemented in the decisions of the Court of Military 
Appeals, had induced the military to resort to adminis­
trative action, which was not subject to these safe­
guards .73
71
After the subcommittee decided to conduct hearings on 
the constitutional rights of military personnel, ex­
tensive research was undertaken and detailed question- 
aires were submitted to the Department of Defense for 
answer by each armed service. Moreover, copies of 
service regulations pertinent to military justice and 
administrative discharges were examined in detail. The 
hearings occupied 7 days, and testimony was received 
from spokesmen for the Defense Department and each armed 
service, from the judges of the Court of Military Appeals, 
from representatives of bar associations and veterans' 
organizations, and from various individuals with special 
experience relevant to the subcommittee's inquiry.74
The subcommittee also studied the responses to 7000 questionaires
and members of the staff made a seventeen-day field study of military *7
71Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U. S. 579, 1958.
7^Clackum v. United States, Ct. Cl. 237-257.
73Senate Report, note 34, supra., p. IV.
p. V.
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justice in Europe. The hearings were published in a 966 page volume in 
1962.^  The major part of that publication is concerned with adminis­
trative discharge procedures, although considerable testimony and factual 
information relates directly to the Uniform Code. The hearings have 
been referred to many times in this paper.
Unquestionably the hearings and the study by the Senate sub­
committee are most thorough and far reaching. Since the subcommittee 
weighed the recommendations of the sponsors of previous legislative 
proposals, one would expect a resolution of most of the major differences.
Generally this is so. Based on the findings and recommendations of the 
7 6subcommittee, eighteen legislative proposals were introduced by 
Senator Sam J. Ervin on August 6, 1963. The stated purpose was to
77protect and enhance the constitutional rights of military personnel.
On September 25, 1963, Representative Victor Wickersham introduced
78identical bills in the House of Representatives. Each bill was re­
ferred to appropriate committees but no hearings were held. The House,
however, did pass a bill granting life tenure to the judges of the
79Court of Military Appeals.
In the next session, 1964, the Defense Department recommended 
separate legislative proposals which it preferred over the Ervin-
81Wickersham bills. No hearings were held on any of these bills.
^Note 32, supra.
7^The Report, note 34, supra., contained twenty-four conclusions 
and twenty-two recommendations. S. 2002-S. 2019 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
^Co-sponsors with Senator Ervin were Senators: Bayh, Cooper, 
Fong, Humphrey, Hruska, Long, and Williams.
78H.R. 3179, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
79H.R. 3179, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. The bill also granted Federal 
judiciary retirement privilege (full pay after ten ye'ars) . There was no 
action in the Senate.
80H.R. 10048 and H.R. 10050, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess.
O 1
Air Force Times, March 11, 1964, p. 22.
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Early in the 89th Congress, on January 25, 1965, Senator Ervin 
, 82again introduced eighteen bills in the Senate; in addressing the Senate 
he made the following remarks:
Mr. President, I send to the desk, for appropriate 
reference, a legislative program designed to further 
safeguard the constitutional rights of our Nation's 
servicemen and women who for so long have sacrificed 
so much to protect our American way of life. Senator 
Hruska has joined me in sponsoring some of these 
measures as will be indicated on the bills when they 
are printed.
President Johnson recently stated that we must make 
every effort to improve the status of our military per­
sonnel and to make them "first class citizens in every 
respect." Improved pay and retirement policies, better 
housing and equitable promotion systems are indeed im­
portant steps for improving working and living con­
ditions for our Armed Forces. However, basic to the 
goal of making military personnel "first class citizens 
in every respect," is to insure that they are accorded 
the rights, privileges and protections guaranteed to 
every American citizen under the Constitution.
Complaints received by the Senate Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Rights, and the results of its ex­
tensive 4-year study, have revealed numerous inade­
quacies both in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 
administrative discharge proceedings, and other im­
portant phases of military justice.
Almost without exception, the subcommittee work has 
pointed up a very serious need for legislation to mod­
ify our system of military justice so that it adequately 
protects the constitutional rights of our military per­
sonnel .
Protecting the rights of the individual by providing 
procedures in which disputes about rights and duties 
can be fairly and equitably decided is basic to our 
Nation's system of constitutional due process. This 
system has long been a part of the rights of every 
citizen. Certainly, Mr. President, it is time that the 
men and women of the armed services, whose sacrifices 
almost defy enumeration, should also be provided the 
protections of our Constitution which are consisten 
with the duty of the military to protect our Nation.
82S. 745 - S. 762, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
83U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965,
CXI, 17-1.
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On January 4, 1965, Representative Charles E, Bennett again 
introduced the Defense Department sponsored bills in the House of 
Representatives,^4 His remarks are included in the appendix. The 
objectives of Mr, Bennett's bills are essentially the same as Senator 
Ervin's; "To insure every serviceman the same rights as a person
85accused of committing a crime in a federal criminal proceeding,"
No hearings were conducted on any of the twenty proposals, in the 1965 
session,
Hearings on all twenty bills were held in January and March,
1966, before joint sessions of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights,
and a Special Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. All
three judges of the Court of Military Appeals, and the Judge Advocates
General testified at the hearings. No legislation was reported out of
committees following the hearings. In the House of Representatives,
86Mr. Bennett introduced another bill0 sponsored by the Department of
87Defense, Summaries of these bills follow,
S, 745. A bill to further insure to military personnel certain due
process protection by providing for military judges to be
detailed to all general courts-martial, and for other purposes.--
This essentially makes the "law officer" a "military judge,"
88and creates a field judiciary program for all services.
84H.R. 273, H.R. 277, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
85Appendix.
^H.R. 16115, 89th Cong,, 2nd Sess,
87Extracted from copies furnished by Senator Ervin and Representa­
tive Bennett.
88The Army initiated the Field Judiciary Program. The Navy followed 
but the Air Force is opposed.
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S. 746. A bill to further insure due process in the administration of 
military justice in the Department of the Navy by establishing 
a Judge Advocate General's Corps in such Department.-- This 
is not opposed but will create a personnel recruiting problem 
for the Navy.
S. 747. A bill to protect the constitutional rights of military
personnel by providing an independent forum to review and correct
the military records of members and former members of the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes.-- This has no direct relation
89to UCMJ except to clarify correction of conviction errors.
S. 748. A bill to provide additional constitutional protections for
members of the armed forces by establishing Courts of Military 
Review, and for other purposes.-- This would change the title 
from Boards of Review, set minimum tours for military and
90require one civilian member, who is not a military retiree.
S. 749. A bill to insure to military personnel certain basic constitu­
tional rights by prohibiting command influence in courts-martial 
cases and in certain non-judicial proceedings, and for other 
purposes,-- This is the old bugaboo in military justice. The 
Code prohibits command influence but there have been cases 
reversed by USCMA for this violation. There have been no pro­
secutions against offenders. This bill puts more teeth in the
89There is general disagreement amongst the services for the 
correct authority to correct courts-martial convictions.
90The Navy has had civilian membership on boards of review. 
Continuity would be improved by this proposal.
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measure and extends to non-judicial proceedings hitherto not
91covered in the Code.
S. 750. A bill to protect the constitutional rights of military
personnel by insuring their right to be represented by
qualified counsel in certain cases, and for other purposes.--
This would add a new Article 141, to govern procedure and
right to counsel in discharge board actions. It would also
require qualified legal counsel for defense in special courts-
92martial, if a bad-conduct discharge can be adjudged.
S. 751. A bill to protect the constitutional rights of military personnel
by increasing the period within which such personnel may petition
for a new trial by court-martial and for other purposes.-- This
would extend the period for petition for a new trial from one
93year to two years, and grant the right in any court-martial.
S. 752. A bill to amend chapter 47 (Uniform Code of Military Justice) 
of title 10, United States Code, so as to provide additional 
constitutional protection in trials by courts-martial.-- This 
is a major change. It would provide a law officer (trial 
judge if so phrased) in special as well as general court-
91Undoubtedly there have been many cases of command influence which 
have not reached USCMA. The purposes of the bill are commendable. Chief 
Judge Quinn says this article should be grouped with the punitive articles. 
USCMA Annual Report, 1966,
92Like S. 746 this will require more lawyers for the Navy. The 
Army sends bad-conduct cases to a general court-martial. The Air Force 
provides defense counsel in special courts-martial if the charge warrants 
a bad-conduct discharge. The Navy special courts-martial adjudge such 
discharge without benefit of counsel. The right to counsel in board pro­
ceedings is new to all.
9 37 “This has been supported by the Code Committee and the Depart- 
ment of Defense for many years. The old article limits applicability to 
serious sentences only. The new proposal is similar to Federal Rules for 





martial. The accused in either court could waive trial by
the court members and agree to trial by the law officer (trial
judge). The requirement for law officer in the special court-
94martial would not apply in time of war.
753. A bill to implement the constitutional rights of military 
personnel by providing appellate review of certain administrative 
board decisions, and for other purposes.-- This would extend 
the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Military Appeals
95to review decisions of board for correction of military records.
754. A bill to insure due process in the case of certain administra­
tive actions involving military personnel.-- This would reorganize 
administrative discharge boards, and revise procedure. It would 
require a law officer to preside, and would grant the respondent
i  i  i  9 6legal counsel.
755. A bill to further insure the fair and independent review of 
court-martial cases by prohibiting any members of a board of 
review from rating the effectivenss of another member of a
9^The rationale is based on the fact that special courts-martial 
can now adjudge a bad-conduct discharge. In some cases a defense counsel 
is provided, but there is now no provision for a law officer. This bill 
will also increase Navy personnel requirements. USCMA approved, but 
objects to relief in war clause.
95A unique proposal; USCMA considers this action worthwhile. 
Review would be limited to matters of law as in courts-martial. This 
proposal is a major gain for a board respondent.
96Discharge boards have been conducted as "show cause" pro­
ceedings, The respondent is at a disadvantage. In most cases, however, 
he is anxious to get out of the service and prefers this action to trial 
by court-martial. He does not realize, or chooses to ignore, the harm­
ful effects of a less than honorable discharge. Fair hearing and right 
to counsel would be major protections.
169
board of review, and for other purposes.-- This would revise
a long standing procedure of military supervisor relationships,
97but there has been a trend to correct this in such situations.
S. 756. A bill to broaden constitutional protection against double
jeopardy in the case of military personne.-- This is to cir­
cumvent administrative discharge of military personnel who have
98been acquitted by a court-martial for the same offense.
S. 757. A bill to more effectively protect certain constitutional rights
accorded military personnel.-- This would allow pretrial
hearings to resolve certain issues, motions, plea, etc. The
99rights referred to are speedy and fair trials.
S. 758. A bill to provide additional constitutional protection in certain 
cases to members of the armed forces, and for other purposes.-- 
This would require an additional article in the Code or another 
section of section 10 U . S. C. The purpose is to extend due 
process, confrontation, compulsory process and assistance of 
counsel to a respondent in administrative discharge proceedings.
97There used to be semi-permanent courts-martial with the senior 
member having general supervisory responsibility and authority over the 
members. That procedure was abandones many years ago. In some cases 
this has carried over in the boards of review. The Army corrected the 
practice after the hearings in 1962. The Air Force still uses the old 
procedures. The Navy usually has a civilian as the permanent member.
98Protection against double jeopardy is provided in UCMJ,
Article 44. This relates to criminal proceedings only. The services 
use administrative boards to discharge undesirables who "beat the rap."
99The proposal would bring military procedure still closer to 
that of Federal district courts. The Department of Defense has made 
similar proposals in the past.
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He would have the right to demand trial by court-martial.'*'®®
S. 759. A bill to afford military personnel due process in court-
martial cases involving minor offenses, to insure the right of 
counsel in such cases, and for other purposes.-- This would 
eliminate the summary court-martial and require the use of 
special courts if the service desires to prosecute. It would 
also allow an accused who elects court-martial by refusing non­
judicial punishment (an existing right) to have the benefit of
higher court procedure. This proposal was mentioned above in
, ,. . _ , . 101the discussion of Article 15.
S. 760. A bill to amend chapter 47 (Uniform Code of Military Justice) 
so as to assure constitutional rights of confrontation and com­
pulsory process by providing for the mandatory appearance of 
witnesses and the production of evidence before certain boards 
and officers, and for other purposes.-- This bill would grant
subpena power to discharge boards and incidentally to UCMJ,
102Article 32 investigating officer.
S. 761. A bill to provide for compliance with constitutional requirements 
in the trials of persons who are charged with having committed
^®®The proposal is applicable to those who deny the alleged mis­
conduct, which is the basis for the administrative action.
'*’̂'*"This proposal has been advanced by the services since 1953. 
With the new Article 15, summary courts-martial are even less justified.
102Like S. 754, note 98, supra., S. 760 would make board pro­
ceedings closer to trial proceedings. There would have to be a reason­
able distance limit for subpena of civilian witnesses. The Article 32 
subpena power would be a major improvement in the Code.
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• certain offenses while subject to trial by court-martial, who
have not been tried for such offenses, and who are no longer
subject to trial by court-martial.-- This is to close the
jurisdictional gap created by the Supreme Court Toth decision
invalidating Article 3(a). The remedy, granting jurisdiction
to a Federal District Court, must be staffed by the Committee 
103
on the Judiciary.
S. 762. A Bill to provide for compliance with constitutional require­
ments in the trials of persons who, while accompanying the 
armed forces outside the United States commit certain offenses 
against the United Stated.-- This is to plug the jurisdictional 
loophole created by the Supreme Court decisions in several cases 
involving civilians tried under UCMJ, Article 2(11) . The remedy,
granting jurisdiction to a Federal District Court, must be
104staffed by the Committee on the Judiciary.
H.R. 273. A bill to amend chapter 47 (Uniform Code of Military Justice) 
of title 10, United States Code, by creating single-officer 
general and special courts-martial, provising for law officers 
on special courts-martial, affording accused persons an 
opportunity to be represented in certain special court-martial
Corrective action has been advocated ever since the Supreme 
Court decisions. The jurisdiction would apply to the court in whose 
area the offense took place; if overseas, to the area where the accused 
was first apprehended or taken. The accused should be protected against 
doublt jeopardy if tried in a foreign or State court.
^^The Department of Defense is anxious to close the jurisdictional 
gap. This bill would clarify that jurisdiction extends to military tri­
bunals in time of war. There is also a provision against double jeopardy 
in the event of trial by a foreign court.
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proceedings by counsel having the qualifications of defense 
counsel detailed for general courts-martial, providing for 
certain pretrial proceedings and other procedural changes, and 
for other purposes.-- This bill "provides for pretrial pro­
ceedings, authorizes the law officer to conduct court-martial 
proceedings alone under certain circumstances, guarantees legal 
counsel in special court-martial cases, and establishes post 
conviction proceedings."^^ This is a combination of Senate 
bills 750, 752, 757. It would establish a law officer for a 
special court-martial and allow the law officer to be a single 
officer court if the accused waives trial by the full court.
It would retain however, the special court without a law officer
106as an alternative and the summary court.
H.R. 277. A bill to amend chapter 47 (Uniform Code of Military Justice) 
of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the Judge Advocate 
General to grant relief in certain court-martial cases, to extend 
the time within which an accused may petition for a new trial, 
and for other purposes.-- This bill "will extend the period 
within which a new trial may be requested from the present one 
year to two years, and it authorizes the Judge Advocate General 
of each service to set aside those convictions where fraud, 
illegality, lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or newly
^'’Appendix. Statement by Hon. Charles E. Bennett.
106The major difference regarding the requirement for a law 
officer in all or certain special courts-martial should be resolved in 
committee. The summary court-martial will surely be eliminated. This 
bill was formerly H.R. 10048 (88), and was first proposed by the Code 
Committee in 1959.
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discovered evidence is found." This bill has certain
108features of Senate bills 747 and 751. x
H.R. 16115. A bill to amend chapter 47 (Uniform Code of Military
Justice) of title 10, United States Code, by permitting timely
execution of certain court-martial sentences.-- This bill
would insure that a death sentence should include a dishonorable
discharge or dismissal, total forfeitures, and life imprisonment.
This would allow all of the lesser sentence to take effect upon
approval without waiting for the President's review of the death 
109sentence.
Conclusions
Even a cursory examination of the bills advanced by Senator Ervin
reveals a dedicated concern for constitutional rights. The term or a
derivative of it appears in each bill. The language in Representative
Bennett's bills was developed from that of the Code Committee and is
less dedicated; but Bennett's introduction expressed the same concern.
This concern for constitutional rights for military personnel
is a great advance over the military justice system before the Code.
We attribute this advance to the United States Court of Military Appeals.
110Even considering early interpretations of the Code when the Court con­
sidered that rights stem from Congress, not the Constitution, there has
■*^Note 107, su p r a .
108According to Mr. Bennett, the differences should be resolved 
in committee. This bill was first proposed by the Code Committee in 1963 
and was formerly H.R. 10050 (88).
The Code Committee has made a similar proposal each year since 
1959. This is the first introduction as a bill to either House of Congress.
110United States v. Clay, 1 USCMA 74, 1 CMR 74 (1951) .
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been a significant change of view. Now there can be no doubt. Mili­
tary personnel have every right except thos particularly excluded by
the Constitution.
Senator Ervin and his committee's concerns have had major effect
even without legislation. The Army changed its board of review manning
HI 112policy; the Navy adopted the field judiciary system; and the Air
113Force revitalized administrative discharge procedures. All without
legislation.
So too have Supreme Court decisions influenced military justice 
procedures. After the Miranda v. Arizona r u l i n g , w h i c h  extended pro­
tections to accused persons in state jurisdictions, the military justice 
authorities corrected their own directives. Even before this decision
many legal experts agreed that the military system afforded maximum pro­
tection to the accused. Commissioners of USCMA participated in con­
ferences on the impact of that decision and the Escobedo v. Illinois
. . . U 6decision.
The improved quality of military justice can be attested by 
Supreme Court rulings last year. In Gallagher v. Quinn et al, the 
complainant alleged a denial of due process and equal protection of the
^ ^ Congressional Record, CXI, no. 17-3.
112Ibid. no. 17-11.
113Air Force Times, Sept. 21, 1966; Air Force Manual 39-12.
^ ^ Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 Sup. Ct. 1602
(1966) .
^~*Air Force Times, July 13, 1966, p. 3.
•'•'̂Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 84 Sup. Ct. 
1758 (1964) .
117Gallagher v, Quinn et al, 363 F. 2nd 301 (C.A.D.C.) (1966).
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laws, in the requirement that an enlisted accused show good cause in
order to obtain review by USCMA; whereas a general or flag officer's
118case is automatically reviewed. The U. S. Court of Appeals rejected
119the contention; the Supreme Court denied certiorari, thereby terminating
the litigation. In like manner, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
120Crawford v. United States in which private Crs.wford attacked USCMA's
decision that he had not been denied his right to enlisted membership
on his court-martial, because of a policy of selecting members from non-
121commissioned officers of the first three grades.
Constitutional rights and the United States Court of Military 
Appeals have been the subjects of this thesis. It should be apparent 
that the rights exist for military personnel, and that the Court is 
dedicated to protect them.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice has been in effect over 
sixteen years. Military justice has improved, numbers of cases are 
down, discipline is high; the case load of the Court of Appeals has 
diminished, all in spite of an increase in overall strength and greater 
demands on the armed forces. There is not only a decrease in courts- 
martial rates, but there is also a rising sophistication in the admin­
istration of military justice at all levels. It is fitting to conclude 
with these remarks by the United States Court of Military Appeals:
. . .  It is gratifying to note the increased attention 
being paid at the trial level--particularly among the pro­
fessional law officers of the services--to procedural and
118UCMJ, 67 (b) (1).
11 9Gallagher v. Quinn et al, 385 U. S. 881, 87 Sup. Ct. 167 (1966).
Crawford v. United States, 380 U. S. 970, 85 Sup. Ct. 1349
(1965).




substantive matters in order that the number of errors may 
be reduced and appellate reversals brought to an all-time 
low. Nevertheless, no system of justice is ever perfect, 
nor can it hope, by maintaining a static position, wholly 
to eliminate its faults. Hence, it is to be hoped that 
the Armed Services, guided by this Court, will continue to 
strive in every instance for the fairness and impartiality 
which should be the hallmark of every American judicial 
proceeding.
122^  USCMA Annual Report, 1966, pp. 5-6.




THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 
Washington, June 8, 1949.
Hon. MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
United States Senate.
DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: As you know, I requested Prof. Edmund 
M. Morgan to inform your committee of my support of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice when he appeared before you on my be­
half.
I would appreciate it if this letter is incorporated in the 
record of your hearings and the committee report, because I am 
anxious to reiterate my strong support of the Uniform Code.
The Code was drafted and transmitted to the Congress before 
I assumed office. I have taken the time, however, to familiarize 
myself with its principal provisions and I concur in Mr. Forrestal's 
opinion that the Code represents an outstanding example of unifi­
cation in the armed services. In my opinion, the Code provides 
a number of very desirable protections for the accused without in­
terfering with necessary military functions. In addition it re­
presents a great advance in military justice in that it provides 
the same law and the same rights, privileges, and obligations 
will apply to Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Coast Guard. I 
cannot emphasize too much the importance of this equality and 
the fact that I believe it will be an item which will enhance 
the teamwork and cooperative spirit of the services.
I am aware of the concientious and objective work of your 
committee and the House committee. I know that the bill has 
been improved by these constructive efforts and I wish to express 
to you and the members of your committee my deep appreciation.
In order that the benefits of the Code may be available at the 
earliest possible time, I strongly urge its passage at the present 
session of the Congress.




UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS 
Washington 25, D. C.
September 25, 1961
Honorable Sam J. Ervin, Jr.
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights 
United States Senate 
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Senator Ervin:
I have your letter of September 15 requesting a "preliminary 
statement" of my views on the constitutional rights of persons 
in the armed forces and I am glad to comply therewith.
Without attempting to analyze the basis of my conviction 
which includes a study of the opinions, old and recent of the 
United States Supreme Court, I firmly believe that accused 
persons in the military services "are entitled to the rights 
and privileges secured to all under the Constitution of the 
United States, unless excluded directly or by necessary im­
plication, by the provisions of the Constitution itself." I 
set out that view as a controlling principle of my judicial 
conduct in my dissent, in United States v. Sutton, 3 USCMA 220, 
228, 11 CMR 220. More recently, writing not as a judge but 
merely as a member of the great confraternity of the legal 
profession, I said: "it is anomalous to say that aliens re­
siding in the United States are entitled to constitutional 
guarantees, but that citizens of the United States in the ser­
vice of their country are deprived of those rights simply be­
cause they wear the uniform of one of its military departments." 
The United States Court of Military Appeals and Individual 
Rights in the Military Service, 35 Notre Dame Lawyer 491, 493 
(August 1960) . To that I might add the question: "If sentences 
felons are not deprived of constitutional rights and protection 
(see Fulwood v. Clemmer, Court of Appeals, D. C. Circuit,
August 1, 1961) surely the men and women wearing the uniform in 
defense of the United States are not deprived of those rights 
and protections?"
Should you decide to conduct hearings on the matters raised 
in your letter, I shall be glad to submit to your subcommittee 
a compilation of pertinent United States Court of Military 
Appeals opinions and other of my public statements on those 
matters.
With every good wish for continued physical and spiritual 
strength in the discharge of your monumental responsibilities 
in these difficult times, I am
Very sincerely yours, 
(s) Robert E. Quinn 
ROBERT E. QUINN 
Chief Judge
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UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS 
Washington 25, D. C.
January 25, 1962
Honorable Sam J. Ervin, Jr.
Chairman Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Rights 
United States Senate 
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Senator Ervin:
Referring to your notification of January 23rd of the 
hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights 
on February 6th, please be advised I shall be present at the 
time and place indicated.
In accordance with my letter of January 9, 1962, I am en­
closing a list of cases decided by the United States Court 
of Military Appeals, which the Subcommittee might find help­
ful. The essence of my personal views on some of the matters 
under inquiry by the Subcommittee is set out in my letter of 
September 24, 1961. I shall be pleased to enlarge upon them 
in direct testimony before the Subcommittee.
In anticipation of our early meeting, I am
Sincerely yours, 
(s) Robert E. Quinn 




U. S. Court of Military Appeals, 
Washington, D. C., Dec, 15, 1965.
Hon. Sam J. Ervin, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights,
Old Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.
DEAR SENATOR ERVIN: Thank you very much for your invitation 
to testify in connection with proposed legislation on constitu­
tional rights of service personnel at the joint hearings in 
January 1966, before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights 
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and a special sub­
committee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. My 
brother judges and I welcome the opportunity.
At earlier congressional hearings, I pointed out that 
the U. S. Court of Military Appeals, which was established 
by Congress in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U. S. C. 
801, et seq., has attempted to expunge the dictum in the mili­
tary establishment that courts-martial are mere instrumentalities 
of the executive branch and, therefore, are not bound to accord 
to military accused the protections and privileges granted by 
the U. S. Constitution. By decision and discussion, the judges 
of the Court of Military Appeals have endeavored to demonstrate 
that military discipline is wholly compatible with, and en­
couraged by, equal justice under law. The war crimes trials 
after World War II established that, even in the field in time 
of hostilities, the military commander cannot disregard the 
rule of law.
Millions of Americans are committed to serve in our armed 
services in defense of our country and the free world. The 
preservation of their constitutional rights and privileges is 
imperative, I commend you, and the other committee members, 
for the intense interest you have shown, and the work you have 
done, in this important field of law.
As requested, Judges Ferguson, Kilday and I will separately 
send you a written statement of our respective views on the 
pending bills.
With warmest regards, I am,
Sincerely yours,




UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY 
COLORADO
TO: Lt. Colonel Thomas H. McGuigan 
Professor of Air Science 
AFROTC Detachment 615 
University of North Dakota 
Grand Forks, North Dakota
Dear Colonel McGuigan
1. The Department of Law teaches a one-year prescribed
course in elementary law to all cadets in their second- 
class (junior) year, and three one-semester elective 
courses: Constitutional Law, International Law and Gov­
ernment Contracting. The first semester of the prescribed 
law course is a survey of the major fields of civil law 
(e.g., contracts, torts, property), and the second semester 
is a survey of criminal law, evidence, jurisdiction and 
personal estate planning.
2. Military justice is not part of any of our academic 
courses, and the only instruction furnished cadets re­
lating to this topic is in the military training program, 
under the auspices of the Commandant of Cadets, In that 
program, members of the Law Faculty present a two-hour 
lecture on the military justice system. There are no pre­
pared course materials for these lectures.
3. The general area of civil rights protection in the 
military justice system is taken up in a small part of our 
Constitutional Law course. The text used for that course 
is the commersially available Mason and Beaney, American 
Constitutional Law (2nd ed.).
4. I regret that we have no course materials which pertain 
to your thesis topic. I believe your best source for in­
formation would be The Military Law Review (DA Pamphlet 27- 
100-1), which is published quarterly by the Army Judge Ad­
vocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia. That 
school also has on file the thesis of its graduates, many 
of which pertain to your topic.
Sincerely
(s) Christopher H. Munch 





THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U. S. ARMY 
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA
24 May 1963
Lt. Colonel Thomas H. McGuigan, USAF 
Professor of Air Science 
Air Force ROTC Detachment 615 
University of North Dakota 
Grand Forks, North Dakota
Dear Sir:
Although the students at The Judge Advocate General's School 
receive extensive instruction on the procedural and substantive 
aspects of military justice, including the rights of a military 
accused, we have no available material particularly devoted to 
discussion of civil rights protection of military personnel.
A subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee last 
year conducted extensive hearings on the question of the con­
stitutional rights of military personnel. You might find the 
record of the hearings and the report of the Subcommittee 
helpful. Both documents are for sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. 
The hearings volume costs $2.45 and is entitled, "Constitutional 
Rights of Military Personnel, Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Constitutional Rights of the Committee On The Judiciary,
United States Senate pursuant to S. Res. 260, Eighty-Seventh 
Congress, Second Session." The Committee Report is Senate 
Report No. 1455, 87th Congress, 2nd Session.
I hope you will find this information of value in your 
project.
Sincerely yours,
(s) Peter H. Cook




UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20442
July 26, 1965
Lt. Col. Thomas H. McGuigan 
161 E. N. Bear Creek Drive 
Merced, California 95340
Dear Colonel McGuigan:
Pursuant to your request of July 21st, there is enclosed a 
copy of the 1964 Annual Report of the Court and the Judge Advocates 
General, submitted to the Congress. As there is no charge for 
this copy, I am returning your check in the amount of $2.50.
An inquiry was made in Judge Ferguson's office regarding 
the speech he made before the Federal Bar Association in April.
Judge Ferguson spoke from notes and did not have a prepared 
speech. Therefore, of course, no copies are available.
Very truly yours,
(s) Frederick R. Hanlon
Frederick R. Hanlon 
Acting Clerk of the Court
E n d s .
1 - 1964 Annual Report.
2 - Check for $2.50.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20442
March 7, 1966
Mr, Thomas H. McGuigan 
161 E, N. Bear Creek Drive 
Merced, California 95340
Dear Mr. McGuigan:
In response to your request of February 28th, I regret that the 
Annual Report covering the period from January 1 to December 31, 1965 
is still in the hands of the printer and will not be available before 
next month. A copy will be sent to you upon release.
I also regret that Judge Ferguson's remarks at the Federal Bar 
Association meeting at Bolling Air Force Base on Nov. 10, 1964 were 
not made from a prepared text and, accordingly, a copy is not available.
You may be interested in knowing that the Senate Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Rights recently conducted additional hearings on the 
constitutional rights of military personnel. Further information may 
be obtained by addressing the subcommittee directly.
Enclosed is a copy of a pamphlet on the Court recently released.
Very truly yours,
(s) Alfred C. Proulx 
Alfred C. Proulx
Enel.
1 - Pamphlet on Court.
ACP:vb s
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UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS 
WASHINGTON, D. C0 20442
June 2, 1966
Mr. Thomas H. McGuigan 
161 E. N. Bear Creek Drive 
Merced, California 95340
Dear Mr. McGuigan:
This is in response to your letter of May 24th regarding the
availability of the 1965 Annual Report of the Court.
This report has just recently been received from the printer
and a copy thereof is enclosed for your use.
Very truly yours,
(s) Frederick R. Hanlon
Frederick R. Hanlon 
Acting Clerk of the Court
Enel.




Member, 2nd District, Florida
Committee: Armed Services
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
House of Representatives 
Washington, D. C. 
February 25, 1966
Mr. Thomas H. McGuigan 
161 E. N. Bear Creek Drive 
Merced, California
Dear Mr. McGuigan:
Thank you for your February 15 letter. Attached are 
copies of my bills H.R. 273 and H.R. 277, and a recent 
statement I made to the Senate subcommittee on constitutional 
rights which sets forth my feelings on this legislation. The 
Department of Defense is actively supporting my bills and 
I am hopeful that a hearing will be granted on them by the 
House Armed Services Committee sometime this spring. I hope 
this information will be helpful to you, and if I can be of 
any further assistance, please let me know.
With kindest regards, I am 
Sincerely,





BIOGRAPHICAL BRIEFS, USCMA JUDGES
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MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
ROBERT EMMETT QUINN, CHIEF JUDGE; born in Phenix, Rhode Island, 
April 2, 1894; son of Charles and Mary Ann (McCabe) Quinn; A.B., Brown 
University, 1915; LL.B., Harvard, 1918; married Mary Carter, August 3,
1923; children, Norma Marie, Robert Carter, Pauline Fulton, Cameron 
Peter, and Penelope Dorr; admitted to Rhode Island bar and practicing 
attorney at Providence, Rhode Island, since 1917; member, United States 
Diplomatic Intelligence Service in England and France, 1917-19; member, 
Rhode Island Senate, 1923-25 and 1929-33; Lieutenant Governor, State of 
Rhode Island, 1933-36; Governor, State of Rhode Island, 1937-39; judge, 
Rhode Island Superior Court commencing May 1, 1941; legal officer, First 
Naval District, 1942-45; captain, United States Naval Reserve Volunteer 
legal Unit of Rhode Island, 1947-50; president, Kent County Bar Associa- 
tion; member, American and Rhode Island Bar Associations; member, Phi 
Kappa; member, Brown, Harvard, Wannamoisett, Turks Head, West Warwick 
Country, and Army and Navy Clubs; nominated by President Truman to chief 
judge of the United States Court of Military Appeals May 22, 1951, for the 
term expiring May 1, 1966, confirmed by Senate, June 19, 1951, and took 
oath of office June 20, 1951, under commission of President Truman dated 
June 20, 1951; Democrat; Roman Catholic.
HOMER FERGUSON, JUDGE: born in Harrison City, Pennsylvania, son 
of Samuel and Margaret Ferguson; married Myrtle Jones, June 20, 1913, one 
daughter, married, Mrs. Charles R. Beltz. Attended University of Pitts­
burgh; LL.B. degree University of Michigan, 1931. Admitted to bar of 
Michigan, 1913; practiced law, Detroit, 1913-29. Circuit Judge of the 
Circuit Court of Wayne County, Michigan, 1929, elected 1930, and re-elected
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1935 and 1941; United States Senator from Michigan, 1943-55; Chairman, 
Republican policy committee, 83rd Congress; member, Foreign Relations 
Committee and Appropriation Committee, 83rd Congress. Honorary degrees 
conferred by Detroit College of Law, Kalamazoo College, Michigan State 
College, Muhlenberg College, Allentown, Pennsylvania; LL.D ., University 
of Michigan, 1951. Member of the second Hoover Commission; Ambassador 
from the United States to the Philippines, March 22, 1955, to April 8, 
1956, at which time resigned to accept Presidential appointment; 
nominated by President Eisenhower as judge of the United States Court of 
Military Appeals, January 30, 1956, for terms expiring May 1, 1956, and 
May 1, 1971, unanimously confirmed by Senate, February 17, 1956, and took 
oath of office April 9, 1956, administered by Chief Justice Warren.
Member of American and Michigan Bar Associations.
PAUL J. KILDAY, JUDGE; born in Sabinal, Uvalde County, Texas,
March 29, 1900, son of Pat and Mary (Tallant) Kilday; moved with his 
family to San Antonio, Texas, in 1904; attended the San Antonio public 
schools, St. Mary's Parochial School, and old St. Mary's College of San 
Antonio, Texas; graduated from Main Avenue High School and from George­
town University, Washington, D. C., in 1922, with LL.B. degree; LL.D. 
degree, St. Mary's University of San Antonio, Texas, 1963; admitted to 
bar of Texas in 1922; engaged in private practice at San Antonio from 
1922 to 1935; First Assistant Criminal District Attorney of Bexar County 
(San Antonio), 1935-38; member of bars of Texas, District of Columbia, 
and Supreme Court of United States; member, Texas State, San Antonio, 
and American Bar Associations; married Miss Cecile Newton, of San 
Antonio, 1932, and they have two daughters- Mary Catherine and Betty Ann 
(Mrs. Fred W. Drogula); elected in the 76th Congress in 1938 and reelected
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to the eleven succeeding Congresses, serving from January 3, 1939 to 
September 24, 1961; member, Committee on Military Affairs, House of 
Representatives, 1939-46, and Committee on Armed Services, 1946-61; 
for ten years, member joint Committee on Atomic Energy; awarded 
"Citation of Honor" by the Air Force Association "for tireless efforts 
in building national armed strength and active participation in success­
ful legislation to enhance the military service as a career" (1955) ; 
awarded "Army Times 1957 Accomplishment Award in recognition of his out­
standing leadership in military personnel legislation and his unceasing 
concern for the welfare of the men and women of the Armed Forces"; 
awarded honorary membership by the Fleet Reserve Association (1958); 
awarded "Honor Bell" by the Military Order of the Association of the 
United States in Recognition of Outstanding Contribution to the Associa­
tion's Programs" (1961); awarded Veterans of Foreign Wars Gold Medal of 
Merit "in recognition of his many outstanding historic contributions to 
national security" (1961); resigned from House of Representatives 
September 24, 1961, to accept Presidential appointment; nominated by 
President Kennedy as Judge of the United States Court of Military Appeals, 
June 28, 1961, for the term expiring May 1, 1976, unanimously confirmed 
by Senate, July 17, 1961, and took the oath of office September 25, 1961, 
under commission of President Kennedy dated September 25, 1961; Democrat.
APPENDIX C
PERTINENT STATEMENTS AND REPORTS
194
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10214
PRESCRIBING THE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the act of Congress 
entitled "An act to unify, consolidate, revise, and codify the Articles 
of War, the Articles for the Government of the Navy, and the disciplinary 
laws of the Coast Guard, and to enact and establish a Uniform Code of 
Military Justice," approved May 5, 1950 (64 Stat. 107), and as President 
of the United States, I hereby prescribe the following Manual for Courts- 
Martial to be designated as "Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 
1951."
This manual shall be in force and effect in the armed forces of 
the United States on and after May 31, 1951, with respect to all court- 
martial processes taken on and after May 31, 1951: Provided, That 
nothing contained in this manual shall be construed to invalidate any 
investigation, trial in which arraignment has been had, or other action 
begun prior to May 31, 1951; and any investigation, trial, or action 
so begun may be completed in accordance with the provisions of the 
applicable laws, Executive orders, and regulations pertaining to the 
various armed forces in the same manner and with the same effect as if 
this manual had not been prescribed: Provided further, That nothing 
contained in this manual shall be construed to make punishable any act 
done or omitted prior to the effective date of this manual which was 
not punishable when done or omitted: Provided further, That the maximum 
punishment for an offense committed prior to May 31, 1951, shall not 
exceed the applicable limit in effect at the time of the commission of 
such offense: And provided further, That, any act done or omitted prior
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to the effective date of this manual which constitutes an offense in 
violation of the Articles of War, the Articles for the Government of the 
Navy, or the disciplinary laws of the Coast Guard shall be charged as 
such and not as a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice; 
but, except as otherwise provided in the first proviso, the trial and 
review procedure shall be that prescribed in this manual.
(s) HARRY S. TRUMAN
THE WHITE HOUSE, February 8, 1951
196
TITLE 10--ARMED FORCES
CHAPTER 47.-- UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
Sec. 801. Art. 1. Definitions 
In this chapter:
(1) "Judge Advocate General" means, severally, the 
Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force and, except when the Coast Guard is operating as 
a service in the Navy, the General Counsel of the De­
partment of the Treasury.
(2) The Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard 
when it is operating as a service in the Navy, shall be 
considered as one armed force.
(3) "Commanding officer" includes only commissioned 
officers.
(4) "Officer in charge" means a member of the Navy, 
the Marine Corps, or the Coast Guard designated as such 
by appropriate authority.
(5) "Superior commissioned officer" means a commis­
sioned officer superior in rank or command.
(6) "Cadet" means a cadet of the United States Mili­
tary Academy, the United States Air Force Academy, or 
the United States Coast Guard Academy.
(7) "Midshipman" means a midshipman of the United 
States Naval Academy and any other midshipman on active 
duty in the naval service.
(8) "Military" refers to any or all of the armed 
forces.
(9) "Accuser" means a person who signs and swears to 
charges, any person who directs that charges nominally 
be signed and sworn to by another, and any other person 
who has an interest other than an official interest in 
the prosecution of the accused.
(10) "Law Officer" means an official of a general 
court-martial detailed in accordance with section 826 
of this title (article 26).
(11) "Law specialist" means a commissioned officer 
of the Navy or Coast Guard designated for special duty 
(law).
(12) "Legal officer" means any commissioned officer 
of the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard designated 
to perform legal duties for a command.
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A Statement by Brigadier General Alan B. Todd, U. S. Army, Assistant 
Judge Advocate General for Military Justice, to the Senate Subcommittee 
on Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel February 20, 1962.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
A person subject to military law does not divorce himself 
from his responsibilities under the civil law. On the contrary, 
the former is superimposed upon the latter with the result that 
a serviceman's misconduct frequently violates both the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice and the State or local laws wherein 
the offense occurred. The rule of law is well settled that 
trial by one system of laws does not impose a bar to subsequent 
trial for the same misconduct by a court deriving its authority 
from a separate sovereign. In this respect, the serviceman 
stands in no better and no worse position than do all the 
citizens of the United States, for in every State there is the 
possibility that an act in violation of State law, may also be 
a violation of a Federal law prohibiting the same activity. 
Nevertheless, the Department of the Army's pertinent policy 
provision, as set out in regulations, is that a member of the 
Army normally will not be prosecuted by a court-martial for 
misconduct which violates both the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice and the State or local laws if the individual has 
already been convicted by a civil court.
There are circumstances, however, under which it believed 
a military offender should be prosecuted by court-martial 
even though he has already been tried in a State court. Let 
us assume that a military policeman, who is on duty dressed 
in his identifying uniform, observes that a soldier is 
engaged in a fist fight with another individual on a public 
street in a civilian community, when the military policeman 
attempted to apprehend the soldier, the latter struck him 
with a beer bottle. Subsequently, the soldier was convicted 
of assault and battery in the local civilian court and was 
fined $20. The military commander of the soldier may have 
decided that the soldier, by assaulting a military policeman 
who was then in execution of his duties may have committed 
a serious military offense, and that the sentence of the 
civilian court was inadequate under the circumstances. The 
officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over 
the individual may, therefore, authorize disposition of the 
matter under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, notwith­
standing the previous trial. This would be based upon his 
personal determination that authorized administrative action 
alone is inadequate and that punitive action is essential to 
maintain discipline in his command.
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Extract from a statement by Major General Charles L. Decker, The Judge 
Advocate General of the Army, in his annual report, 1963, pursuant to 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
In the past, much time has been spent on discussions of 
improvement of substantive and procedural law. There has 
been substantial improvement--the greatest single improvement 
has been the enactment of article 15, which has provided for 
the correction of young soldiers by their commanders. No 
permanent stain left on the soldier's record. Long since, 
the officers of the Army have dropped the concept of the 
pseudo-exemplary sentence, the unfairly heavy punishment 
designed to scare potential offenders. With a few scattered 
exceptions, military men realize that, except for those who 
must be kept away from society indefinitely, punishment 
should be directed toward correction and rehabilitation.
Article 15 provides small corrective dosages for expeditious 
administration. Normally, the soldier is not removed from 
his fellows and his training, thereby eliminating problems 
of restoration to the community after confinement. This 
simple provision for expeditious correction draws us closer to 
basic and universal concepts of good justice, because it creates 
a neighborhood consciousness of good order and discipline. The 
principle of neighborhood responsibility and keeping the admin­
istration of justice close to the community is admirably demon­
strated in the use of this article. This underlying principle 
should be put to use in the civilian community.
In the last two decades, there has been a tendency to 
make the administration of justice mechanistic--to remove from 
the citizen an awareness of his own responsibility for law and 
order. This tendency can have a particularly unfortunate 
effect on the military community. Give to a young commander, 
commissioned or noncommissioned, the feeling that he can turn 
his disciplinary problems over to someone else and, on occasion, 
he will try to do so. Regarding himself basically as a budding 
strategist and logistician, he will turn over this "administra­
tive aspect" of the command function to "the lawyers." Ex­
perience has proved, time and again, that morale and discipline 
are responsibilities of the commander. There should always be 
some training in the judicial process for commanders at all 
levels, as well as some participation. Article 15 supplies 
some of the requisite responsibility. I am of the opinion 
that participation by the younger line officers in all parts 
of special court-martial work is salutary. Proper supervision 
by judge advocates can insure substantial compliance with law.
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REPORT TO HONORABLE WILBUR M. BRUCKER,
SECRETARY OF' THE ARMY - 18 Jan. 1960.
by
The Committee on the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice Good Order and Discipline in the Army.
Summary.
The committee was appointed by Major General R. V. Lee, by order 
of the Secretary of the Army, October 7, 1959. The purpose was to study 
and submit a confidential report on the Uniform Code and good order and 
discipline in the Army. The scope of the study included the date on 
courts-martial, discharges, pertinent USCMA decisions and analysis of 
the Court's function; disciplinary interest was primarily concerned with 
UCMJ.
Extracts,
During the period FY 52 - FY 59, 915, 369 persons were tried by 
courts-martial; highest rate FY 1953 113.3/1000, lowest rate FY 1959 
66.2/1000. Rate is persons tried per 1000 assigned strength; definite 
improvement in state of discipline.
Comments on the effects of USCMA. Developed (p. 27) case law 
contrary to, but paramount to Manual. Cited prohibition of use of 
Manual during trials, Cited effects of USCMA decisions on Article 31, 
self-incrimination, e.g. body fluids, "statement" extended to include 
handing over a pass on demand, "All these interpretations have had 
the effect of making it extremely difficult to investigage suspected 
offenses in the military. They have had an (p. 87), adverse effect on 
good order and discipline." Criticized rulings of USCMA on search and 
seizure. "It is not clear what the COMA considers to be a permissable 
search." The committee recommended change in the Code to give commanding
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officer broad power of search. (p. 89) Recommended USCMA be a five 
man court, with members who have had recent military-legal experience.
Extracts from letter to Hon. Paul J. Kilday, Chairman, Special 
Subcommittee on Amendments to UCMJ, committee on Armed Services, H.R. 
from Major General Stanley W. Jones Asst. Judge Advocate General.
800 Ct. 1959, (p. 181) . .
. . . Certain refinements have been introduced by judicial 
interpretation that tend to dilute its (the UCMJ) efficiency 
to support military operations.
At the outset it is fair to say that a number of decisions 
of the (U.S. COMA) have made it unduly difficult to collect 
evidence and prosecute military offenders. The stated 
objective of the Court is "to place military justice on the 
same plane as civilian justice." U.S. v. Clay 1 USCMA 
74, 1 CMR 74. In order to achieve this objective there has 
been a pronounced tendency, on the part of the Court, to 
import civilian rules.
(cites U.S, v. Brown, the search and seizure hereoin case) 
(cites Article 31 "statements" - "body fluids," etc.)
In recent years there has been a pronounced tendency in 
Court of Military Appeals decisions to downgrade the standing 
of the Manual for Courts-Martial which is a Presidential re­
gulation and, in effect, to declare that many provisions of 
the Manual are invalid exercises of the President's authority 
as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.
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STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. BENNETT 
TO THE JOINT HEARING OF THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 
AND THE SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
JANUARY 18, 1966
Mr. Chairman, it is a distinct pleasure for me to appear before 
this joint meeting of these two subcommittees, and I want to take this 
opportunity to personally congratulate the distinguished senior Senator 
from North Carolina for his leadership in the field of military justice.
It can safely be said that no one person has contributed more than you 
have to the protection of the American serviceman's individual rights.
As you may know, I have been a member of the House Armed Services 
Committee for over a decade and a half now, having been assigned to that 
committee from another about the time the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
was adopted. Various matters before the committee over the past 15 years 
have shown that the Code needs further work.
In November of 1964 the Department of Defense advised it had 
two draft bills to overcome certain problems in modern military justice, 
concerning which I had contacted them. Those two proposals I introduced 
and they presently bear the numbers of H.R. 273 and H.R. 277 and in many 
respects resemble five of the Senate bills now before this committee for 
consideration. They in no way diminish the objects sought by the Senate 
bills, but if anything strengthen them.
Essentially, my bill H.R. 273 provides for pre-trial proceedings, 
authorizes the Law Officer to conduct court-martial cases, and establishes 
post conviction proceedings. H.R. 277 will extend the period within 
which a new trial may be requested from the present one year to two years, 
and it authorizes the Judge Advocate General of each service to set 
aside those convictions where fraud, illegality, lack of jurisdiction,
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improper venue, or newly discovered evidence is found.
At this point X think I should make my position clear that I 
am not wedded to the language of my two proposals, because we have not 
had hearings on these bills in our committee yet, and perhaps your 
committee will report a bill better than these two I have proposed, in 
which case I would of course prefer to back your bill. A hearing was 
scheduled by the House Armed Services Committee on these two House bills 
for early in October of the last session, but when we learned you ex­
pected to conduct hearings' ours were postponed until you had a chance 
to meet and report something. By way of urging action, I certainly 
hope this committee will report a bill to the Senate, and get it passed 
early in this session, because I would like the House to have a Senate 
bill to consider when hearings are held later this year.
Without exploring the technicalities of my bills, since I know 
the Department of Defense will go into this in great detail later in 
these hearings, I would like to say that what I am trying to do with 
these two bills is to streamline the military court-martial proceeding 
so as to insure every serviceman the same rights as a person accused of 
committing a crime in a federal criminal proceeding.
I want to again thank the members of these two committees for 
your efforts to insure a standard of military justice that all Americans 
can be proud of, and I greatly hope you will report and pass a bill that 
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